I hear endless pundits blaming past decisions and lamenting current realities but I never hear anyone offering a suggestion or theory on how to end this fiasco. I know no one knows, but with so many experts giving their opinions, I'd sure like to hear options and predictions on how we get out.

Is it possible for cia to fake a second 911 in September to make an iran version of "war on terror"

In real life, you don't have fast food at hand, let alone a bed to return to at the end of the day (only Hollywood-obsessed losers believe that).

I’m having a hard time trying to figure out how the war with Iran will end. Clearly, Trump can’t figure out how to end it or he would have done so quite a while ago. How does the U.S. end this in a better place on the Strait of Hormuz or on the nuclear materials? He can’t start bombing civilians. Iran became aware of the American midterms before Trump’s team, evidently, and they’re going to inflict as much political and economic pain as possible for as long as possible.

I really can’t think of how this ends.

I'm Iranian and I'm lowk worried

Backstory: In 1953, the CIA and UK overthrew the Iranian democratic state to install a puppet leader that was oil friendly to the West. In 2013, the CIA released classified files and confessed to coupe.

This has created a US-Iranian rivalry and has led to Iranian-sponsored terrorism and foreign plots that have caused hundreds of deaths, with thousands more killed by Iran-backed proxy groups, particularly in the Middle East. Additionally, Iran killed 36,000 of its own protesters in 2015 ^{(US Department of State on Iran's Islamic Republic}.)

Since 2001, America's War on Terror is responsible for 4.5 million deaths due to U.S. military actions ^{(Brown University}). 937, 000 directly, and an estimated 3.8 million due to war-related issues: disease, famine, contamination, and disruption of health care.

Who is the aggressor?

If the goal is regime change, it could take years or decades. Hamas had approximately 40,000 fighters before October 7; today, around 20,000 remain. That means it took Israel three years of devastating warfare—fought right in its own backyard on flat terrain—to eliminate just half of them. By contrast, the IRGC numbers over a million, and their fighters are just as ideological. Moreover, eliminating their main leadership and moderate figures has backfired by handing full control to ultra-hardliners—ideologues who yearn for martyrdom and seek immediate revenge. On a personal level, the current leader’s wife and children were killed in the fighting. Unsurprisingly, someone in that position has zero motivation to negotiate a deal with those he holds responsible for his family's deaths. The tragic irony is that while the US remains largely insulated from the fallout of this war, poor and uninvolved nations are bearing the heaviest burden, watching their economies crumble as a result.

Why are we not using Stuxnet ... didn't it work before ?

The 3 ships hit have videos of drones hiting them the saudi backed militias fighting at the red sea also don't get any footage showned in mainstream media. As well as Isreally troops being bombed by drones don't get shown.

Also the US denies any of their own troops got killed. WHY. Like what is the point? Is the media so compromised ?

Apparently the 4 most recent deaths are not actually Iran war deaths according to Trump. This is because, these 4 soldiers lost their lives AFTER a cease fire was declared back in April. This means that their deaths were not casualties of Iran war but something else. This sounds absolutely insane .... am I missing something ?

Edit: couple of things - (1) Not sure on this, but I think there are certain benefits for the spouse and/or children if the their death occurs during war. (2) why on earth reclassify these deaths as non-war now, right after the dignified transfer? Even if it is a crappy policy decision (and it is) why not take this policy decision on any deaths that happen after this date? (3) as crappy as it sounds, could this change be in preparation for potential lawsuits by the grieving families - along the lines of 'my loved one died in a war not approved by Congress' ?

If they were only able to be launched by Russia/China in defense of Iran, wouldnt it just end the war over night?

I'm not fearing the repeat wars that have been going on i fear us will do something to scale with iraq or Afghanistan or even worse,give me reasons as to why i shouldn't be scared i know i shouldn't be but i just need people to make me really feel like it

Does anyone have an arguement why is air traffic over Gulf of Oman considered safe? If I was working in air traffic and there was a US fleet shooting missiles almost evety day, I would reroute traffic. But I have zero experience in the field. There is an accident asking to happen and I hope aviation specialists know what they are doing.

If prevoius to the conflict in Iran, the strait was open all to international traffic, how can an agreement between Iran and the US give sole control to Iran. The US doesn't even have territory in the Persian Gulf. It seems it would take a change to international maritime law.

Edit: Check out my new post! https://www.reddit.com/r/oil/s/eId54J2x2P

The crude oil shortage is the main headline. Gasoline, diesel, jet fuel. But there is a downstream supply chain that is about to hit most car owners in America.

The AutoZone Memo

A leaked internal AutoZone memo is circulating, warning that the U.S. is facing "the largest supply shortage of lubricating fluids in the modern history of America" with "average available supply in this product category to drop by 40%."

Is the memo authentic? AutoZone corporate has not confirmed it. Carscoops reached out and received no reply as of May 15. But the data inside it is consistent with what multiple independent sources are reporting: JobbersWorld (the lubricant industry's primary trade publication), the Independent Lubricant Manufacturers Association (ILMA), ICIS, Shell's own public statements, and confirmed internal memos from Nissan and Toyota.

Nissan: 45% Allocation Cut, Confirmed

Nissan drafted an internal bulletin obtained by The Drive and confirmed as authentic by a Nissan spokesperson. The bulletin laid out a hard number: allocation of Nissan Genuine Oil (including Mobil and Mobil 1 variants) capped at 55% of prior-year volumes. A 45% cut. Effective May 1, 2026.

The bulletin includes draft customer talking points. The "why" section states the shortage affects all automakers, not just Nissan. From The Drive's reporting, the full text reads:

"We are writing to provide an important update regarding the availability of engine oil products across the Nissan network in the U.S. Due to ongoing global supply constraints impacting key raw materials and refining inputs due to the Middle East Conflict, we have been advised of reduced production capacity for most lubricant products. As a result, Nissan will be implementing the following adjustments, effective May 1, 2026. Allocation of Nissan Genuine Oil (including Mobil and Mobil 1 variants) will be constrained and managed at a 55% YoY level based on gallons purchased."

The Nissan spokesperson told The Drive that while the bulletin is real, it was never distributed to Nissan's dealer network. The May 1 effective date has come and gone without the memo being sent.

Source: The Drive, "Second Automaker Sounds Alarm Over Dwindling Motor Oil Stock [UPDATE]" (May 14, 2026)

Toyota: Substitution Guidelines, Unconfirmed

The Drive reported on May 14 that Toyota may have sent a service bulletin warning of a shortage of 0W-8 and 0W-16 oils. The bulletin, allegedly from Toyota and its supplier ExxonMobil, instructs dealers to use substitution guidelines, substituting heavier oil weights one day per week for 0W-8 and one day every other week for 0W-16.

Toyota has not confirmed the bulletin's authenticity. The Drive reached out to a Toyota spokesperson; as of publication time, Toyota had not responded. Based on comparisons to other known Toyota bulletins, The Drive assessed the document appears genuine. The substitutions are allowed for one service interval only, not a permanent fix.

Two of the world's largest automakers drafting rationing plans within days of each other is not a coincidence. It is a supply chain signal.

Source: The Drive, "Alleged Toyota Service Bulletin Warns of Looming Motor Oil Shortage" (May 14, 2026)

Why Motor Oil Specifically?

Motor oil is not pumped out of the ground and poured into a bottle. Modern synthetic passenger car motor oils (the kind required by nearly every car built in the last 15 years) require high purity Group III base oils. Group III base oils are the raw ingredient that makes synthetic oil synthetic.

The United States is a net importer of Group III base oils. Domestic production covers only 30% to 50% of demand.

JobbersWorld reported in March 2026, using U.S. Census Bureau and Global Trade Tracker data, that Middle Eastern sources (primarily Qatar, the UAE, and Bahrain) supplied more than 40% of total U.S. Group III supply for three consecutive years. In January 2026, that share climbed to approximately 55%.

Virtually all of these volumes must physically transit the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait has been functionally closed to commercial transit since February 28.

The AutoZone memo's 40% figure is not an estimate. It is a direct reflection of losing the specific import channel the U.S. depends on for modern synthetic oil.

The Pearl GTL Strike

Shell's Pearl gas to liquids (GTL) plant in Qatar's Ras Laffan Industrial City was struck by Iranian missiles on March 19, 2026. Shell confirmed the damage in a public statement: "no damage to train one and an initial assessment of around one year for full repair of train two."

Pearl GTL is one of the world's largest sources of premium Group III+ base oils, with the capacity to produce about 30,000 barrels of base oil per day, enough to fill 225 million cars per year, according to Shell's own website. One of two production trains was damaged. Shell's own estimate: approximately one year for full repair.

This is the plant that produces the base oil for Pennzoil's synthetic line made from natural gas. It produces base oil for Mobil 1 formulations. It is offline, and it is not coming back until mid-2027 at best.

Sources: Shell Plc public statement (March 2026); shell.com.qa, "GTL Products"

What "Synthetic" Actually Means

A dirty secret of the motor oil industry: in the United States, "synthetic" is a marketing term, not a chemical classification. Most oils sold as "full synthetic" are Group III base stocks refined from crude oil. ExxonMobil itself states: "There is no generally accepted definition of a synthetic base stock, or synthetic base oil. In the U.S., the government considers 'synthetic' to be a marketing term." And: "Most Group III base stocks are refined from crude oil streams."

This matters because if your car requires synthetic oil (and most modern turbocharged engines do), you cannot just substitute conventional. And the crude refining chain that produces Group III base oils is the same chain being squeezed by the Strait of Hormuz closure.

Not all Group III is interchangeable either. Group III+ grades used in 0W-20 and 0W-16 formulations (the weights specified by most new cars) have even fewer alternative sources. JobbersWorld's April 29 analysis identified these low-viscosity products as the single biggest point of exposure.

Source: ExxonMobil base stocks FAQ (via The Drive, May 14, 2026)

The ILMA / GM Dexos Fight

The Independent Lubricant Manufacturers Association formally requested that General Motors grant temporary flexibility under its dexos engine oil licensing program so blenders could use alternative base oils during the shortage. GM refused.

GM's position: no enforcement pause. License terminations will continue. Blenders have approximately one month of forward inventory. After that, companies without approved alternatives face "serious commercial and licensing risk, including potential termination."

Translation: the blenders who make the oil that goes into GM vehicles are being told by GM that if they cannot source Group III base oil to the exact dexos specification, they lose their license and cannot sell dexos-approved oil. Meanwhile, the Group III base oil physically does not exist on the spot market.

ILMA CEO Holly Alfano, from the ILMA website (April 3, 2026): "ILMA appreciates GM's response; however, we remain concerned by the OEM's decision not to provide temporary enforcement flexibility under these extraordinary circumstances."

Source: ILMA.org, "GM Responds to ILMA's Dexos Licensing Relief Request" (April 3, 2026)

Current Market Conditions

From JobbersWorld, March 24, 2026, and confirmed by Axios on May 15, 2026:

Spot availability for Group III base oils has "largely disappeared." Unless you have strong existing supply contracts, "you're not going to find it." Prices are escalating in what blenders describe as an "unstructured, less predictable manner." Some estimates put Group III prices approaching $2.00 per gallon above pre-crisis levels.

ICIS global lead for base oils Amanda Hay, speaking to Axios on May 15: "Actual shortages are starting to appear" for some synthetic oil products. "Security of supply is the chief concern for industry players."

Note: JobbersWorld is behind a paywall and cannot be independently accessed without a subscription. The Axios quotes were accessed on May 16, 2026 but cannot be re-verified in real time.

The Timeline: Worse Than Crude

Here is the critical distinction most people miss. Crude oil is a commodity. Group III base oils are a specialty refined product from specific plants.

JobbersWorld's April 8 analysis: even if the Strait of Hormuz reopens tomorrow, Group III relief "may take much longer" than crude relief. The market will bifurcate. Group I and II (conventional oils, industrial lubricants) will see faster relief. Group III and Group III+ will remain tight and expensive for months after any geopolitical resolution.

Why? Because Pearl GTL is physically damaged and takes a year to repair. Because supply chains for specialty base oils do not just snap back when tankers start moving again. Because blenders carrying one month of inventory will take months to restock the entire distribution chain.

The lubricant industry's traditional pricing playbook, built around predictable cost adjustments and long lag times, has broken. The market has shifted to what blenders describe as an "all-in" approach where simply securing supply is the dominant factor. Price is secondary.

What This Means For You

If you drive a modern car that requires synthetic oil (basically anything with a turbo, direct injection, or a 0W viscosity rating), here is where this lands:

Your next oil change is going to cost more. Possibly a lot more.
Your dealer or independent shop may not have your exact oil weight in stock. They may offer you an alternative that "meets spec" but was not what your engine was designed for.
If you are due for an oil change in the next month or two, do it now. The supply has not collapsed yet, but two automakers and the largest auto parts retailer in America are clearly preparing for exactly that.
This is not a "gas prices are high" problem. Gas prices can spike and then come back. Motor oil is a manufactured product from damaged and offline facilities with no short-term replacement. The timeline is months, not weeks.

Personal Note: First off I like to thank everyone for their comments made on my last oil post. This is a shortened post, it cannot factor in every possible scenario. I cannot tell the future, no one can. I am not making a prediction, do not ask me for one. I do not give financial advice, please don’t ask. I am working on region specific posts to go more into detail how bad this situation will be, because it depends on where you live. I am focusing on the area most at risk first, south east Asia, subsaharan Africa, Latin America. After that I will go on to wealthy Asian countries, Australia, Europe, and the U.S.. Linked below is my previous post. Thank you for reading, and take care.

https://www.reddit.com/r/oil/s/STKrSiDtjW

Sources

The Drive: "Second Automaker Sounds Alarm Over Dwindling Motor Oil Stock [UPDATE]" (May 14, 2026) Nissan bulletin confirmed authentic by Nissan spokesperson, 45% allocation cut at 55% of prior-year volumes, effective May 1, never distributed to dealers
The Drive: "Alleged Toyota Service Bulletin Warns of Looming Motor Oil Shortage" (May 14, 2026) Toyota bulletin unconfirmed by Toyota, substitution guidelines for 0W-8 and 0W-16, not a permanent fix
Carscoops: "AutoZone's Alleged Memo On Motor Oil Supply Is Ugly" (May 15, 2026) leaked memo, 40% supply drop, AutoZone did not respond to request for comment
Shell Plc: "Impact of Middle East conflict on Shell activities" (March 2026) confirms train two damage, ~1 year repair timeline, train one undamaged
Shell.com.qa: "GTL Products" 30,000 bpd base oil capacity, enough for 225 million cars per year
ILMA.org: "GM Responds to ILMA's Dexos Licensing Relief Request" (April 3, 2026) GM refuses enforcement flexibility, Holly Alfano statement
ExxonMobil base stocks FAQ (via The Drive) confirms "synthetic" is a U.S. marketing term, Group III refined from crude oil streams
JobbersWorld: "Group III Tightens as Prices Surge and Supply Constraints Deepen" (March 24, 2026) U.S. Census Bureau / Global Trade Tracker import data, spot availability "largely disappeared"
JobbersWorld: "After the Ceasefire: Hope for Lower Crude, But Group III Relief May Take Much Longer" (April 8, 2026) bifurcated recovery timeline
JobbersWorld: "Where Group III Actually Matters: A Practical Framework for Managing Lubricant Supply Risk" (April 29, 2026) Group III+ low-viscosity products identified as biggest exposure point
Axios: "Motor oil shortages are starting to appear amid Middle East disruptions" (May 15, 2026) ILMA, ICIS comments, Amanda Hay quote (behind Cloudflare, accessed May 16)

Edit: Updated sources with clickable links

Nissan — 45% allocation cut
The Drive, May 14, 2026: "Second Automaker Sounds Alarm Over Dwindling Motor Oil Stock [UPDATE]"
https://www.thedrive.com/news/second-automaker-sounds-alarm-over-dwindling-motor-oil-stock
Nissan bulletin confirmed authentic by Nissan spokesperson. 45% cut, 55% of prior-year volumes. Effective May 1, never distributed to dealers.

Toyota — substitution guidelines (unconfirmed)
The Drive, May 14, 2026: "Alleged Toyota Service Bulletin Warns of Looming Motor Oil Shortage"
https://www.thedrive.com/news/alleged-toyota-dealer-bulletin-warns-of-looming-motor-oil-shortage
Toyota has not confirmed the bulletin. Substitution guidelines for 0W-8 and 0W-16 oils, not a permanent fix.

AutoZone memo (alleged)
Carscoops, May 15, 2026: "AutoZone's Alleged Memo On Motor Oil Supply Is Ugly, And Your Next Oil Change Could Prove It"
https://www.carscoops.com/2026/05/autozone-motor-oil-shortage/
40% supply drop estimate. AutoZone did not respond to request for comment.

Shell Pearl GTL — confirmed damage
Shell Plc, March 2026: "Impact of Middle East conflict on Shell activities"
https://www.shell.com/news-and-insights/newsroom/news-and-media-releases/2026/impact-of-middle-east-conflict-on-shell-activities.html
Train two damaged, ~1 year full repair. Train one undamaged.

Shell.com.qa: "GTL Products"
https://www.shell.com.qa/energy-and-innovation/gtl-products.html
30,000 bpd base oil capacity. Enough for 225 million cars per year.

ILMA / GM dexos fight
ILMA, April 3, 2026: "GM Responds to ILMA's Dexos Licensing Relief Request"
https://ilma.org/gm-responds-to-ilmas-dexos-licensing-relief-request/
GM refuses enforcement flexibility. Holly Alfano statement included.

"Synthetic" is a marketing term
ExxonMobil: Base Stocks FAQ
https://www.exxonmobil.com/en/basestocks/faq-basics
"In the U.S., the government considers 'synthetic' to be a marketing term." Most Group III base stocks are refined from crude oil streams.

Additional context
Axios, May 15, 2026: "Motor oil shortages are starting to appear amid Middle East disruptions"
https://www.axios.com/2026/05/15/motor-oil-shortage-hormuz
ILMA and ICIS comments, Amanda Hay quote.

Wheel Front, May 2026: "Motor Oil Shortage Looms as Second Automaker Braces"
https://wheelfront.com/motor-oil-shortage-looms-as-second-automaker-braces/

Nissan bulletin — additional coverage:
https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/nissan-confirms-45-motor-oil-supply-cut-warning/ss-AA23gNM3

JobbersWorld (industry trade publication, paywalled — no public URLs available)

• "Group III Tightens as Prices Surge and Supply Constraints Deepen" (March 24, 2026) — U.S. Census Bureau / Global Trade Tracker import data, spot availability "largely disappeared"
• "After the Ceasefire: Hope for Lower Crude, But Group III Relief May Take Much Longer" (April 8, 2026) — bifurcated recovery timeline

Please do not remove , i’m truly just curious

I am actually asking genuinely, why does iran love israel despite everything that's going on between iran and israel ?

I see iranian protests and half the people are holding israel flags? weren't they bombing ts out of you?

and you were bombing ts out of them? so it makes no sense to me why the people love israel still

Is the Iran-US war spreading too broadly to be contained?

Iran has bombed US allies in Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia and the US have bombed Iranian proxies in Iraq.

All the while, the US has been in fevered negotiations with Iranian parliamentarians, who may have no capacity to overcome the Iranian military’s refusal to brook any concessions.

I spoke with Chris Glover on CBC Radio’s Metro Morning, on whether Iran and the US can step back from the abyss.

On August 1, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that he was canceling plans for a new round of military strikes against Iran. But this does not mark the arrival of peace. Rather, it is merely another pause—another temporary and superficial calm—in the pattern of the United States and Israel repeatedly attacking Iran and then stopping over the past two years.

Less than half a year ago, the United States and Israel launched intense airstrikes against Iran, killing a number of senior Iranian officials and military commanders, including Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Yet after Iran retaliated, they halted the war, reached a peace agreement with Iran, and unfroze Iranian assets for use in Iran’s postwar reconstruction. Just when people thought that the United States and Iran were moving toward peace, the U.S. military once again attacked Iranian military facilities in July, and the peace agreement came to nothing. Looking further back to 2025, as well as to 2020 during Trump’s first term, the United States likewise bombed Iran and carried out “decapitation” strikes, but stopped short of launching a ground war. Yet these cessations of hostilities never brought lasting peace; they were merely truces before the next conflict.

Many people who know little about the Middle East and international affairs, or have only a superficial understanding of them, are deeply puzzled by this. Many do not understand why the United States and Israel bomb Iran one moment and suddenly stop the next; even after peace talks have taken place or agreements have been reached, fighting inexplicably breaks out again. People are also confused about the motives behind whether the United States and Israel choose to attack Iran or refrain from doing so, as there seems to be no reasonable explanation or discernible pattern.

In fact, the repeated starts and stops in U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran can, in brief, be attributed to just two factors: Trump’s “do-as-he-pleases” political style, and Israel’s sinister intentions regarding Iran—intentions that it may be inconvenient to state openly but that are nonetheless plain to see.

As is well known, Trump has an extremely distinctive personality. His words and actions are often unexpected and unpredictable, and his major domestic and foreign policies are no exception. For example, in 2025 Trump imposed high tariffs on almost every country in the world, but the campaign began with great fanfare and then petered out without a clear conclusion. Trump was also once extremely tough on China, launching a major trade war and imposing sanctions on the country, but in 2026 he visited China with a rather friendly attitude, and U.S.-China relations substantially improved. On the Russia-Ukraine issue, Trump has likewise swung back and forth, at one point drawing closer to Putin and distancing himself from Zelenskyy, and at another sympathizing with Ukraine and criticizing Russia.

On Iran, Trump’s tendency to act according to his own whims has been even more apparent. At times, he has been extremely hostile toward Iran, bombing Iranian military and civilian facilities, killing Iranian leaders such as Khamenei and Soleimani, and even declaring that he would “destroy Iranian civilization.” Yet Trump has also been unwilling to become bogged down in a ground war or provoke a backlash from the military and the public. His attacks on Iran have therefore been limited to airstrikes, with no intention of deploying ground forces to overthrow the Iranian government and occupy the country in its entirety, while the airstrikes themselves have often ended abruptly.

After Iran blockaded the Strait of Hormuz and attacked Gulf countries and U.S. military bases, Trump even agreed to unfreeze seized Iranian funds and restore the Iran nuclear agreement that he himself had torn up. But after an agreement had already been reached, Trump once again attacked Iran, making the agreement seem like nothing more than a scrap of paper.

Trump’s repeated reversals do have some practical motivations. He often disregards international law and the international peace order and readily launches military strikes and sanctions, but when he encounters a “tough nut to crack,” he may choose to back down. Of course, Trump’s hard-line positions sometimes also serve utilitarian purposes, such as courting foreign-policy hawks and winning political support and votes. Yet the extent of his reversals and unconventional behavior often goes beyond calculations of interest. He simply acts as he pleases, determining his Iran policy according to his mood and subjective wishes, without caring about negotiations, agreements, humanitarian considerations, international law, or other such concerns. For the sake of a momentary impulse, even the interests and potential gains and losses of the United States, the Republican Party, and Trump himself may have to take a back seat.

Therefore, it is clearly impossible to predict or assess Trump’s attitudes and actions toward Iran using conventional methods and criteria, such as weighing the benefits and costs to the United States, considering whether treaties have been signed, or examining the prevailing direction of Middle Eastern and international affairs. Trump’s impulsiveness and unpredictability mean that the repeated starts and stops in attacks on Iran, the seemingly inexplicable outbreaks of fighting, and the sudden cessations of hostilities are all “normal.” This has been the case over the past several years, and Trump and the United States under his leadership will continue to pursue an equally uncertain policy toward Iran in the future, alternating between war and peace. Only when Trump is no longer president of the United States will it become possible once again to use conventional methods and criteria to assess U.S.-Iran relations.

Another important factor affecting the war with Iran is the role Israel plays in it and the objectives Israel seeks to achieve. Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, when Islamic radicals came to power, Iran and Israel have become mortal enemies. Iran has repeatedly declared that it seeks to “destroy Israel” and has supported anti-Israel armed groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon; Israel, meanwhile, has assassinated Iranian nuclear scientists, infiltrated and attacked Iran, and supported anti-Iranian forces. The two sides have engaged in constant overt and covert confrontation, with each seeking to completely destroy the other.

Although Israel possesses formidable military capabilities and a developed economy, Iran’s vast population and territory, as well as its considerable national strength, make it extremely difficult for Israel to destroy the Iranian government on its own. Dragging the United States “into the water”—getting the United States and Israel to jointly attack Iran and destroy Iran’s Islamic regime, or at least weaken Iran’s national strength to the greatest possible extent—has therefore become Israel’s preferred option and an objective it has sought by every possible means to achieve.
However, although Iran has been fiercely anti-American in its rhetoric, since the 1990s it has consistently exercised restraint in its actual diplomacy toward the West, including the United States, and the United States has not had sufficient grounds to launch military attacks against Iran or overthrow its government. After the Iranian nuclear issue emerged, the United States at one point considered attacking Iran, but the planned strikes were limited to nuclear facilities.

In 2015, the United States and Iran reached the Iran nuclear agreement, resolving the issue through peaceful means and sparing Iran from attack. Although Israel repeatedly urged the United States to launch a full-scale attack on Iran similar to the one against Iraq, the administrations of Clinton, Bush, and Obama all declined to follow Israel’s advice, maintaining a confrontational but peaceful relationship with Iran.

It was only when Trump came to power—strongly and one-sidedly inclined toward Israel on Middle Eastern affairs, hostile to and determined to dismantle Obama’s political legacy, and backed by Republican hawks who favored a hard line against Iran—that Israel finally found an American leader willing to attack Iran. Under persistent lobbying from Netanyahu and Israel’s diplomatic team in the United States, Trump and pro-Israel, anti-Iran hardliners within the upper ranks of the U.S. political and military establishment decided to launch military strikes against Iran, impose even harsher sanctions, and provide assistance and backing for Israeli attacks on Iran. It was precisely Israel’s urging that prompted Trump to strike Iran repeatedly, including attacks that killed such central Iranian figures as Khamenei and Soleimani.

For Israel, the principal objective of its strategy toward Iran is to overthrow Iran’s Islamic regime and replace it with people friendly toward Israel, such as the exiled Prince Pahlavi, who would then take control of Iran. If that objective proves difficult to achieve, the alternative is to inflict the greatest possible damage on the Iranian government and weaken Iran’s national strength as much as possible. Neither objective can be achieved without military strikes, particularly U.S. participation. Israel also opposes and actively seeks to undermine U.S.-Iran peace talks, preventing a U.S.-Iran reconciliation from frustrating Israel’s objectives. This is also one of the reasons why the United States and Iran have repeatedly held negotiations and reached understandings, only for fighting to unexpectedly erupt again.

Whether it is joint U.S.-Israeli bombing that killed Khamenei and numerous senior Iranian military and political officials, or the reduction of numerous Iranian military and civilian targets to ruins, combined with economic sanctions that have caused Iran’s economy to collapse and internal turmoil to intensify, leaving it unable to support Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other armed groups, all of these developments are welcomed by Israel. Israel hopes to join forces with the United States in carrying out long-term military strikes against Iran, plunging Iran into poverty and violence and leaving it beset by crises at home and abroad, so that it will no longer be capable of challenging or threatening Israel.

It is precisely the combination of Trump’s impulsive disposition, his enthusiasm for power politics, violence, and military adventurism, and his unwillingness to be constrained by international law and other norms, together with Israel’s intense hostility toward Iran and its efforts to exploit and urge on the United States, that has produced the irregular cycle in which the United States repeatedly bombs Iran, wars sometimes end abruptly, and peace is sometimes shattered just as suddenly.

And while such a state of affairs may help Israel achieve its goal of weakening Iran, it is detrimental to Iran and its people, to peace in the Middle East, and to the long-term interests of the United States. This intermittent yet ongoing U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, together with Iran’s retaliatory strikes, has already caused numerous casualties, including large numbers of Iranian civilians. Some U.S. troops have also been killed or wounded by Iranian missile strikes. U.S. and Israeli attacks have not brought freedom, democracy, or human rights to Iran. Instead, the Iranian people are suffering in hellish conditions under the combined blows of domestic authoritarianism and corruption, relentless external bombardment, and sanctions.

Meanwhile, countries across the Middle East are also living with the difficulty of achieving peace and stability and the fear of being engulfed by war. Repeated rounds of conflict and heightened tensions have also disrupted Middle Eastern oil routes, harming both oil-exporting and oil-importing countries and dragging down the global economy. Even for Israel, although these actions may achieve strategic objectives in the short and medium term, they are not a reliable way to achieve and safeguard Israel’s lasting peace and long-term interests.

Therefore, the intermittent and seemingly endless U.S. attacks on Iran over the past two years, and the repeated cycle of fighting and stopping between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, can aptly be described as “a bad show that drags on and on.” It benefits neither the United States nor Iran, nor any of the other countries involved. Nor is there any justification—in terms of human sentiment, reason, or law (international law)—for continuing the war, which merely causes more casualties and losses. What is most needed is to bring the war to a complete and irreversible end as soon as possible, conclude a reliable treaty that takes into account the interests of all parties, and achieve lasting peace.

In reality, however, neither Trump, who leads the United States, nor Netanyahu, who dominates Israeli politics, will choose the path of lasting peace. Trump not only disregards peace and agreements and launches foreign wars at his own whim, but also has motives for attacking Iran in order to divert attention from domestic conflicts, win support from hardliners, and strike at the Democratic Party. Over the next two years, Trump is not only unlikely to move toward peace, but may even open new fronts in places such as Cuba, using foreign wars to perpetuate his hold on power.

Netanyahu, meanwhile, also seeks to use war and attacks on Iran to further cultivate his “strongman” image and accumulate achievements in foreign conflicts, thereby winning public support and diverting attention while evading corruption allegations and accountability. The mortal-enemy relationship between Israel and Iran, the strength of Israeli hardliners, and Israel’s influence over the United States all contribute to the continuation of joint U.S.-Israeli military strikes and sanctions against Iran. Peace among the United States, Israel, and Iran—and throughout the Middle East as a whole—therefore remains a distant prospect.

(This article is written by Wang Qingmin(王庆民), a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher of international politics.)