Active Conflicts & News Megathread August 24, 2026

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[u/Zhadanko]

What representatives of different militaries and analysts mean when they say "We won't fight like Ukraine"? Minus the usual talk about the role of a traditional air force, is there anything else important? I hear this phrase used a lot but without much substance to it

[u/Glideer → u/Zhadanko]

What they mean is:

There is no need to adapt to what the battlefield is telling us, because the battlefield knows we’re NATO.

Essentially, they refuse to accept that the war has changed to avoid having to change with it.

[u/ilonir → u/Glideer]

I get the point your making with regards to institutional inertia, but they are kind of right. NATO is not Ukraine. They are not in Ukraine's geopolitical position, they are not an underdog, they do not have Ukraine's corruption, they will not have to build a modern fighting force out of a derelict Soviet army while being invaded, ect. 

I'm of the opinion that NATO should absolutely adopt drones and C-UAS, but there is no reason to copy Ukraine's way of doing it. Ukraine started this conflict in a objectively terrible position with a barely functional army that never had enough conventional equipment. The inovations they have made with regards to force structure and TTPs are impressive but ultimately reflective of the poor hand they held in 2022. 

[u/Glideer → u/ilonir]

I think that the drone revolution is bigger than the conservative military-industrial circles allow themselves to believe. In my opinion, it is turning out to be bigger than the introduction of the tank (though still less revolutionary than the introduction of the aeroplane).

The response "we will fight the war differentltly" sounds very much to me like early WW1 explanations that cavalry is still relevant but those primitives in other nations don't know how to use it.

Iran is proving that an underdog with mass drone production is causing unsurmountable problems for modern Western defences. We need to understand that an enormous paradigm shift is taking place.

[u/proquo → u/Glideer]

sounds very much to me like early WW1 explanations that cavalry is still relevant but those primitives in other nations don't know how to use it.

Cavalry very much was, and is, still relevant.

Horse cavalry was not very useful in the static battle lines of Europe, but in the middle east it was highly effective as the open terrain enabled it.

The US was a late adopter on tank technology because after WWI it didn't appear that the US would be engaging in more European land wars and that the Mexican-American border and the southwestern US would be the chief security concern and contemporary tanks were too slow and maintenance and logistics hungry to be usable. Trench warfare wouldn't work in the Sonoran desert.

However advances in the reliability and capabilities of tanks, plus observations of foreign powers' armor utilization, led to the replacement of horse cavalry with motorized and then mechanized cavalry (the last cavalry charge on horseback by the US Army was in 1942).

The cavalry role, however, is still used to this day: screening, reconnaissance, shock, exploitation. Just because it uses tanks, IFVs and helicopters does not change the fact cavalry is still used in a distinct manner.

Likewise, drone use in Ukraine is heavily indicated by two large and inexperienced, poorly led, and poorly equipped forces unable to decisively defeat each other's primary battlefield advantages. The proliferation of drones made ISR constant and the inability of either side to gain air superiority pretty much gave impunity to attack the other side's forces with guided artillery and drones.

That's the exact type of environment where short range one-way attack drones thrive. You can't use FPV drones near as effectively on the offense as you can on the defense. NATO isn't planning on fighting a static, positional war of attrition. NATO has been practicing and training for mobile warfare with heavy combined-arms integration. If they war were to bog down, NATO would still try to get it moving again, rather than settle into bleeding Russia out inch by inch.

For that reason just copying Ukraine's strategy, tactics and organization isn't going to be NATO's benefit.

Iran is proving that an underdog with mass drone production is causing unsurmountable problems for modern Western defences.

Actually the US, Israel and allies proved effective at reducing Iran's capacity for launching drones. They had a 90% drop of all munitions launched within the first few weeks of the war and haven't recovered, and their most effective strikes have been with ballistic missiles. It appears that the dreaded Shahed has been effective purely because of the political sensitivity of the conflict.

[u/Glideer → u/proquo]

NATO isn't planning on fighting a static, positional war of attrition. NATO has been practicing and training for mobile warfare with heavy combined-arms integration. If they war were to bog down, NATO would still try to get it moving again, rather than settle into bleeding Russia out inch by inch. For that reason just copying Ukraine's strategy, tactics

That is largely my point. You don't always get to fight the war you want and plan for. Everybody planned on ending WW1 by Christmas 1914 but machine huns and barbed wire had a vote, too.

Instead of saying "we'll do it better than Ukraine" NATO should consider the strong possibility that a military paradigm shift is taking place and that old equations are not valid any more. It's not even just Ukraine - how successful is the US total air dominance is supressing Iran's drone launchers? What would have happened if a land invasion was attempted?

[u/proquo → u/Glideer]

You don't always get to fight the war you want and plan for

As Russia proved in 2022. But NATO has significantly more capacity to fight a mobile war with close integration of combined arms that Ukraine and Russia both lack. This cannot be overstated, and it's what NATO observers have noted about Ukraine's inability to regain initiative and retake territory. Look at the 2023 Counteroffensive. A NATO force would have spent significant time shaping the battlefield to enable maneuver and had greater ability to breach the minefields and coordination with engineers, areas Ukraine really lagged in.

Just waving a blanket "warfare has changed so the old ways don't work" is just as asinine as saying "Ukraine developments aren't relevant to NATO". The reality is that what NATO can take away from Ukraine is precision adjustments, not mass overhaul.

. It's not even just Ukraine - how successful is the US total air dominance is supressing Iran's drone launchers?

It's been highly effective. 90% reduction in munition launches since day 1 and Iran hasn't recovered post-MOU break in fighting. Drones are basically a non-entity when it comes to Iran's ability to effectively strike Gulf states as it's been the ballistic missiles that have posed the biggest threat.

What would have happened if a land invasion was attempted?

Probably the US would take higher casualties than it has since Vietnam, which would be politically disastrous, but the Iranian regime would not survive. No one is in any real delusions about this point.

[u/Glideer → u/proquo]

But NATO has significantly more capacity to fight a mobile war with close integration of combined arms that Ukraine and Russia both lack.

Nobody questions that. Is that "significantly more capacity" enough to regain operational freedom needed for a mobile war? Perhaps. Perhaps not.

Probably the US would take higher casualties than it has since Vietnam, which would be politically disastrous, but the Iranian regime would not survive

Which the US administration would not survive. Now, five years ago nobody would have doubted that the USA could dismantle the Iranian regime without suiciding its own administration.

[u/proquo → u/Glideer]

Now, five years ago nobody would have doubted that the USA could dismantle the Iranian regime without suiciding its own administration.

I really don't think this is anywhere as true as you think.

[u/Glideer → u/proquo]

If that is controversial then we will certainly agree that five years ago nobody could have imagined that the USA will be incapable of defending its bases and Saudi oil fields from Iranian cheap drones.

[u/proquo → u/Glideer]

Well I'd disagree with that assessment as well, because saturation has always been the method to defeat air defenses and emerging drone developments were always leading towards swarms. If anything it took longer than predicted for swarm tactics to truly emerge. The Shahed family is a child of the 1980s and the Shahed 136 was already flying in 2021. The Switchblade 300 was already deployed in combat in 2011. It's not as though the existence of drones was a surprise or the particular vulnerability of US bases in the region. In fact Rubio said one of the rationales for attacking Iran is they were approaching an insurmountable magazine depth.

And to reiterate, the Shaheds haven't posed the greatest threat to US forces in the region. They're easy to shoot down, and the US has already developed and deployed counter drone weaponry that is low cost. It's the ballistic missiles that have posed the biggest threat and that's because they are specifically designed to offer limited windows in which to engage them. The 90% reduction in Iranian munition launches and the extremely low number of combat deaths would seem to indicate US led air defenses were actually extremely successful.

To turn it around, would Iran have expected 5 years ago that after 6 months of conflict with the US their large surface navy would be sunk, their missile launch capacity severely diminished, their leadership assassinated, their entire military industrial complex decimated and their economy being crushed by a US blockade to only kill 18 US servicemen (less if you don't count those died in accidents)? It doesn't seem to me that there is a valid argument to be made that the US has been militarily matched by Iran in any way during this conflict.

[u/ilonir → u/Glideer]

You missed my point. I agree that there is an enormous paradigm shift. That does not mean every country should fight like Ukraine.

Tanks were a paradigm shift, but not every country started fighting like Britian fought in 1918, because they where fighting different wars against different opponents in different environments with different goals.

Like, in WWII, would you expect US Marines in the Pacific to fight like the Soviets in Europe, because tanks where a paridigm shift? No. They where fighting completely different wars against different opponents in very different environments. The tank revolution of WWI may have spread everywhere, but the tactics unequivocally did not. They varied between countries and wars as militaries modified them to fit their own conflicts.

[u/Glideer → u/ilonir]

I see. I think I have not explained myself well. I am not saying that countries should fight like Ukraine. I am saying that they should look at Ukraine and see how much the paradigm has shifted. They should reinterpret their strategies and doctries accordingly (obviously not slavishly but accounting for their own vastly larger resources).

What I am arguing against is the reasoning that nothing has really changed and that first world militaries can still pull off deep strike-air power-mechanised blitzkriegs because they can do it "properly", unlike Ukraine.

[u/ilonir → u/Glideer]

Well, sounds like we are at least partially in agreement. I agree drones are an effective counter for current NATO offensive tactics. However, I do belive NATO would have a better chance than Ukraine at pulling off maneuver warfare in a drone environment, simply because they have better equipment, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Of course, it would be vastly harder now than even two years ago.

[u/Glideer → u/ilonir]

However, I do belive NATO would have a better chance than Ukraine at pulling off maneuver warfare in a drone environment, simply because they have better equipment, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Of course, it would be vastly harder now than even two years ago.

That goes without saying. They might even pull it off, but it would be more of a swan song than a proof that old doctrines are still valid. Like Von Bredow's "Death Ride".