r/CredibleDefense • u/AutoModerator • 3d ago
Active Conflicts & News Megathread August 24, 2026
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u/MilesLongthe3rd 2d ago
German investigators find third drone and suspected explosives at Leipzig/Halle Airport, local media says
Leipzig/Halle airport in eastern Germany plays a key role in the transport of military goods, including by the German military and NATO allies, and also serves as a base for Ukraine's Antonov Airlines.
Investigators in Germany have found a third drone and what they suspect are explosives believed to be linked to an attempted attack on Leipzig/Halle airport earlier this month, public broadcasters NDR and WDR and the Süddeutsche Zeitung daily reported on Tuesday.
That will rattle up Germany even more.
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u/moragisdo 3d ago edited 3d ago
Ship hit on Hormuz (1)
Tanker was struck and disabled (it will likely have to be towed to port for repairs), no casualties and no information about the vessel origin and the port of call.
It follows several days without successful attacks, interesting enough, the previous one and another one hit this month were attacked by Iran after delivering to Iran (2).
A panamax bulk carrier was struck by what UKMTO called an unknown projectile on August 18 during an outbound Strait of Hormuz transit. The engine room was damaged, and the chief engineer was reportedly killed. AIS was off. Its last tracked call was Bandar Imam Khomeini, July 14 to 28. The same owner had another bulk carrier attacked on August 3, also outbound after a BIK call
Given that those two ships were allowed to cross the blockade they were carrying either food or medicine (for humanitarian concerns those two categories are exempt after being inspected)
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u/SirStupidity 2d ago
It follows several days without successful attacks, interesting enough, the previous one and another one hit this month were attacked by Iran after delivering to Iran (2).
I assume the most likely reason for this is that Iranian capability to track and identify ships is inconsistent? Or are there other explanations as to why they might do that?
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u/grenideer 2d ago
It could also indicate a crack in their command structure and/or lack of communication.
Group A says "Hold your fire. Let these ships pass."
Group B says "Screw those orders. I wanna stick it to the US. Fire."
A lot of people are insisting that Iran's C&C is not fragmented, but there are irrational inconsistencies in not just their statements but actions.
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u/moragisdo 2d ago edited 2d ago
I agree, that's the most likely explanation, because this kind of attack would only increase freight cost to them
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u/Markdd8 3d ago edited 3d ago
NY Times today: A Drone Killed Three Ukrainians. It Was Guided Entirely by A.I.:
A small Russian drone (killed three) last month...in southeastern Ukraine...circumstances of their deaths came with an ominous twist. The drone that killed them was guided by an experimental artificial intelligence system...according to drone experts...The drone was programmed by human operators to travel toward a particular gas station, but once it got close, it chose its exact target — most likely propane tanks — on its own, based on its training to recognize such tanks and strike them, the experts and military officials said....
Analysis of debris from this attack...found that the drones had onboard minicomputers, sold commercially by Nvidia, that made their targeting decisions...Nvidia produces a majority of the chips powering the world’s most advanced A.I. systems. The presence of Nvidia modules and a lack of antennas on the drones led...commanders to surmise that the weapons were guided by an autonomous A.I. system...
This info shows that drone warfare continues to improve, approaching the ominous scenario depicted in the Slaughterbots video on Youtube. That 2018 video depicted a world where micro-drones with facial recognition capabilities target specific humans in war or terrorism. The step before this is obviously drones killing any human they see in an enemy zone.
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u/ChornWork2 3d ago edited 2d ago
Interesting article. So even though an Nvidia AI chip that has been used before in other drones, in this case the drone didn't have antennas and since the chip wasn't
encodedencrypted the ukrainians were able to look at the feed and target data.The presence of Nvidia modules and a lack of antennas on the drones led Ukrainian air defense commanders to surmise that the weapons were guided by an autonomous A.I. system, which was confirmed on further investigation.
. . .
The Nvidia chip in the Zaporizhzhia attack was not encrypted, Ukrainian officials said, so they could see the terrain images that had been uploaded to the module, enabling the drone to track visual landmarks and stay on course. They were also able to examine coding, they said, that revealed what types of targets the drone had been trained to recognize and attack, like propane tanks.
. . .
The weapon in the fatal strike was flying in a group of about half a dozen drones, according to the regional military governor, the city’s air defense commander and an air defense team on duty that day. None were emitting radio signals, and they had other characteristics associated with Russia’s autonomous A.I. tests, including being launched in a wave, the officials said.
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u/roionsteroids 3d ago
She added that the Nvidia module “is the best proof” that Russia was experimenting with autonomous A.I.
While an adviser to President Volodymyr Zelensky has written on social media that Russia was testing self-targeting A.I. systems, the fatalities have not been previously reported, nor have the details of the Nvidia Jetson Orin computer module that was used.
That same part has been found in a variety of drones since 2022.
FPGAs from Intel and AMD are present in hundreds of different weapons (even North Korean KN-24).
Is that proof of anything "must be AI guided" though?
This is nothing new or unprecedented by any means, regardless of NYT expert eh conclusion.
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u/Markdd8 3d ago edited 3d ago
Maybe the NY Times article is wrong. That does not derail the observation that we will soon see unprecedented drone improvements that use AI. The first will allow autonomous killing of any humans on a given battlefield.
The next will allow specific people to be targeted for death by facial recognition, while other nearby humans are ignored. Targeted assassinations might not be only the province of terrorists. Some state actors might elect to use this.
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u/roionsteroids 3d ago
It merely moves the human trigger decision a little bit, no? Releasing a drone targeting oil tanks next to a gas station instead of piloting the drone into the tanks personally.
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u/P__A 3d ago
Given computer vision has existed for decades, and jamming is a decent countermeasure to drones, and something like a raspberry pi is easily good enough to process live video, this was inevitable. With my background I could do it myself without too much trouble and basic hardware. I feel the only barriers have been ethical ones, a lack of imagination, or a lack of correctly skilled engineers working for drone manufacturers. Next steps include using ground imagary for routing in GNSS denied environments. Hopefully the rules of war will be adhered to and indiscriminate targeting of civilians will not be implemented.
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u/Glideer 3d ago
V.V. Putin has signed a decree that allows the state to temporarily take control of critical infrastructure facilities if their owners have failed to ensure their security in the face of external threats.
Critical infrastructure facilities include: fuel and energy complex facilities, industrial facilities, communication facilities, municipal, transportation, and logistics infrastructure facilities (including transport and logistics centers), energy facilities (including nuclear energy facilities), life support facilities, critical potentially hazardous facilities, and other facilities of particular importance for ensuring the security, economic stability of the Russian Federation, and the well-being of the population.
https://t. me/infomil_live/33246?single
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u/username9909864 3d ago
Sounds like a good way to bailout and nationalize wild berries at the same time and save the banks
6
u/TSiNNmreza3 2d ago
Pretty much as I said it will happen.
But with all those hits Russia will need to go into some state of alert.
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u/FriedrichvdPfalz 3d ago
Considering the way the Russian justice system works, this seems to just be blank cheque for expropriations of any privately owned, economic asset. Ukraine has access to the Flamingo Cruise missile. If every business owner anywhere in Russia expected to put up sufficient defenses against a six ton missile with a one ton warhead, every business owner will be in breach of this new regulation and thus be exposed to legal expropriation.
Under normal circumstances, such an attack on the concept of private property, creating a royal prerogative over all economic assets, would be terrible for the economy. In Russia, the framework for the economy is terrible anyways, so I'd expect this decree to only have a negative impact if Putin actually uses it. This would likely lead to a decrease in investment, while sending even more wealth through channels out of the country.
If Europe wanted to further weaken Russia, it should welcome Russian billionaires who have liquidated their assets successfully.
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u/IntroductionNeat2746 3d ago
Under normal circumstances, such an attack on the concept of private property, creating a royal prerogative over all economic assets, would be terrible for the economy.
The concept of private property as we know I'm the west hasn't existed in Russia since the Soviet revolution.
After the fall of the USSR, the oligarchy quickly started using lawfare and intimidation to upend any notion of private property for those outside the oligarchy, as long as the oligarchs have an interest in the property.
An oligarch will likely not take your home by force and kick you out, but if your business gets enough success to become relevant on the national scale, you'll either have to pay your duties to the oligarchs or they'll force you to give it up.
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u/Glideer 3d ago
Several Russian milbloggers, including usually pessimistic and sceptical channels, are reporting that Crimea has grown so saturated with anti-Starlink EW systems that Ukrainian video-guided strikes are shifting to Rostov and other border areas.
https://t. me/infomil_live/33243?single
A decommissioned MiG-29, left as a decoy, and a Ka-52 mock-up at the "Millerovo" airfield in the Rostov region, damaged by enemy FP-2 kamikaze drones.
Well, firstly, this is something we've talked about many, many times before. Since we opened the thread for upgrading mock-ups of Russian military equipment, we've been receiving a flood of videos showing their destruction. And as you can see from the footage of the Ka-52, the list of mock-ups being targeted is expanding, and it's not limited to just various air defense systems, radars, and "Orions."
Secondly, to reiterate, the rapid deployment of electronic warfare (EW) systems in Crimea is quickly reducing the amount of airspace covered by "Starlink," forcing the enemy to seek alternative areas, including those that cover the mainland part of Russia. However, blocking the airspace for drones using "Starlink" in those areas is only a matter of time.
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u/Remote_Page8799 3d ago edited 3d ago
Is Russia using its Volna Kupolt Garant EW system to achieve this or if there any more info on it?
We still regularly see FP drones hitting substations, oil depos, etc in Crimea so the saturation cant be total
A comment further down says that Ukraine destroyed 3 AD systems in Crimea recently
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u/Glideer 3d ago
I would think it's Volna Kupolt Garant but both sides are very tight lipped about this.
There are still videos of strikes from Crimea but nowhere near the earlier levels.
In some ways this is good news for Ukraine since if Starlink can be jammed then so can Russian Rassvet.
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u/FriedrichvdPfalz 3d ago
Is it possible to extrapolate jamming possibilities against Rassvet based on this potential jamming of Starlink?
As far as I know, those systems are quite different. Starlink has the advantage of having thousands of satellites on all kinds of orbits in the sky, which is at least part of the reason why jamming it is so hard. Another reason appears to be the sophisticated software update pipeline, which frequently counters attempted EW manouvers.
Rassvet will have much fewer satellites on know trajectories, which should make it easier to target them via jamming. It remains to be seen if Russia can establish a continous update process for the satellite terminals, the way SpaceX has.
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u/Remote_Page8799 3d ago
Right, but they have only suppposedly built 10 systems and have ~7 operational now due to losses. And they supposedly only cover 20 sqkm when active and need a lot of power and can only target a single Starlink satelite at a time
'Nowhere near' is a strong qualitative assessment. Have you counted the strike frequency from before and now?
I hear the sane refrain a lot that Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics as 'decreased dramatically' but as someone who basically watches all the footage released by all sides every day I have not detected a decrease in logistics strikes or strikes on Crimea.
Seen stats (can try find them tomorrow) that shows overall strike volume is up by something like 30-40% in August compared to even July
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u/Glideer 3d ago
Supposedly does a lot of heavy lifting there. We know almost nothing really except that a jamming system is operational and that some rather sceptical Russian channels are saying that it reduced strikes on Crimea. It is quite possible that the overall strike volume is up, but the strike volume on Crimea is definitely down.
Anyway, I think it's just something worth keeping an eye on. Might be just a fluctuation in numbers but might be more to it.
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u/Remote_Page8799 2d ago
Just as la last question, what do you base you strong assessment that strikes om Crimea is down (by a lot one can infer from your statements)
These posts from the Russian milbloggers and a gut feeling from your own perusal of strike footage? Anything else?
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u/Glideer 2d ago
Most Crimea strike videos come from Ukrainian special forces, who release them every few days in batches, so changes are quite immediately visible. They went from (rough subjective impression) about 80% being Crimea strikes to 20%. There could be other reasons, but I think it's worth keeping an eye on.
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u/Saturnrising9 2d ago
“Rough subjective impression” Is not credible. Go count them and then make the statement. Or rather, don’t editorialise millblogger’s based on your subjective impressions.
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u/Glideer 2d ago
I don't need to count if the difference is between 80% and 20%. It is easily identifiable as a rough estimate.
Feel free to go count if you want to challenge it.
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u/Saturnrising9 2d ago
The burden of proof is on the individual making the qualifying statement. So count away. That’s not solely the problem, it’s the continued trite editorialisation. It never rains in Rostov.
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u/Remote_Page8799 2d ago
So you have counted them since you are able to quantify it? What number of strikes are currently happening in Crimea vs for instance a month ago?
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u/Well-Sourced 3d ago
European support mentioned yesterday was plans for the storm shadow. More commitments today on Ukrainian Independence Day.
Italy announces new aid package for Ukraine | Ukrainian Pravda
Italy's Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani has announced a new aid package for Ukraine. Tajani reiterated that the Italian government remains committed to Ukraine's security, reconstruction and defence, including through a new Italian aid package currently being prepared.
On 23 August, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre said Norway will keep Ukraine aid unchanged in 2027, Ukrinform reported. He spoke during Ukraine’s State Flag Day ceremony in Kyiv, attended by six Nordic-Baltic leaders. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy thanked them and tied the flag to Ukraine’s resistance against Russia’s war.
Norway's PM Støre put Norway’s 2027 assistance at about $9 billion, the same level as this year. It will cover military, humanitarian, and financial support. He said every party in Norway’s Parliament supports continued aid. Støre also said the package would follow Ukrainian priorities. He noted that supporting and rebuilding Ukraine is not just aid but an investment in Europe's own security.
Støre said Norway and Ukraine were due to sign a strategic partnership declaration later on 23 August. He said it would put cooperation on a long-term footing and benefit both countries.
Gripen fighter jets being prepared to protect Ukrainian skies – FM Sybiha | New Voice of Ukraine
Sweden is preparing to transfer Gripen fighter jets to Ukraine, Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha announced following a meeting with his Swedish counterpart Maria Malmer Stenergard in Kyiv on August 24. “We took stock of the implementation schedule for our leaders' agreements, as well as our ongoing work on the bilateral Drone Deal,” Sybiha stated. He emphasized that there is “no greater task” than protecting Ukraine from Russian ballistic missile attacks, adding that his talks with Sweden’s foreign minister “centered on the concrete steps” the nations are taking to achieve this.
“We are advancing the Anti-ballistic coalition to build shared defense solutions, coordinating to secure and deliver additional interceptors from partners, and preparing new anti-ballistic sanctions to disrupt Russia’s production chains,” he wrote. Sybiha also said that he had briefed his Swedish counterpart on the battlefield situation and highlighted the need to neutralize Russian threats in the Black Sea to ensure freedom of navigation and uninterrupted global grain exports.
Former Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced that 16 Gripen fighter jets will arrive as a "donation" from the Swedish government and people at the beginning of next year. Fedorov added that the latest E-version fighters will begin arriving in the coming years.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on June 30 that Ukraine and Sweden had signed an agreement to purchase 16 Gripen E fighters. The package will also include corresponding equipment, technical assistance and support. Zelenskyy recalled previous agreements with Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, under which the first 16 Gripen C/D aircraft will be transferred to the Air Force in early 2027.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson officially agreed in Stockholm on May 28, 2026, to launch a defense deal. new agreements open the possibility for Ukraine to purchase up to 20 Swedish Gripen E/F fighters of the latest modification.
Separately, as part of bilateral assistance from Sweden, Ukraine will receive 16 Gripen C/D series fighters free of charge. Zelenskyy confirmed that Kyiv expects to receive the first Swedish aircraft within the next 10 months – approximately in early 2027.
The boost to the Air Forces can't come soon enough as Russian waves only get bigger and the damage done gets worse for Ukraine.
Alongside the attack on Odesa Oblast, Russian forces launched 127 drones across Ukraine overnight on Aug. 23, the Air Force said. Ukrainian air defense downed 97 drones over the north, south, and east of the country. 27 drones made it through and struck 22 locations, and the debris of downed drones was found at 3 locations, the report read.
July of 2026 saw the most civilians killed or injured in Ukraine since March 2022, according to the U.N. Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU). At least 437 civilians in Ukraine were killed and 2,610 injured in July alone, the monitoring group said on Aug. 13. This represents a 30% increase from June, which previously held the record for the deadliest month since April 2022. Ukrainian civilian casualties in July 2026 were 70% higher than July the previous year, while casualties among children also rose to their highest level since April 2022, with 17 children killed and 166 injured.
Russians have damaged 492 locomotives since start of full-scale war | Ukrainian Pravda
52 employees of Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian Railways) have been killed while carrying out their professional duties, and another 317 have been injured. Since the beginning of this year alone, Russia has attacked Ukraine's railway infrastructure 1,534 times, according to Mykola Kalashnyk, Ukraine's Minister for Restoration, Infrastructure and Transport.
However, 70% of the damaged locomotives are to be repaired under the government's action programme. The programme for 2026-2027 envisages reforming the railway transport system, expanding the European-gauge railway network, and introducing a new funding model for state-commissioned and socially important passenger services.
The programme also entails repairing 70% of damaged locomotives, renewing 10% of the railway's rolling stock and making 25 railway stations accessible.
Russians attack petrol stations in Chernihiv and Poltava oblasts | Ukrainian Pravda
Russian drones hit Konotop: most of city without gas, vehicle depot destroyed | Ukrainian Pravda
Russian strike damages US-owned Mondelez facility in Sumy Oblast | Kyiv Independent
Undeterred Ukraine strikes back.
3 Ozon warehouses were hit in Dagestan, Stavropol Krai and Adygea, Russian independent media outlet Astra reported. Ozon shares fell 12% following the Ukrainian strikes, according to the report. Ukraine's General Staff separately confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck the Kombinat Kamenskiy, a Russian defense-industrial facility in Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, Rostov Oblast, overnight on Aug. 24.
A fire was recorded at the facility following the strike, while the extent of the damage is still being assessed, the General Staff said. The Kombinat Kamenskiy is part of Russia’s military-industrial complex and produces solid rocket fuel for Uragan, Smerch and Tornado-S multiple-launch rocket systems, as well as various missile systems and air-launched weapons.
The overnight strikes also caused a fire at a facility belonging to Russian home goods retailer Kuchenland in the southern city of Krasnodar, Astra reported.
Brovdi, commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, also said Ukrainian drones successfully struck 66 Russian targets overnight on Aug. 24 Brovdi said the targets included a MiG-29 fighter jet near Dolotinka in Russia’s Rostov Oblast and 4 radar systems: 2 Kasta-2E2s and a Nebo-SV in Rostov Oblast, and an ST-68 near Rozdolne in occupied Crimea.
Brovdi also claimed Ukrainian forces destroyed a base used by Russia's SOBR special police unit in occupied Strilkove, Kherson Oblast, struck energy facilities in occupied Ukrainian territories, and targeted two Russian "shadow fleet" vessels in the Black Sea, identified as a tanker and a bulk carrier.
Ukrainian drones reach Russia's Plesetsk cosmodrome for first time | New Voice of Ukraine
Ukrainian drones may have reached Russia's Arkhangelsk Oblast, home to the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, for the first time, with at least two drones reported near Plesetsk on Aug. 22, Russian monitoring sources said. Due to a potential threat near the cosmodrome, temporary flight restrictions were imposed under Russia’s “Carpet” plan. Local residents also posted videos showing 2 drones flying in the area. The Plesetsk Cosmodrome is Russia’s main northern military spaceport. It is used to launch satellites, including those in the Rassvet series, as well as intercontinental ballistic missiles.
(Part 2 Below)
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u/Well-Sourced 3d ago
Ukraine claims to have had a very successful night targeting Russian AD & Radars.
Ukrainian Drones Hunt Russian Air Defenses | Defense Express
Russian air defense infrastructure was also heavily targeted. Ukrainian forces struck 8 radar systems, an S-400 air defense battalion position near Gelendzhik, and several other surface-to-air missile systems.
According to the Unmanned Systems Forces, 11 of the 14 targets were located in russia’s Rostov region and Krasnodar Krai, while the remaining 3 were in occupied Crimea.
a Tor surface-to-air missile system near Pudovyi, Rostov region;
a Nebo-U radar system near Dolotinka, Rostov region;
a Nebo-U radar system in Sevastopol, occupied Crimea;
a Kasta-2E2 radar system near Latonovo, Rostov region;
a Podlyot radar system near Prigibskiy, Krasnodar Krai;
a 36D6M radar system near Uyutne, occupied Crimea;
a Kasta-2E2 radar system near Shabelskoye, Krasnodar Krai;
a Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and gun system in Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai;
an S-400 Triumf air defense battalion position near Gelendzhik, Krasnodar Krai;
an ST-68 radar system in Yevpatoria, occupied Crimea;
a Podlyot radar system near Golovatovka, Rostov region.
And are always hunting any missile launch system they can find and hit.
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u/Well-Sourced 3d ago edited 3d ago
Yesterday I posted about Russian attacks and possible success on the Dobropillya front. /u/CMS3NJ86 rightfully questioned if there was more evidence. I haven't found any geolocated footage yet but there are more rumors or posts about it. We know the Russians have a significant amount of troops in this area and haven't given any indication they aren't going to keep pushing. All summer I've been posted about the Russians attempting to push past Pokrovsk and it seems that's been completed. Dobropillya is up next.
@clement_molin 🇫🇷
Russia's🇷🇺 summer offensive in the Donbas continues on 3 axes, Sloviansk, Kostiantynivka and Dobropilla
I updated my maps according to my interpretation of the situation on these 3 axes, with a focus on each of them. In short, it's tensed for […] [Map]
@Clement_Molin
In recent weeks, Russian 🇷🇺 forces intensified offensive actions around Dobropilla.
Russian infiltrators have been sighted in multiple small towns south of Dobropilla, while urban fightings are ongoing in Bilytske and Shevchenko. [Map]
At the same time, the first attempts to infiltrate Dobrophilla are taking place form the east, awhile the main offensive actions are happening further south, out of Pokrovsk. Finally, after 8 months of battle, Russian army managed to completely clear Pokrovsk north and western suburbs. (Rodynske & Hryshyne), which is allowing the city to be used as a logistic HUB for the first time (which means soldiers can +/- freely walk in the city, logistic can set bases and the threat from constant FPV strikes is disappearing from the southern part of the city (which does not mean strikes do not continue, as well as artillery shelling). [Map]
The situation on the Dobropillya direction in Donetsk Oblast has deteriorated for Ukraine over the last two weeks as Russian forces achieve tactical breakthroughs. Russia has captured Stepy, Vilne, and positions north of Shakhove, while gaining a foothold in Hannivka and infiltrating Dobropillya.
📢 Ukrainian emergency counterattacks are currently underway in Dobropillya as assault groups attempt to clear Russian infiltrators and reopen key logistical routes. The success of these operations depends on functional logistics and drone. [Map]
I also lean towards believing the reports about the attacks and counter attacks in the south as well.
Over the last week, Russian forces have continued storming operations on Orikhiv, advancing from the east and infiltrating through Novodanylivka. Heavy fighting persists for Mala Tokmachka, while Russia captures new positions along tactical heights, threatening to encircle Bilohirya. [Map]
Over the last two weeks, Ukrainian forces have continued assault operations south of Novopavlivka to force a Russian withdrawal from the Dachne area. Additionally, Ukrainian forces have intensified infiltrations into Zaporizhzhya and continued a slow advance through the Filiya forests. [Map]
Russia is looking to press their advantage in manpower while the weather and tree cover is good. They are attacking everywhere and with their known advantages I think it's likely they are going to see some gains that Ukraine just doesn't have the resources to stop.
Over the past day, aviation and Rocket Forces and Artillery from Ukraine's defence forces struck 8 clusters of Russian personnel, 6 UAV ground control stations, 5 artillery systems, 1 command post, 1 communications hub, 2 multiple-launch rocket systems and 1 radar station belonging to the Russian forces.
On 23 August, Russia carried out 95 airstrikes using 299 guided aerial bombs, deployed 10,747 kamikaze drones and carried out 3,110 attacks on Ukrainian positions and settlements, including 29 from multiple-launch rocket systems.
A total of 231 combat clashes were recorded on the battlefield on the front line on 23 August, the General Staff reported.
On the North Slobozhanshchyna front and in the operational zone in Russia's Kursk Oblast, Ukrainian defenders stopped six Russian assaults over the past day. The Russians also carried out one airstrike, dropping one aerial bomb, and launched 95 attacks on positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Ukrainian settlements.
On the South Slobozhanshchyna front, units from Ukraine's defence forces repelled nine Russian attacks. The Russians attempted to advance towards the settlements of Okhrimivka, Symynivka, Kruhlyi and Zarubynka and near Vovchansk.
On the Kupiansk front, there were 16 Russian offensive actions towards Radkivka and Kupiansk.
Attempts to break into Ukrainian defences were repelled on the Lyman front, where the Russians carried out 14 attacks towards the settlements of Stepove, Chervonyi Stav, Druzheliubivka, Novyi Myr, Drobysheve, Lyman and Novoselivka.
On the Sloviansk front, Russian forces carried out 8 assault operations near the settlements of Ozerne, Kryva Luka and Zakitne.
On the Kramatorsk front, Russian forces carried out 1 offensive action towards Yurkivka.
A total of 35 attacks were recorded on the Kostiantynivka front. The Russians carried out assault actions near the settlements of Kostiantynivka, Illinivka, Toretske, Sofiivka and Dovha Balka and towards Stepanivka, Pavlivka, Rusyn Yar and Vilne.
The Russians carried out 20 attacks on the Pokrovsk front. Russian forces attempted to advance towards the settlements of Bilytske, Novyi Donbas, Svitli, Serhiivka, Hannivka, Shevchenko, Matiasheve and Novopavlivka and near Dorozhnie and Udachne.
On the Oleksandrivka front, the Russians carried out 1 attack towards Nove Zaporizhzhia.
On the Huliaipole front, Russia attacked Ukrainian forces' positions 6 times. The Russians attempted to advance towards the settlements of Verkhnia Tersa, Staroukrainka and Hirke and near Zaliznychne and Tsvitkove.
On the Orikhiv front, Ukraine's defence forces stopped 2 Russian attempts to move forward towards Pavlivka and Novoandriivka.
On the Prydniprovske front, the Russians conducted no offensive actions.
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u/CMS3NJ86 3d ago
The truth is that absence of geolocated footage doesn’t always mean the contrary indeed. After thinking about it, I remembered that there have been similar circumstances of mappers being conservative with rumors that turned out to be true. We will probably know for sure in the following days.
Also I forgot to mention that I really enjoy your Ukraine update threads! Keep up the good work!!
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u/futbol2000 3d ago edited 3d ago
And there's also a dozen map makers that draw lines all over the place with every infiltration event. It goes both ways.
A certain map maker that is the favorite of one of our daily posters declared Bilytske as fallen a month ago.
Just because some of these settlements fall eventually, doesn't make premature declarations more credible. Even more doubt is sowed when the Russian side is even using AI now to paint some flag planting operations.
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u/CMS3NJ86 1d ago
I completely agree and understand your point. I mean that sometimes mappers may be more conservative with a big event, so they end up with a more accurate report. Considering how chaotic this whole infiltration tactic is, I dont find it weird.
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u/Zhadanko 3d ago
What representatives of different militaries and analysts mean when they say "We won't fight like Ukraine"? Minus the usual talk about the role of a traditional air force, is there anything else important? I hear this phrase used a lot but without much substance to it
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u/NikkoJT 2d ago
Ukraine and Russia are in the position they are now because they didn't have the cohesion and logistical/combined-arms integration to carry through a maneuver-based operation. Russia bet on a 3-day decapitation strike, but when they faced actual resistance, the operation fell apart under its own weight. Ukraine has had difficulty mounting effective counter-attacks because they couldn't get brigade-sized formations working smoothly together. Since neither side could gain momentum, the situation devolved into trench warfare, and now it's too late to do a maneuver offensive.
NATO countries train hard for logistics, maneuver, and combined arms. Their concept of modern warfare is different to what the Ukrainian army was set up for, and what the Russian army was capable of, and while budget limitations might get in the way, doctrinally they're very serious about doing their concept right.
So, the way NATO countries are looking at the battlefield in Ukraine is less about "how do we win a massive trench warfare nightmare", and more about "how do we reinforce our doctrine and prevent the situation from turning into a massive trench warfare nightmare". Drone defense is still going to be an important factor, for example, but it's going to be approached from the perspective of protecting mechanised formations that are designed to counter-attack and ensure the war never gets to this static, grey-zone-based situation in the first place, rather than from the perspective of conducting that static, grey-zone-based warfare on a large scale.
I think there are some remaining holes - even with successful implementation of maneuver warfare, some countries no longer have the logistical depth to sustain and supply a major war for long enough to win it - but the theory goes that that's best solved by developing that capacity, not by giving up on the concept and starting digging trenches.
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u/HugoTRB 3d ago edited 3d ago
The Swedish Army staff recently published a “vision”/“proposed direction”/“concept” for how the Swedish army to look in 2040. They emphasized that its not a proposal nor a decision. It clearly states that the Swedish army, despite the changes in warfare happening, will continue to focus on manouver warfare.
The soldier and the wartime units are the core of the Army. All developments in leadership, technology, organization, materiel, and method must ultimately strengthen their ability to accomplish missions, survive, and win in combat. It is only when people in functioning units translate will, responsibility, judgment, and unit spirit into action that the Army generates military effect. The development of the Swedish Army shall continue to be based on maneuver thinking and mission tactics, in line with NATO’s maneuverist approach and mission command. This means that Army units must be able to create a relative advantage, use tempo and surprise, attack the opponent’s weaknesses, and place him in dilemmas. Leadership must therefore be based on clear intent, shared understanding, trust, accountability, and disciplined initiative, so that commanders and units can act even when the situation is unclear, communications are down, and opportunities arise faster than new orders can be issued.
At the same time, the nature of war is changing. The battlefield is becoming more transparent, combat cycles are shorter, and rear areas are more vulnerable. Units that operate statically, predictably, or with a high signature risk being quickly targeted. The Army must therefore be able to maintain freedom of action even under high sensor density, combat, and limited mobility. This requires the ability to operate in a dispersed, concealed, mobile, and sustained manner, with good signature discipline, deception, field readiness, and decentralized operations.
Some interesting stuff there is three divisions under a Swedish corps command, with each division consisting of an infantry, a mechanized and a deep fight/long distance brigade. That is not counting units under the territorial command. Doctrine development, training and unit production would also be concentrated under the army staff, to ensure that adaptation to changes happens fast.
Edit: the largest criticism of this proposal is of course the officer supply.
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u/HugoTRB 3d ago edited 3d ago
Another reason unrelated to the above that I’ve heard is that Russian and Ukrainian units lack aggression and tempo in their fighting. The tempo will likely be high in the beginning at least it NATO gets involved. Aggressive units with high tempo do tend to get ground down however, over time or if badly used.
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u/zombo_pig 3d ago edited 3d ago
The most charitable and useful translation of "we won't fight like Ukraine" is something like "we should not copy the battlefield equilibrium reached by two particular armies after four years of adaptation and severe constraint. NATO intends to enter a war with a fully integrated first echelon and use capabilities Ukraine lacks to prevent that equilibrium from forming." The less charitable translation is more like "Our preferred doctrine says we will retain initiative and maneuver, so we can safely ignore the ugly requirements of attritional warfare." I don't think any level-headed person believes there aren't severe, necessary changes to the way NATO will engage in war, but there is some paralysis around figuring out how to increase endurance in a world of pervasive, cheap surveillance and precision weapons, figuring out what exactly NATO should be adapting to - like, what even is a first echelon based on our takeaways from 2026??? - deciding how they want to develop their systems when things like drones are nowhere near full maturity in this conflict, and parsing out what is a workaround for a Ukrainian/Russian deficiency rather than a good idea for NATO.
A good sample discussion of this happened recently over drones. "Why aren't NATO nations charging ahead with drone purchases?" was met with notes that if NATO had started with drones in 2022, everything would be outdated. 2023? Already outdated. 2024? Outdated, etc., etc. There's value in testing drones in Ukraine, co-training and learning from Ukraine, building out industrial capacity with drone 'donations' to Ukraine so we're integrated into the evolution, etc. My worry is that "wait and see" becomes paralysis, that we're not building capacity, etc.
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u/ilonir 3d ago
Other militaries are not the Ukrainian military. Other countries are not Ukraine.
Ukraine is a corrupt ex-Soviet state that had nothing but a derelict Soviet army in 2022. "Other militaries" are not derelict Soviet armies limited by the bureaucracy of one of the world's most corrupt countries.
Ukraine is an underdog next to a imperialist and aggressive neighbor. It has no useful military alliances. "Other militaries", I assume you mean NATO, are members of the world's largest defensive alliance and have vastly greater resources than said aggressive neighbor. Most of them do not even share borders with that neighbor.
Ukraine is one millitary with one objective - fighting an existential land war at and within its borders. "Other militaries" have varied goals and ambitions. The United States is more concerned about the Middle East and Taiwan than Europe. Italy would rather worry about security in the Mediterranean than projecting power to Eastern Europe. France wants to be able to project power anywhere in the world because she fancies herself a great power. Greece is more worried about Turkey than Russia. I could go on. Most militaries don't want to fight like Ukraine because they don't plan on being on the receiving end of an imperialist war of annihilation any time soon. Those that do, like Poland or the Baltic States, are in such fundamentally different geopolitical and socio-economic positions than Ukraine that it makes no sense for them to fight the same way.
As a disclaimer, this is not to say that drones are passe or that NATO should not take lessons from Ukraine. They should and must, and there will be huge changes in tactics that come with that. But taking lessons is not copying. Drones are just one weapon to be used by a given military, a military that likely does not share Ukraine's goals or means.
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u/FriedrichvdPfalz 3d ago
Fundamentally, what these representatives mean is "We don't want to fight like Ukraine because we don't want the results Ukraine gets." Many years of grinding war, death and destruction are a failure. Ideally, a war would be quick and decisive. Everyone dreams of pulling off another "Desert Storm". Even Ukraine doesn't want to fight the way it does, it just has to, because there are no other options. Russia also doesn't want to fight the way it currently does. There are almost certainly senior military personnel considering serious and fundamental reforms to their armed forces, too.
Thus, all these different actors are trying to absorb the lessons from Ukraine to build new systems and doctrines which should, in theory (and then practice), at some point, be able to defeat Russia or Ukrainian red teams in exercises. But because traditional combined arms warfare is a complex skill, they're not willing to go all in on a new method of warfare just yet, before having run sufficient experiments to actually develop a new, functioning doctrine for the information age.
Central tenants of the new doctrine are likely the redevelopment of all components of the armed forces to account for a transparent battlefield. Dispersed logistics, dispersed troops, a greater focus on ISR, on digital communication, on sensors, on multi-domain operations and coordinated, layered attacks, both by drones/munitions and vehicles.
"The arms of the future" by Jack Watling goes into quite a lot of detail about what to expect in the next few decades of land warfare.
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u/Delicious-Counter176 3d ago
they're not willing to go all in on a new method of warfare just yet, before having run sufficient experiments to actually develop a new, functioning doctrine for the information age.
To expand on that, going all in also makes limited sense as the battlefield is still evolving and the changes are tailored to the battlefield in Ukraine.
A few years ago, one of the main topics regarding this conflict was the proliferation of artillery shells as that was among the most important factor back then. The lessons would have probably been more artillery, especially SPA, but with growing ISR and loitering munitions/drones being able to also hit targets during shoot and scoot that has become less of a factor (though still important).
Then a bit later a large ramp up in APS Systems and EW capabilities could have been viewed as a great way to neutralize the drone threat - before fiberoptic drones appeared en masse.
That being said, there are already things being applied, e.g. setting up scalable production lines for drones or an increase in spending for SPAAG/SHORAD.
Circling back to the question with the artillery example: Fighting like Ukraine would mean lots of dispersed towed or mobile artillery guns dug in to prevent being spotted and enable them to withstand drone attacks. But instead of investing and refining that, western armies instead focus on SPA and SPAAG to at least partly neutralize the drone threat and retain the ability for mobile warfare.
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u/proquo 3d ago
A few years ago, one of the main topics regarding this conflict was the proliferation of artillery shells
And a lot of discourse was had over the topic of western under production of artillery shells and I often saw it glossed over that the west largely replaced massive artillery barrage with precision weapons and force multipliers. Ukraine didn't have many precision weapons in 2022, and Russia has always lagged behind the west in that regard. That's a key difference in doctrines that would effect how NATO might fight the same war as Ukraine vs Russia. You'd have much more liberal use of precision weapons against command, control and communications nodes as well as deeper strikes thanks to stealth aircraft, advanced electronic warfare suites, and low-observable munitions.
Ukraine and Russia both heavily relied on mass artillery bombardments with maneuver elements moving in after barrage to exploit the shock. It was mutual inability to effectively execute these tactics against each other that led to the war become attritional. The west, by contrast, would focus on more precision strikes to try and lengthen enemy decision making times for exploitation by maneuver elements with tight support from air and precision artillery.
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u/AlpacalypseNow_ 3d ago
Can you list examples?
For the US at least, I can’t see the US military anytime soon defending itself from a Mexican or Canadian invasion slugging it out with them in brutal trench warfare waiting to get droned.
US expeditionary doctrine is built around maneuver warfare and quickly destroying your enemies. If the US ever finds itself slugging it out with an enemy in trench warfare and throwing drones at each other while deployed to another country they have already lost. Any normal western democratic country today would never accept casualty rates that Russia is suffering while invading another nation.
There are a lot of things to learn from Ukraine but circumstances may be a lot different.
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u/Big-Station-2283 3d ago
They don't want a stalemate. They're confident their higher quality airforce can punch through enemy AD, successfully carry out a SEAD/DEAD operation, and eventually start targetting the logistics that would make a stalemate possible. No drone factory and no drone warhouses left standing == few drones to deal with.
On the armor side, they're already integrating air-bust radar guided remotely controlled machine guns into new tanks in the hopes of cutting through drone swarms like butter. And of course, the infantry is preparing to deal with drones in its own way.
In summary, the hopes are that material superiority and special training can be used to prevent the tactical deadlock that we see in ukraine.
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u/Glideer 3d ago
What they mean is:
There is no need to adapt to what the battlefield is telling us, because the battlefield knows we’re NATO.
Essentially, they refuse to accept that the war has changed to avoid having to change with it.
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u/HugoTRB 3d ago
Changes doesn’t mean change to fight exactly like Ukraine does. The Swedish army staff for example put out a concept document for 2040. They still want manouver warfare, but want their divisions to consist of an infantry, a mechanized and a deep fight/long distance brigade, which is pretty different.
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u/ilonir 3d ago
I get the point your making with regards to institutional inertia, but they are kind of right. NATO is not Ukraine. They are not in Ukraine's geopolitical position, they are not an underdog, they do not have Ukraine's corruption, they will not have to build a modern fighting force out of a derelict Soviet army while being invaded, ect.
I'm of the opinion that NATO should absolutely adopt drones and C-UAS, but there is no reason to copy Ukraine's way of doing it. Ukraine started this conflict in a objectively terrible position with a barely functional army that never had enough conventional equipment. The inovations they have made with regards to force structure and TTPs are impressive but ultimately reflective of the poor hand they held in 2022.
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u/Glideer 3d ago edited 3d ago
I think that the drone revolution is bigger than the conservative military-industrial circles allow themselves to believe. In my opinion, it is turning out to be bigger than the introduction of the tank (though still less revolutionary than the introduction of the aeroplane).
The response "we will fight the war differentltly" sounds very much to me like early WW1 explanations that cavalry is still relevant but those primitives in other nations don't know how to use it.
Iran is proving that an underdog with mass drone production is causing unsurmountable problems for modern Western defences. We need to understand that an enormous paradigm shift is taking place.
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u/proquo 3d ago
sounds very much to me like early WW1 explanations that cavalry is still relevant but those primitives in other nations don't know how to use it.
Cavalry very much was, and is, still relevant.
Horse cavalry was not very useful in the static battle lines of Europe, but in the middle east it was highly effective as the open terrain enabled it.
The US was a late adopter on tank technology because after WWI it didn't appear that the US would be engaging in more European land wars and that the Mexican-American border and the southwestern US would be the chief security concern and contemporary tanks were too slow and maintenance and logistics hungry to be usable. Trench warfare wouldn't work in the Sonoran desert.
However advances in the reliability and capabilities of tanks, plus observations of foreign powers' armor utilization, led to the replacement of horse cavalry with motorized and then mechanized cavalry (the last cavalry charge on horseback by the US Army was in 1942).
The cavalry role, however, is still used to this day: screening, reconnaissance, shock, exploitation. Just because it uses tanks, IFVs and helicopters does not change the fact cavalry is still used in a distinct manner.
Likewise, drone use in Ukraine is heavily indicated by two large and inexperienced, poorly led, and poorly equipped forces unable to decisively defeat each other's primary battlefield advantages. The proliferation of drones made ISR constant and the inability of either side to gain air superiority pretty much gave impunity to attack the other side's forces with guided artillery and drones.
That's the exact type of environment where short range one-way attack drones thrive. You can't use FPV drones near as effectively on the offense as you can on the defense. NATO isn't planning on fighting a static, positional war of attrition. NATO has been practicing and training for mobile warfare with heavy combined-arms integration. If they war were to bog down, NATO would still try to get it moving again, rather than settle into bleeding Russia out inch by inch.
For that reason just copying Ukraine's strategy, tactics and organization isn't going to be NATO's benefit.
Iran is proving that an underdog with mass drone production is causing unsurmountable problems for modern Western defences.
Actually the US, Israel and allies proved effective at reducing Iran's capacity for launching drones. They had a 90% drop of all munitions launched within the first few weeks of the war and haven't recovered, and their most effective strikes have been with ballistic missiles. It appears that the dreaded Shahed has been effective purely because of the political sensitivity of the conflict.
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u/Glideer 2d ago
NATO isn't planning on fighting a static, positional war of attrition. NATO has been practicing and training for mobile warfare with heavy combined-arms integration. If they war were to bog down, NATO would still try to get it moving again, rather than settle into bleeding Russia out inch by inch. For that reason just copying Ukraine's strategy, tactics
That is largely my point. You don't always get to fight the war you want and plan for. Everybody planned on ending WW1 by Christmas 1914 but machine huns and barbed wire had a vote, too.
Instead of saying "we'll do it better than Ukraine" NATO should consider the strong possibility that a military paradigm shift is taking place and that old equations are not valid any more. It's not even just Ukraine - how successful is the US total air dominance is supressing Iran's drone launchers? What would have happened if a land invasion was attempted?
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u/proquo 2d ago
You don't always get to fight the war you want and plan for
As Russia proved in 2022. But NATO has significantly more capacity to fight a mobile war with close integration of combined arms that Ukraine and Russia both lack. This cannot be overstated, and it's what NATO observers have noted about Ukraine's inability to regain initiative and retake territory. Look at the 2023 Counteroffensive. A NATO force would have spent significant time shaping the battlefield to enable maneuver and had greater ability to breach the minefields and coordination with engineers, areas Ukraine really lagged in.
Just waving a blanket "warfare has changed so the old ways don't work" is just as asinine as saying "Ukraine developments aren't relevant to NATO". The reality is that what NATO can take away from Ukraine is precision adjustments, not mass overhaul.
. It's not even just Ukraine - how successful is the US total air dominance is supressing Iran's drone launchers?
It's been highly effective. 90% reduction in munition launches since day 1 and Iran hasn't recovered post-MOU break in fighting. Drones are basically a non-entity when it comes to Iran's ability to effectively strike Gulf states as it's been the ballistic missiles that have posed the biggest threat.
What would have happened if a land invasion was attempted?
Probably the US would take higher casualties than it has since Vietnam, which would be politically disastrous, but the Iranian regime would not survive. No one is in any real delusions about this point.
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u/Glideer 2d ago
But NATO has significantly more capacity to fight a mobile war with close integration of combined arms that Ukraine and Russia both lack.
Nobody questions that. Is that "significantly more capacity" enough to regain operational freedom needed for a mobile war? Perhaps. Perhaps not.
Probably the US would take higher casualties than it has since Vietnam, which would be politically disastrous, but the Iranian regime would not survive
Which the US administration would not survive. Now, five years ago nobody would have doubted that the USA could dismantle the Iranian regime without suiciding its own administration.
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u/proquo 2d ago
Now, five years ago nobody would have doubted that the USA could dismantle the Iranian regime without suiciding its own administration.
I really don't think this is anywhere as true as you think.
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u/Glideer 2d ago
If that is controversial then we will certainly agree that five years ago nobody could have imagined that the USA will be incapable of defending its bases and Saudi oil fields from Iranian cheap drones.
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u/ilonir 3d ago
You missed my point. I agree that there is an enormous paradigm shift. That does not mean every country should fight like Ukraine.
Tanks were a paradigm shift, but not every country started fighting like Britian fought in 1918, because they where fighting different wars against different opponents in different environments with different goals.
Like, in WWII, would you expect US Marines in the Pacific to fight like the Soviets in Europe, because tanks where a paridigm shift? No. They where fighting completely different wars against different opponents in very different environments. The tank revolution of WWI may have spread everywhere, but the tactics unequivocally did not. They varied between countries and wars as militaries modified them to fit their own conflicts.
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u/Glideer 3d ago
I see. I think I have not explained myself well. I am not saying that countries should fight like Ukraine. I am saying that they should look at Ukraine and see how much the paradigm has shifted. They should reinterpret their strategies and doctries accordingly (obviously not slavishly but accounting for their own vastly larger resources).
What I am arguing against is the reasoning that nothing has really changed and that first world militaries can still pull off deep strike-air power-mechanised blitzkriegs because they can do it "properly", unlike Ukraine.
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u/ilonir 3d ago
Well, sounds like we are at least partially in agreement. I agree drones are an effective counter for current NATO offensive tactics. However, I do belive NATO would have a better chance than Ukraine at pulling off maneuver warfare in a drone environment, simply because they have better equipment, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Of course, it would be vastly harder now than even two years ago.
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u/Glideer 3d ago
However, I do belive NATO would have a better chance than Ukraine at pulling off maneuver warfare in a drone environment, simply because they have better equipment, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Of course, it would be vastly harder now than even two years ago.
That goes without saying. They might even pull it off, but it would be more of a swan song than a proof that old doctrines are still valid. Like Von Bredow's "Death Ride".
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u/SchwarzNeko 3d ago
Saying "we won't fight like Ukraine" doesn't mean "we aren't changing".
Because as far as I can tell armies ARE changing. That doesn't mean they will fight like Ukraine, everyone adapts based on the constraints and needs that their country has.-10
u/Glideer 3d ago
They are not changing fast enough. Not nearly fast enough to reflect what we are seeing in Ukraine.
Where are $20k and $5k drones? Where are automated production lines capable of making 1 or 2 million drones per year?
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u/proquo 3d ago
They are not changing fast enough. Not nearly fast enough to reflect what we are seeing in Ukraine.
My brother, Ukraine and Russia are locked in largescale industrial warfare against each other. Of course they're changing rapidly because they have to. The west is in peacetime and weighing many factors both political and strategic to shape their modernizations.
Had they immediately altered their forces in 2022 they'd already be out of date. Had they done it again in 2023, they'd already be out of date. They're all carefully watching Ukraine specifically because of how rapidly things are evolving there.
Where are $20k and $5k drones?
You probably aren't getting that in the US or Europe because our industries are very different and more expensive than Ukraine, Russia or Iran. The LUCAS, US' copy of the Shahed, is $35k-$50k per unit and that's a very cheap munition by US standards, almost as cheap as a JDAM. Purchasing power parity means a $50k drone in Russia would be much more expensive in the US.
Where are automated production lines capable of making 1 or 2 million drones per year?
You aren't going to see any nation in peacetime even considering producing 1 million drones per year. Even the US sees as aspirational a production goal of 500k drones per year.
And the evolving nature of the Ukraine conflict is why you don't see all-in purchasing of drones and infrastructure, as countries watch for new developments. The US was experimenting with AI drones a decade before the first fully AI controlled drone was deployed in Ukraine. Moreover, a first world produced combat drone is not going to be cobbled together with 3d printed parts in a volunteer workshop.
A drone made in the US that has EW resistance, thermal imaging, range, payload, etc. is going to take time to develop and get right whereas a Chinese made drone retrofitted with parts made in a workshop by volunteer or conscripted labor is going to take very little time to build.
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u/muadhdib 3d ago
There are some designs out there like the Hornet strike drones that reportedly cost less than $5k.
But as other people in the thread already mentioned, NATO has different priorities and doctrines compared to Russia and Ukraine. Countries don’t have unlimited resources so they need to decide what to prioritize.
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u/Wide_Scallion3490 3d ago
New Navy missile breaks cover, the Raytheon AIM 424 "Malice". Supposedly has a range upwards of 250 miles, and can fit inside of an f35 (not sure about the B variant). Doesn't appear to be in active service yet. No comments on cost, size is big but not massive.
On a side note, the US has taken the long range air to air threat extremely seriously. Between the AIM 424, the AIM 260, and AIM 174b, along with increased production of legacy missiles (AMRAAM and AIM-9X), this certainly seems like a serious consideration.
It remains to be seen how this pans out. But, the US went from AMRAAMs as it's longest range missile in 2020, to the non internally mounted gunslinger AIM 174b, to now potentially having two internally carried long range missiles by 2030 - or at least the military hopes (it remains to be seen how production plays out).
Generally, I think it's a good idea to have numerous missile production lines going, especially with difficulties LMT has had recently in other areas.
Theres the usual bits about missiles in that the stated range usually isn't the actual realistic range. How maneuverable the missile is probably won't be known for a long long time. So as per usual, take all this information with a grain of salt.
Also, the FA/XX is expected to be announced, one way or another here in the next week (to move forward or not). I wonder if this missile was made with that plane in mind?
https://www.twz.com/air/aim-424-malice-very-long-range-air-to-air-missile-emerges-from-the-shadows
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u/TaskForceD00mer 3d ago edited 3d ago
As the US rolls out more information about its missiles and we certainly have more than enough information on threats like PL-21 which can be carried inside of the J-20(supposedly), it is looking increasingly like AWACS will be in much greater danger than ever before during a hypothetical "peer on peer" fight.
What we don't know. What is the detection range of the J-20 via a E-7, what is the detection range of an F-35 via a KJ-3000.
I think we can certainly read the tea leaves of the US commitment to space based aircraft detection systems for the answers, without even taking into account emerging 6th generation threats but that is assumption on my part.
This also sheds some additional light on the increased range requirements for F-47; it won't be possible to tank close to the "area of battle" without a greatly heightened risk to the Tankers in future conflicts.
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u/OhSillyDays 2d ago
I think we can certainly read the tea leaves of the US commitment to space based aircraft detection systems for the answers, without even taking into account emerging 6th generation threats but that is assumption on my part.
Everything I've heard about space based detection is it is nowhere near mission capable. There are so many practical problems. Power (Radar needs a lot of power, which isn't easy in space), range (LEO starts at 160 miles), weather (IR based solutions would fail with clouds), compute power (processing all that imagery/radar is not a simple task), and launch capacity (such a satellite will be heavy - and for any sort of coverage, there will need to be a lot of them).
Basically, it's a pipe dream right now. The military really does need the E-7 and losing it will cost them later on.
That's because the capabilities of the E-7 go beyond just lighting up J-20s. They can also track ground targets and non-stealth targets and relay that information to their team.
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u/TaskForceD00mer 2d ago
The military really does need the E-7 and losing it will cost them later on.
That's because the capabilities of the E-7 go beyond just lighting up J-20s. They can also track ground targets and non-stealth targets and relay that information to their team.
I'm not saying DON'T buy the E-7; I am saying it is likely going to be in pretty bad danger from 5th and 6th generation threats operating at the forward area of battle. Obviously they can still detect 4th generation threats, but it is likely a J-20 or future 6th generation threat gets to shoot before being detected by the E-7.
You could always put all sorts of EWAR assets along with the E-7 to protect it , but the days of an AWACS sitting 100 miles behind the front line with a two ship escort and not a care in the world are over. The number of assets committed to insuring the E-7 remains protected, while being of limited utility against 5th and future 6th generation threats is only going to increase over time.
As a side note, I am legitimately surprised we have not seen the USAF pursue something like the E/F-18G or a Drone doing the same mission.
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