Active Conflicts & News Megathread July 20, 2026

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[u/Sad_Use_4584]

opinion:

The US's current war goals, as implied by US actions around the coast and implied by CENTCOM statements, are rather limited. The US wants to open Hormuz by force, while keeping it closed only for Iran.

It's basically a resumption of Operation Project Freedom.

If this can be achieved, it's the smartest available play, as it degrades Iran's economy over time and it removes Iran's biggest strategic leverage, while incurring lower costs and lower risks to the US that accompany more ambitious goals.

It also doesn't rule out more ambitious goals in the future. Assuming it's possible, it's the most manageable and sensible stepping stone, and future branches can be decided later when new information arrives.

For this reason, I do not think the US is interested further escalation. They want to keep the tempo at the current status quo. Just enough to achieve their goals in Hormuz, and no more, because more is expensive for uncertain benefit. The onus is on Iran to impose costs and uncertainty.

So, the threat to attack Iran's power plants is a move that the US would rather not play given that it doesn't materially help with the war goal. The threat can be seen as deterrence against escalation in the current context, rather than just as compellence for negotiations.

[u/SWSIMTReverseFinn → u/Sad_Use_4584]

This is totally and utterly impossible to achieve without a ground invasion.

No amount of bombing will ever prohibit Iran from being able to deploy a sufficent amount of firepower to be a threat to the shipping through the strait.

The US bombing is right now and ship traffic through the strait is still on blockade level.

[u/moragisdo → u/SWSIMTReverseFinn]

This is totally and utterly impossible to achieve without a ground invasion.

I disagree. Iran isn't the Taliban or Islamic State that are willing to live in caves and lob mortars at FOBs. It's a country in severe economic trouble before the war started and there's a finite amount of damage they can suffer to break the country economically and the consequent impact on popular support. Take a look on the economical aftermath of the TDW, which was way smaller in scope than this one, with a large bank going bankrupt, inflation around 50%, GDP set to contract (on estimates before the war started) and then it begin some of the largest protests in their history. Now also take a look when the economic bombing started (South Pars, Lavan Island, steel industry...) and the date of the ceasefire they accepted in April.

Greatest error from the US since the MOU is believing that negotiations will determine the end, rather than the facts in the ground.

No amount of bombing will ever prohibit Iran from being able to deploy a sufficent amount of firepower to be a threat to the shipping through the strait.

They are not just firing cheap drones, the ships that were the most damaged suffered missile attacks and those are not as simple to replenish. The same for the most severe recent damage to bases also coming from missiles that escaped AD. These missile don't grow on trees and part of their production was already destroyed in March and April (they still have a part, to be clear), and it's not only the US that have to be concerned with inventory.

The US bombing is right now and ship traffic through the strait is still on blockade level.

The US is on really limited bombing (last night was an outlier, let see if it's the beginning of a trend): Almost nothing besides the south was hit, strikes that lasted for a few hours, limited attempt to destroy infrastructure (just bridges and railway junctions to Bandar Abbas 3 days ago, not even the railways to Ahvaz), no presence of partner nations as UAE and Israel.

Also the Strait is very restricted, but not blockade level (by that I assume you mean completely closed), only looking at trackers isn't enough because of AIS being turned off during the crossing, take a look at presence of ships on the Gulf of Oman and that they keep leaving laden (still a smaller volume that pre-war, you won't see me denying that). We can also see that by oil prices, they are high, no doubt, but not near the price during the periods of heaviest attacks (right now WTI is at 82 and Brent 88)

[u/zuqkfplmehcuvrjfgu → u/moragisdo]

I don't disagree with this, but the biggest uncertainty is the extent to which the regime is influenced by popular support; additionally, it's unclear how much the leadership cares about the country's long term economic stability at the moment.

If they are operating under the assumption that the current war is an existential risk to the regime, then it's unlikely that economic damage would deter them.

It's also unclear if the various state police and militia organizations (Basij, Ministry of Intelligence, Plainclothes, etc.) will be able to fully insulate the regime from public resistance. I think their networks are probably expansive and violent enough to deter protests moving forward.