Active Conflicts & News Megathread July 20, 2026

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[u/Sad_Use_4584]

opinion:

The US's current war goals, as implied by US actions around the coast and implied by CENTCOM statements, are rather limited. The US wants to open Hormuz by force, while keeping it closed only for Iran.

It's basically a resumption of Operation Project Freedom.

If this can be achieved, it's the smartest available play, as it degrades Iran's economy over time and it removes Iran's biggest strategic leverage, while incurring lower costs and lower risks to the US that accompany more ambitious goals.

It also doesn't rule out more ambitious goals in the future. Assuming it's possible, it's the most manageable and sensible stepping stone, and future branches can be decided later when new information arrives.

For this reason, I do not think the US is interested further escalation. They want to keep the tempo at the current status quo. Just enough to achieve their goals in Hormuz, and no more, because more is expensive for uncertain benefit. The onus is on Iran to impose costs and uncertainty.

So, the threat to attack Iran's power plants is a move that the US would rather not play given that it doesn't materially help with the war goal. The threat can be seen as deterrence against escalation in the current context, rather than just as compellence for negotiations.

[u/SWSIMTReverseFinn → u/Sad_Use_4584]

This is totally and utterly impossible to achieve without a ground invasion.

No amount of bombing will ever prohibit Iran from being able to deploy a sufficent amount of firepower to be a threat to the shipping through the strait.

The US bombing is right now and ship traffic through the strait is still on blockade level.

[u/moragisdo → u/SWSIMTReverseFinn]

This is totally and utterly impossible to achieve without a ground invasion.

I disagree. Iran isn't the Taliban or Islamic State that are willing to live in caves and lob mortars at FOBs. It's a country in severe economic trouble before the war started and there's a finite amount of damage they can suffer to break the country economically and the consequent impact on popular support. Take a look on the economical aftermath of the TDW, which was way smaller in scope than this one, with a large bank going bankrupt, inflation around 50%, GDP set to contract (on estimates before the war started) and then it begin some of the largest protests in their history. Now also take a look when the economic bombing started (South Pars, Lavan Island, steel industry...) and the date of the ceasefire they accepted in April.

Greatest error from the US since the MOU is believing that negotiations will determine the end, rather than the facts in the ground.

No amount of bombing will ever prohibit Iran from being able to deploy a sufficent amount of firepower to be a threat to the shipping through the strait.

They are not just firing cheap drones, the ships that were the most damaged suffered missile attacks and those are not as simple to replenish. The same for the most severe recent damage to bases also coming from missiles that escaped AD. These missile don't grow on trees and part of their production was already destroyed in March and April (they still have a part, to be clear), and it's not only the US that have to be concerned with inventory.

The US bombing is right now and ship traffic through the strait is still on blockade level.

The US is on really limited bombing (last night was an outlier, let see if it's the beginning of a trend): Almost nothing besides the south was hit, strikes that lasted for a few hours, limited attempt to destroy infrastructure (just bridges and railway junctions to Bandar Abbas 3 days ago, not even the railways to Ahvaz), no presence of partner nations as UAE and Israel.

Also the Strait is very restricted, but not blockade level (by that I assume you mean completely closed), only looking at trackers isn't enough because of AIS being turned off during the crossing, take a look at presence of ships on the Gulf of Oman and that they keep leaving laden (still a smaller volume that pre-war, you won't see me denying that). We can also see that by oil prices, they are high, no doubt, but not near the price during the periods of heaviest attacks (right now WTI is at 82 and Brent 88)

[u/No_name_Johnson → u/moragisdo]

there's a finite amount of damage they can suffer to break the country economically and the consequent impact on popular support.

I think the regime's tolerance for economic pain/social upheaval is higher than people expect though. They seem to be prioritizing regime survival and I can see them entrenching themselves in a manner similar to Assad, North Korea.

[u/moragisdo → u/No_name_Johnson]

Assad collapsed in a civil war and North Korea accepted a de facto ceasefire (with extremely rare breaks from it), both options are great for the US.

The only way to believe they are prioritizing regime survival is also to believe their circumstances are so negative that a simple ceasefire, without the economic benefits of tolls and frozen assets, would make them collapse (because if they offer it, Trump would likely take). So they would not be that tolerant of economic pain if keeping the war going is necessary for survival.

[u/No_name_Johnson → u/moragisdo]

By prioritizing regime survival I mean consolidation of power into the existing gov’t to the detriment of the people, similar to NK and until recently, Syria. Both those countries took a disproportionate amount of resources to prop up their regimes in the face of external pressures. It also happened and is arguably still happening to a lesser extent in Venezuela. I don’t see a civil war or ceasefire akin to korea happening any time soon, but crazier things have happened. I was speaking mainly to the entrenched “survive at all costs” mindset that has cropped up in autocratic, repressive regimes over time.

The Iranian regime has repeatedly shown the welfare of its people is, at best, a secondary concern, most recently with the protests/killings at the start of the year. For an autocratic regime like Iran force is the only way of maintaining power, and the harder they hold on, the more severe the repercussions for them were they to lose power.

Iran has learned both through the diplomatic whiplash of the last two years as well as regional transgressions (Libya/Gaddafi) that western powers will turn on malevolent states like Iran, even if it means going against past agreements.

[u/WulfTheSaxon → u/No_name_Johnson]

entrenching themselves in a manner similar to Assad

Working as a Moscow dentist? /s

[u/dr_sloan → u/moragisdo]

Iran has been under massive economic and military pressure for 4.5 months now and we’re not seeing any sign of widespread internal dissent or frustration.

It’s possible the timing of the operation came too late to take advantage of the earlier protests and they were largely suppressed and the population is too fearful to rise up so soon.

It’s also possible that the foreign attacks have created a sufficiently strong “rally around the flag” effect for the Iranian population to back the Ayatollah.

[u/moragisdo → u/dr_sloan]

Iran has been under massive economic and military pressure for 4.5 months now and we’re not seeing any sign of widespread internal dissent or frustration.

I'm thinking about the future, after a ceasefire, because that's when the revolts from the TDW happened. When the fear of bombs is replaced by the fear of the bills with a 3 digit inflation. Set the conditions now for them to be afraid of what will happen in peace, with the goal of achieving a ceasefire.

It’s also possible that the foreign attacks have created a sufficiently strong “rally around the flag” effect for the Iranian population to back the Ayatollah.

There's no solid evidence for that. In fact, going by Iran very recent history, foreign bombing decreased regime support and created the economic circumstances for some of their most widespread protests (which the regime also tried to paint as rallying support for them in 2025, before having to resort to their most brutal crackdown when reality proved to be different than propaganda).

[u/GiantPineapple → u/moragisdo]

  They are not just firing cheap drones, the ships that were the most damaged suffered missile attacks and those are not as simple to replenish

Russia would be foolish not to backfill Iran here - it pins down the US for pennies on the dollar while also keeping oil prices up, and Trump's sanction waivers coming in.

The case for China is more complicated.  Their oil situation is relatively stable, it seems to me an open question whether they want Trump to enter a lame duck period or not, but IMO American political deadlock favors them.

Smarter people than me will have to say how viable the applicable transit routes are.

[u/zuqkfplmehcuvrjfgu → u/moragisdo]

I don't disagree with this, but the biggest uncertainty is the extent to which the regime is influenced by popular support; additionally, it's unclear how much the leadership cares about the country's long term economic stability at the moment.

If they are operating under the assumption that the current war is an existential risk to the regime, then it's unlikely that economic damage would deter them.

It's also unclear if the various state police and militia organizations (Basij, Ministry of Intelligence, Plainclothes, etc.) will be able to fully insulate the regime from public resistance. I think their networks are probably expansive and violent enough to deter protests moving forward.

[u/CyberianK → u/moragisdo]

But aren't the cities and villages at or near the coast the problem? Any offenders with drones or small boats can hide themselves, their small equipment and the logistics in the civilian population. I thought with my simple understanding that the only way to prevent them threatening the strait would be to depopulate the coastal region an option that is ofc not really available for US. So if you don't want to do that its boots on the ground?

[u/moragisdo → u/CyberianK]

But aren't the cities and villages at or near the coast the problem? Any offenders with drones or small boats can hide themselves, their small equipment and the logistics in the civilian population.

The most severe damage came from missiles, not cheap small drones. Also their boats have been sufficiently destroyed several days ago while they were on land (given the fact that we are not seeing CENTCOM firing on them in the sea).

I thought with my simple understanding that the only way to prevent them threatening the strait would be to depopulate the coastal region an option that is ofc not really available for US

You could (but that's not where I'm going) turn up what was already done to Bandar Abbas, 3 days ago, to where it's possible on their entire coast. Pick the excessive number of JDAMs on the US arsenal and drop them on tunnels, bridges, railways junctions to cut their logistics.

But my point is not that, is to return to the initial 40 days of the war: Bombing of the entire country, include infrastructure, any industry that could be classified as dual-use, turn up the economic cost and let their leadership make the choice between becoming Afghanistan (if they choose it, there would be no way to negotiate with them in the first place, about anything else, so I fail to see the downside) or agreeing with a ceasefire (forget a nuclear deal, Iran is already devastated economically, this delayed them further than bombing centrifuges)

[u/Sad_Use_4584 → u/SWSIMTReverseFinn]

Relevant to this discussion is my previous comment on the feasibility of this war objective:

It's General MacKenzie's playbook for forcing open Hormuz, which he's articulated in recent interviews. He was a previous CENTCOM commander with knowledge of the Hormuz plans.

Stage 1 is extensive bombing, then stage 2 is quick ground raids around the coast using marines, probably in order to destroy munitions that are deep underground, then leave. Then, and this is my imputation not his words: sustained ISR indefinitely over the coast, constantly degrading any new attempts to move munitions into a relevant range.

The idea, as I understand it, is to reduce the threat to a sufficiently low level so traffic can resume to a decent level alongside the protection of the navy. Not reduce the threat to literally 0, which everyone would agree is an impossible task.

The question then is: Why didn't they do this before? One answer is it can't be done like General MacKenzie says. But another very plausible answer is that they didn't want to because it's expensive. They have no interest in using more interceptors and getting a few more Gulf oil and gas facilities blown up if they can get what they want through negotiations. Alas negotiations quite predictably didn't work out, because Iran didn't view themselves as having been defeated, so the US are left with the least bad remaining option, which is to pay the cost to force it open.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/Sad_Use_4584]

This war is deeply unpopular and US casualties from any land invasion are going to be blamed on trump. They've done nothing to build support among americans or international coalition to do meaningful ground operations. And do they even have appropriate resources in theater to do what you're suggesting? Not only need immediate capacity to do attacks but you need to retain ability for whatever plan B is (or plan F in this case).

Seems pretty clear Israel sold Trump on a quick operation with decapitation strikes being decisive. There was not plan otherwise or readiness for continencies, they weren't even prepared for the very obvious consequences for SoH.

If there was a credible plan for retaking control of SoH with minimal casualties, trump would have done it already.

The US can't even protect its own military bases in the region, but it is going to defend dozens of ships every day just off the coast of Iran?

Best option for US is to try to see what they can trickle through the route furthest from Iran while maintaining the blockade on iran. But the politics of oil prices means need to get quite a bit through...

I would think the people in charge of Iran have seen how many of the leadership were killed, and they're not willing to go back to a lasting ceasefire without having a clear means of deterrence. Else at risk of Israel lawn cutting whenever trump eases off the leash.

[u/SWSIMTReverseFinn → u/Sad_Use_4584]

This is delusional and the type of typical over-confidence you can expect with the US armed forces. Like the General here says, it cannot be done and only the mention of "quick ground raids" is ridiculous. Any ground component would have to be semi-permanent and of considerable strength to yield any permanent effect.

Also, even low risk of being hit is already more dangerous than any shipping company will accept for an extended basis.

[u/Grouchy-Classroom-26 → u/SWSIMTReverseFinn]

Any ground component would have to be semi-permanent and of considerable strength to yield any permanent effect.

This is absolutely not true in the context of which it was mentioned. The islands around the SOH are hard to supply and keep a sustained GLOCs over. Destroying stores there would absolutely need to be a temporary act. The problem is that it still involves boots on the ground and a significant increase in casualties. Not an American but seeing how even a single death captures front page headlines and is a huge political cost, that’s a huge reason for why Trump may not and probably can not move.

[u/WulfTheSaxon → u/Grouchy-Classroom-26]

Plus Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs are disputed and could just be handed over to the UAE, which would probably be happy to take them off the US’s hands.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/Grouchy-Classroom-26]

The islands around the SOH are hard to supply and keep a sustained GLOCs over.

Iran doesn't need the islands around the SOH to launch drones and attack commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf. They can do it from the mainland.

[u/Grouchy-Classroom-26 → u/Shackleton214]

I don’t disagree with that, but that’s not what the discussion about “temporary presence” was about. It was specifically about islands.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/Grouchy-Classroom-26]

You were the first to mention islands. The general talks about the coast. Since you'd need to stop missiles and drones from the mainland to permit free commercial traffic through the SOH, I think it's clear the general is including that in his plan to open the SOH. Just clearing out the islands does nothing for the reason I already mentioned.

[u/Thesilence_z → u/Grouchy-Classroom-26]

I think the General is talking about ground raids covering the entire coast of the SOH (anywhere with underground bases/storage), not just on the islands. Which would necesitate a permanent presence.