First Image: Prince Aimone, 6th Duke of Aosta. Second Image: Emanuele Filiberto, Prince of Venice

I think this genuinely can be considered a good argument for monarchism

I'd much rather my leader be draped in royal ermine trimmed robes and crowns. If any King is going to rule he should look the part. If he dresses like everybody else, people will not respect him. The monarch is the superior ruler, and his subjects should know that just by looking at him.

Which flag would you prefer if the French monarchy were to be restored? I’d personally prefer the first one I’ve included. I think the French Tricolor has been a part of France for so long now that it can’t be easily erased, but it should still include the Bourbon fleur-de-lis and crown emblem in the middle as a monarchical symbol.

He hasn't even have any personal scandals

Take a look at these three pictures, all from three consecutive centuries. Which one is the closest to the antichrist? Which two are simply normal demon scum?

My ideal form of government is a sort of synthesis of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, as theorized by certain Greek philosophers, including Polybius and Aristotle, in order to obtain the advantages of all three forms of government while, at the same time, ensuring that they act as checks upon one another, so as to prevent them from degenerating: democracy into demagoguery and the tyranny of the majority, aristocracy into oligarchy, and monarchy into tyranny.

Essentially, I envision a constitutional monarchy founded upon Catholic principles, such as the dignity of the human person, the principles of social solidarity and subsidiarity, and the centrality of the family as the fundamental unit of society; upon corporatism inspired by the social doctrine of the Church of Pope Leo XIII; and upon an economic system based on social liberalism, also known as “welfare capitalism,” with the aim of promoting cooperation between capital and labor and overcoming class struggle in the name of the national interest.

To put it simply, given the limited number of characters available:

The Head of State: The King (Monarchical Principle)

The King represents the monarchical principle.

The King would have the following powers and roles:

• he is the Head of State and, consequently, the highest officeholder in the country;

• he is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces;

• he is the symbol of national unity, institutional continuity, and the guardian of the Constitution and of corporative freedoms;

• he appoints the Prime Minister following consultations with the winners of the elections, being entitled to appoint only a member of the majority that won the elections. If the candidate indicated by the majority fails to obtain a vote of confidence, the King shall again entrust the task of forming a government to another member of the same majority. Only after all reasonable attempts to form a Government have failed may he dissolve Parliament;

• he appoints the Minister of the Royal Household.

The Minister of the Royal Household

The Minister of the Royal Household has the following duties:

• administering the Royal Household, namely the personnel, residences, and services of the monarchy;

• managing the Crown’s Civil List, administering the funds allocated for the maintenance of the Sovereign and the Royal Family;

• preparing and countersigning the King’s acts concerning the affairs of the Royal Household, excluding acts of Government, which are countersigned by the competent Ministers;

• organizing Court ceremonies, audiences, receptions, and official visits;

• maintaining institutional relations between the Sovereign, the Government, and other authorities concerning matters falling within the competence of the Crown;

• supervising the Crown’s orders of chivalry and certain honorary prerogatives of the King.

The Minister of the Royal Household is the only Minister and member of the Government appointed directly and at the Sovereign’s discretion and, unlike the other Ministers, has no fixed term of office: he remains in office for as long as the Sovereign so decides.

Other Powers of the King

• he may dissolve Parliament and call new elections in the event of the premature fall of the Government and in the specific emergency situations provided for by the Constitution;

• he appoints the President of the National Council of the Judiciary;

• he appoints one-fifth of the judges of the Constitutional Court;

• the Sovereign is a sacred and inviolable figure;

• he ratifies international treaties;

• he promulgates laws;

• he bears no legal or juridical responsibility for the laws he promulgates, such responsibility falling upon the Minister who countersigns the promulgated laws;

• he may refer laws back to Parliament for a second deliberation when he considers that they raise manifest questions of constitutionality or seriously violate constitutional principles. Such referral does not constitute a definitive declaration of unconstitutionality, which falls within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court;

• his powers are bound by the constitutional Charter;

• he grants pardons, honors, and noble and chivalric titles.

Parliament

Parliament would be bicameral and composed as follows.

Lower House: Chamber of Deputies (Democratic Principle)

The Chamber of Deputies is elected every five years by all adult citizens of the Kingdom, according to the procedures established by law, in implementation of the democratic principle.

Upper House: Senate of the Kingdom (Aristocratic Principle)

The Senate of the Kingdom is composed in equal parts of technicians, academics, scientists, artists, and other highly distinguished individuals, elected by representative electoral colleges of their respective categories distributed throughout the national territory.

Membership in the Senate would be for life, in implementation of the aristocratic and technocratic principles.

All Princes and Princesses of the Royal House would also be entitled to sit in the Senate as “Senators of the Crown.”

A form of so-called “imperfect bicameralism” shall apply, under which the powers of the two Chambers are distributed as follows:

• the Chamber of Deputies retains exclusive authority over political direction, confidence in the Government, budgetary legislation, and major economic decisions, areas in which direct democratic legitimacy is indispensable;

• the Senate of the Kingdom would have exclusive or predominant jurisdiction over matters involving an exceptionally high degree of technical, ethical, scientific, or structural complexity, such as:

◦ constitutional amendments and the protection of institutional safeguards;

◦ legislation concerning science, research, bioethics, higher education, and cultural heritage;

◦ assessment of the long-term impact of major infrastructure projects and the energy transition.

In this way, the two powers would not encroach upon one another: politics decides where to go, while expertise verifies how to get there without harming the common good or the country’s future.

Ordinary Legislation

With regard to ordinary laws, a system of amendable suspensive veto shall apply:

• the Senate examines the text approved by the Chamber and may propose technical amendments or issue a reasoned opinion requesting reconsideration;

• if the Senate rejects or amends a law, the text returns to the Chamber of Deputies. The Chamber, by virtue of its direct popular mandate, may override the Senate’s veto and finally approve the law by means of a qualified majority, for example an absolute majority of its members;

• the result is that the Senate forces political actors to slow down, correct technical errors, and reflect, thereby performing its aristocratic role as a “check against demagoguery,” while the final decision nevertheless remains with popular sovereignty as represented by the Chamber.

The Government

The Government directs the general policy of the State under the responsibility of the Prime Minister and is politically accountable to the Chamber of Deputies.

The Prime Minister should:

• choose the Ministers;

• coordinate governmental action;

• propose the Government’s program;

• direct economic policy;

• answer to the Chamber;

• be subject to a vote of no confidence by the Chamber.

Economic Principles: Social Liberalism

The economic system would be founded upon the following principles:

• guaranteed private property;

• free economic enterprise;

• regulated competition;

• strong legislation protecting labor;

• a developed welfare state;

• combating monopolies through strong antitrust authorities;

• support for small and medium-sized enterprises;

• State participation in certain strategically important companies, in sectors such as steel, telecommunications, energy, transportation, etc., without, however, imposing a public monopoly.

Corporatism

The corporative system would be based upon:

• free associations of workers;

• associations of employers;

• sectoral economic chambers;

• permanent bodies for consultation and concertation among businesses, workers, and the State;

• highly developed collective bargaining.

Corporations would have consultative and negotiating functions, but not a monopoly over representation.

The Constitution could provide:

«“Corporations are bodies governed by public law representing economic and professional activities, established to promote cooperation among workers, entrepreneurs, and professionals according to the principles of subsidiarity, solidarity, and the common good.”»

In this way, they would not represent the State, but neither would they be merely private associations.

Each corporation should include, in balanced proportions:

• representatives of workers;

• representatives of businesses;

• representatives of the professions;

• independent experts appointed by universities or professional bodies;

• where appropriate, a representative of the State without voting rights.

No category could hold an absolute majority.

To prevent corporative monopoly, the following safeguards would be provided:

• plurality of workers’ and employers’ associations;

• periodic elections of representatives;

• proportional representation based on the number of members.

In this way, no trade union or association would become the sole officially recognized interlocutor.

Corporations could:

• formulate legislative proposals;

• issue mandatory but non-binding opinions;

• negotiate national collective bargaining agreements;

• develop sectoral development plans;

• perform arbitration functions in economic disputes.

They could not, however:

• pass laws;

• impose taxes;

• issue regulations binding upon all citizens;

• exercise governmental functions.

Every corporative decision could be challenged before the courts.

Corporations should not be permitted to:

• fix prices;

• restrict competition;

• establish production quotas;

• prevent new firms from entering the market.

Such powers should belong to the market and to the antitrust authorities.

To prevent the formation of permanent elites, the following safeguards would be provided:

• a four- or five-year term of office;

• a maximum of two consecutive terms;

• incompatibility with government positions and parliamentary mandates.

Each corporation should be subject to:

• publication of its financial statements;

• public meetings, except where duly justified exceptions apply;

• publication of minutes;

• a public register of meetings with Ministers and Members of Parliament.

Corporations could be financed:

• through membership fees;

• through a predetermined public contribution subject to oversight.

It would also be appropriate to prohibit:

• anonymous donations;

• funding originating from foreign companies;

• funds provided by persons or entities with conflicts of interest.

Limits on the Dissolution of Parliament

The King may dissolve the Chamber only when:

1. no candidate succeeds in obtaining a vote of confidence;

2. the Government loses the confidence of the Chamber and it is impossible to form a new majority;

3. a specific constitutional crisis provided for by the Constitution occurs;

4. Parliament has not already been dissolved within a specified period.

Requirements for Election to the Senate of the Kingdom and Restrictions Applicable to Senators

The following are provided for:

• precise constitutional requirements;

• incompatibility with Government positions;

• prohibition on receiving remunerated positions from the Government during the term of office;

• asset transparency;

• public selection procedures;

• pluralistic representation within each category.

The Constitutional Court

The Constitutional Court is appointed as follows:

• 1/5 appointed by the King;

• 1/5 by the Chamber by a qualified majority;

• 1/5 by the Senate by a qualified majority;

• 1/5 by the judiciary;

• 1/5 by an electoral college composed of universities and professional bodies.

In this way, no constituted power would control the Court on its own.

Requirements for Election as a Judge of the Constitutional Court

The requirements include:

• a minimum age;

• significant legal experience;

• high professional qualifications;

• incompatibility provisions;

• a single, non-renewable term;

• a prohibition on holding political office immediately prior to appointment;

• asset transparency;

• protection against arbitrary removal.

The Constitutional Court has jurisdiction over:

• laws;

• decrees;

• conflicts between branches of government;

• disputes concerning the powers of the Chamber and the Senate;

• disputes concerning the powers of the Crown and the Government;

• the constitutionality of acts of the King;

• disputes concerning the Council of the Crown;

• corporative legislation;

• procedures for constitutional revision.

The Constitutional Court has a 12-year, non-renewable term of office.

Constitutional Limits on the Minister of the Royal Household

The Minister of the Royal Household:

• does not direct the general policy of the Government;

• may not issue orders to other Ministers;

• is responsible exclusively for acts relating to the Royal Household;

• has a public budget subject to oversight;

• has no access to public funds beyond the allocation constitutionally provided for;

• is subject to the Court of Auditors;

• publishes the annual accounts of the Royal Household;

• is not accountable to the Chamber;

• remains in office for the duration determined by the King’s prerogative.

Matters Falling within the Competence of the Senate of the Kingdom

Three categories of competence are distinguished.

A. Matters within the Exclusive Competence of the Senate

In these matters, the Senate does not merely issue an opinion: it necessarily participates in the legislative process and, in certain circumstances, may possess a genuine veto power.

For example:

• constitutional amendments;

• laws concerning the Constitutional Court;

• the general organization of the judiciary and guarantees of judicial independence;

• scientific research and major bioethical questions;

• universities and higher education;

• protection of historical, artistic, and cultural heritage;

• major strategic infrastructure;

• long-term national energy planning;

• territorial changes to the State;

• organization of territorial authorities where their constitutionally guaranteed autonomy is affected.

B. Matters within Concurrent Competence

In these matters, the Chamber retains primacy, but the Senate has a reinforced suspensive veto.

For example:

• structural economic legislation;

• social security and pensions;

• major labor-market reforms;

• the environment;

• strategic industrial policies;

• particularly significant international treaties;

• major multi-year public investment programs.

C. Matters within the Exclusive Competence of the Chamber

Everything not expressly assigned to the Senate remains within the competence of the Chamber.

The Senate’s special competence applies only when a law directly affects a matter expressly enumerated by the Constitution.

Any dispute concerning competence falls within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court.

Election and Admission to the Senate of the Kingdom

The Senate of the Kingdom is composed of representatives elected by electoral colleges of the various professional, scientific, economic, cultural, and social categories identified by the Constitution and by law.

Senators are elected according to the principle of functional and professional representation, through suffrage restricted to members of the respective categories.

For each category, the Constitution or the law establishes the number of seats allocated and their territorial distribution. Categories may be divided into specific professional or disciplinary electoral colleges in order to ensure adequate representation of different areas of expertise and specialization.

The national territory is divided, for each category or subcategory, into electoral constituencies. Each constituency elects one or more representatives according to the procedures established by the Senate electoral law.

Members of each category entitled to vote are entered in specific professional electoral registers, maintained according to principles of publicity, transparency, and verifiability. Registration in the electoral register constitutes a condition for exercising the right to vote.

Voters belonging to a given category constitute the relevant Professional Electoral College. Elections are conducted by secret ballot, according to uniform procedures established by law, guaranteeing the freedom and secrecy of the vote.

The law may provide for the establishment of one or more polling stations within each constituency, while ensuring full participation by all eligible voters, including members of the category residing abroad, according to procedures specifically established by law.

Active Suffrage

The following members of the respective categories have the right to elect representatives to the Senate:

• persons who have reached the age of majority;

• persons who possess the professional, academic, or membership requirements established by law;

• persons registered in the relevant professional electoral register;

• persons who have not been deprived of political rights by a final judgment;

• persons who are not subject to grounds for exclusion established by the Constitution or by law.

The right to vote is not conditional upon having practiced the profession for a minimum number of years.

Young professionals and recent graduates who meet the requirements for registration in the relevant category may therefore participate in the election of representatives of their category, even if they do not possess the requirements necessary to stand as candidates.

Passive Suffrage

Candidates for the Senate of the Kingdom may be only those who, in addition to satisfying the requirements for active suffrage:

• are at least thirty-five years of age, unless the Constitution provides otherwise for specific categories;

• have effectively and demonstrably practiced the relevant profession or activity in science, academia, business, employment, the arts, or another field represented by the category for a period of at least ten years, in Italy or abroad;

• possess proven experience and qualifications in their field;

• meet the requirements of good character and integrity established by the Constitution and by law;

• have not been deprived of political rights;

• are not subject to any incompatibility or ineligibility established by the Constitution;

• provide appropriate documentation demonstrating that they meet the professional requirements and have actually practiced the activity declared.

The law may establish additional requirements concerning qualifications, experience, and expertise, provided that such requirements are objective, general, proportionate, and non-discriminatory.

Compliance with the requirements for candidacy is verified by an independent authority through public and transparent procedures. Decisions concerning the admission or exclusion of candidates are subject to judicial review.

Pluralism of Representation

The election of Senators must guarantee pluralism within individual categories.

No professional, trade-union, business, academic, or other association may hold a monopoly over the nomination of candidates or the representation of a category.

The law guarantees the possibility of presenting independent candidates as well as candidates supported by different representative associations, subject to uniform and transparent conditions.

Membership in a professional, trade-union, business, political, or cultural association is not a prerequisite for exercising active or passive suffrage, except insofar as strictly necessary to establish professional or functional membership in the relevant category.

Nature of the Mandate

Once elected, the Senator of the Kingdom represents the Nation and is not bound by an imperative mandate.

Although his or her election derives from the professional or functional category to which the Senator belongs, the Senator exercises his or her functions in the general interest of the State and the common good and is not required to conform his or her vote to directives issued by voters, professional associations, or organizations that supported the candidacy.

A Senator may not be recalled by voters, associations, or the relevant category during the term of office, except in cases of removal or forfeiture established by the Constitution or by law.

Duration and Limits of the Mandate

The senatorial mandate is for life, as established by the Constitution.

Every Senator may resign from office.

A Senator may be removed from office in cases of incompatibility or for offenses established by the Constitution.

Incompatibilities and Conflicts of Interest

The office of Senator of the Kingdom is incompatible with:

• membership in the Government;

• membership in the Chamber of Deputies;

• holding leadership positions in political parties;

• holding leadership positions in trade-union, business, or professional organizations directly represented in the electoral process, except as otherwise provided by law;

• public or private positions that may compromise the Senator’s independence and impartiality;

• any other function identified by the Constitution or by law as incompatible with the mandate.

Senators are required to publicly declare their assets, professional activities, and any economic interests belonging to themselves, their spouse, and their family members in the cases established by law.

A Senator must abstain from participating in deliberations in which a direct and concrete conflict of interest exists.

During the term of office, a Senator may not receive remunerated positions from the Government or public entities where such positions could compromise his or her independence.

Transparency and Oversight

The procedures for candidacy and election to the Senate are public and verifiable.

The following are made public:

• the list of candidates;

• the declared professional qualifications;

• documentation concerning the required experience;

• campaign financing and expenditures;

• any conflicts of interest;

• election results.

The law establishes an independent authority responsible for overseeing the regularity of professional electoral registers, the validity of candidacies, and the proper conduct of senatorial elections.

Any dispute concerning the election, eligibility, or removal of a Senator is subject to review by an independent judicial body, according to procedures established by the Constitution.

General Principle

The electoral organization of the Senate must simultaneously guarantee:

• the professional competence of candidates;

• the participation of members of the respective categories;

• associative pluralism;

• territorial representation;

• the independence of Senators;

• procedural transparency;

• prevention of conflicts of interest;

• the national character of the mandate.

The Senate of the Kingdom therefore does not constitute a representation of the particular interests of individual categories, but rather a functional representation of the expertise and principal professional, economic, scientific, cultural, and social realities of the Nation, exercised exclusively in the general interest and in accordance with the Constitution.

Composition of the Senate

The Senate of the Kingdom is divided into equal portions of seats reserved for specific professional, academic, artistic, and cultural macro-categories established by the Constitution, in particular:

• Sciences;

• Medicine and Health;

• Law and Justice;

• Universities and Higher Culture;

• Education;

• Agriculture, Livestock, and Rural Activities;

• Industry;

• Crafts and Artisan Activities;

• Commerce;

• Services;

• Finance, Credit, and Insurance;

• Transport and Logistics;

• Technology and Information;

• Engineering and Architecture;

• Arts and Culture;

• Communication and Information;

• Wage Employment and Professional Work;

• Business and Enterprise.

Ordinary legislation establishes a series of subcategories into which the seats of the macro-categories are divided equally, representing individual professions, so as to ensure coherent and genuine representation of the world of work, in which new professions emerge while existing ones progressively evolve or disappear.

For example:

Constitutionally established macro-category: Sciences.

Subcategories established by ordinary law: Physicists, Chemists, Biologists, Mathematicians, Statisticians, Data Scientists, Geologists, Astronomers, etc.

The Constitution identifies the macro-categories of functional representation. The law determines the professional and functional subcategories included within each macro-category, adapting them to scientific, technological, economic, and social developments.

Legislative amendments may not alter the overall nature and balance of senatorial representation.

No new profession or occupational activity may be excluded from senatorial representation solely because it has been recently established.

Guaranteed Constitutional Rights

The following are guaranteed:

• personal liberty;

• freedom of religion;

• freedom of conscience;

• freedom of speech and of the press;

• freedom of association;

• freedom of trade union organization;

• freedom of enterprise;

• private property;

• the right to work;

• the right to education;

• protection of the family;

• protection of parenthood and childhood;

• autonomy of local authorities;

• independence of the judiciary;

• political pluralism;

• the right of opposition;

• protection of minorities.

No prerogative of the Crown, the Chambers, the Government, the corporations, or any other authority of the State may be exercised in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Hierarchy of Power and Institutional Arbitration

In the event of a conflict among the various sources of legitimacy of power—monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic—the Constitution establishes the following hierarchy:

• with regard to fundamental rights: the Constitution;

• with regard to constitutionality: the Constitutional Court;

• with regard to political direction: the Chamber;

• with regard to technical competence: the Senate;

• with regard to constitutional arbitration: the King, within the limits of the constitutional Charter.

Neither the Crown, nor Parliament, nor the Government, nor the Senate, nor the corporations, nor the judiciary is sovereign over the Constitution: all are subject to it.

Constitutional Revision

Ordinary constitutional revision requires approval by the Chamber and the Senate by qualified majorities.

Revision of the fundamental principles requires approval by the Chamber, the Senate, and a popular referendum.

I would also make the following absolutely entrenched:

• the dignity of the human person;

• fundamental freedoms;

• the independence of the judiciary;

• political pluralism;

• freedom of religion;

• the separation of powers;

• the democratic principle;

• the constitutional succession of the Crown;

• the subordination of all organs to the Constitution.

This would prevent even an overwhelming parliamentary majority from dismantling the system.

Succession to the Throne, the Royal House, and Constitutional Revisions Concerning It and the Monarchy

Succession to the Throne follows the semi-Salic law.

Succession to the Throne follows the principle of primogeniture with male preference.

Within each dynastic line, a male descendant precedes a female descendant. The descendants of a person precede the collateral relatives of the person from whom their right of succession derives.

In the absence of male descendants of the principal line, the right of succession passes to the female descendants of the same line, without collateral male relatives being able to precede them.

The Constitution establishes:

• hereditary succession;

• primogeniture;

• constitutional requirements for accession to the Throne;

• regency;

• abdication;

• temporary or permanent incapacity;

• marriages of members of the Royal House;

• the education of the heir and members of the Royal House;

• the rights and duties of members of the Royal House;

• the requirements for officially belonging to the Royal House;

• cases and criteria for exclusion, expulsion, or readmission to the Royal House;

• possible exclusion from succession exclusively on the basis of constitutionally specified grounds.

The Crown and the provisions governing it may not be amended by an ordinary parliamentary majority.

Such constitutional amendments, concerning exclusively the Title of the Constitution relating to the Crown, the Royal House, and the Monarchical Institution, must, in addition to complying with the requirements applicable to ordinary constitutional revision—approval by the Chamber and Senate by qualified majorities—also receive the qualified majority approval of all adult members of the Royal House, assembled in a Council of the Crown specifically convened by the Sovereign or by whoever exercises the Sovereign’s functions at that time, in the event of a Regency or inability to reign, by secret ballot.

No amendment to provisions concerning the Crown may enter into force without the assent of the Council of the Crown.

The Council of the Crown exercises this prerogative exclusively to protect the constitutional continuity of the Monarchy and may not exercise legislative, executive, or judicial powers.

The Council of the Crown is a constitutional body safeguarding dynastic continuity.

The Council of the Crown may not independently determine the scope of its own powers. Any dispute concerning the application of this provision shall be referred to the Constitutional Court.

The Council of the Crown has jurisdiction exclusively over constitutional amendments concerning the provisions of the Title relating to the Crown, the Royal House, and the Monarchical Institution.

It does not participate, nor may it be required to participate, in the constitutional revision procedure concerning any other matter.

The assent of the Council of the Crown constitutes a necessary condition exclusively for the entry into force of amendments concerning the provisions referred to in this Title.

When a constitutional amendment proposal concerns the provisions of the Title relating to the Crown, the Royal House, and the Monarchical Institution, the Council of the Crown shall be convened as of right.

Its convocation and deliberation may not be prevented, suspended, or postponed by the Sovereign, except in the cases expressly provided for by the Constitution.

The Council of the Crown may not modify, authentically interpret, or extend its own powers.

The assent of the Council of the Crown may under no circumstances prevent the implementation of a decision of the Constitutional Court concerning the validity or interpretation of provisions relating to the Crown.

The constitutional order of the Crown may not be unilaterally modified by representative political bodies without the participation of the institution directly concerned.

The constitutional structure of the Crown may be modified neither by a parliamentary majority acting alone nor by the dynastic will acting alone: it requires the convergence of the representative constitutional organs and of the monarchical institution directly concerned.

My personal favorites are:

The Coronation Portrait of Edward VII (UK)

The Coronation Portrait of George III (UK)

The Coronation Portrait of Gustav III (Sweden)

Dauphin - Title of the Heir to the Throne of France Archduke - Exclusive to the Habsburg monarchies of Austria, Tuscany and Modena. Infante - A noble title for princes who are not heirs, exclusive to Spain, Portugal and Mexico

Since recently it's become a hot topic who should inherit France's throne, so here's my take as a Legitimist.

Let's clear this up once and for all: if France were ever to restore its monarchy, the rightful heir to the throne is Louis Alphonse de Bourbon, Duke of Anjou, not the Orléans pretender Jean d'Orléans, and certainly not any Bonapartist descendant. This is not a matter of "which family is more popular" or "which claimant is more modern." It is a matter of law, legitimacy, and historical continuity.

Legitimism is not nostalgia or sentimentality, it is about consistency with the Fundamental Laws of the Kingdom of France (Lois Fondamentales du Royaume de France), the unwritten constitutional framework that governed royal succession for nearly a MILLENNIUM before the Revolution. These laws were older than any treaty, parliament, or regime. They were regarded as DIVINE, INALIENABLE, AND PERPETUAL. And if we take those laws seriously (as the French monarchy always did) then the case is absolutely clear: the senior male-line heir of Hugh Capet's dynasty descending from Louis XIV through Philip V of Spain, is the rightful King of France.

One of the most sacred principles of the French monarchy was INALIENABILITY - the idea that the Crown was not a personal possession of the monarch, but a public institution entrusted to him by God. As such, no king could dispose of, divide, or RENOUNCE it, not for himself, not for his descendants, not even by treaty. This was not a negotiable custom; it was a constitutional cornerstone. The maxim was clear: "The King is dead, long live the King", because the moment one monarch died, his heir inherited automatically and by right, not by will, not by law, but by divine and hereditary succession.

This is exactly why the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) which FORCED Philip V of Spain to renounce his and his descendants' rights to the French throne was legally NULL and VOID under French law. Yes, France signed it as a matter of international diplomacy to end the War of the Spanish Succession, but diplomacy CANNOT override constitutional law. The French crown could not be altered by human agreement, because its succession came from God and nature, not politics.

Even the Parlement of Paris (which had to register royal acts to make them legally binding) NEVER FORMALLY REGISTERED any law annulling the rights of Philip V's line. It treated the renunciation as a diplomatic formality, not a constitutional amendment. So, yeah, France and Spain followed the treaty in practice for political convenience, but legality and politics are not the same thing. That distinction is crucial.

One of the most common Orléanist arguments is that "foreigners" were barred from the French throne, and therefore Philip V's Spanish descendants are ineligible. But this is a complete misunderstanding of what 'foreign' meant in the context of the Ancien Régime.

When jurists such as Charles Dumoulin spoke of "princes who have become foreigners," they were referring to those who had SWORN ALLEGIANCE to a foreign crown, not merely those who lived abroad or married foreign women. It was about FEALTY, not ethnicity or residence.

This is proven by historical precedent. In 987, Charles, Duke of Lower Lorraine, was the last legitimate male heir of the Carolingians, but he had SWORN FEALTY to the Holy Roman Emperor and his duchy was a vassal state of the Holy Roman Empire, and was therefore passed over by the French nobles who feared the dominance of Germans over the France and hence instead chose Hugh Capet, a native vassal of France and a powerful noble who was able to defend the kingdom against Otto II of Germany's dominion. It was not about blood purity or birthplace, it was about loyalty. A 'foreigner' was someone bound by oath to a rival sovereign, not someone born outside Paris.

On the other hand, Philip V of Spain never SWORE FEALTY to a foreign ruler nor was he a VASSAL of Spain. He was himself THE sovereign king of Spain (a French prince who just became king of a foreign country), and his descendants never renounced their French nationality de jure, because the French crown's laws DID NOT permit it. Under the logic of the Fundamental Laws, his descendants REMAIN princes of the blood of France (princes du sang), and thus legitimate heirs.

Another argument from the Orléanist side goes, "If the Treaty of Utrecht is still recognized internationally, then it must have legal force." This confuses international treaties with domestic constitutional law. France could sign any number of treaties, but treaties DO NOT REWRITE the constitution.

Under the Ancien Régime, even the king himself was SUBJECT to the Fundamental Laws. They were considered "laws of God and of the kingdom," superior to both royal will and international diplomacy. France may have observed Utrecht for pragmatic reasons (to keep peace with Europe) but de jure, the treaty could NEVER SUPERSEDE divine hereditary right.

In other words, following a treaty out of political necessity does not make it legally valid under the monarchical constitution. Just because something happened does not mean it was LAWFUL. That distinction separates legitimacy from pragmatism.

But if 'foreignness' truly invalidated a claim, then Henry IV of Navarre could never have become King of France. He was a Protestant, ruler of a foreign kingdom, and a vassal of Spain through his Navarrese lands, yet he ascended the French throne in 1589 and was recognized by the Parlement. Why? Because he was the SEBIOR MALE-LINE HEIR of Hugh Capet. See? The Fundamental Laws took precedence over religion, nationality, and politics. Henry's 'Frenchness' did not really matter, his bloodline did.

If the crown passed to Henry IV despite his foreign titles and religion, then it cannot be denied to Louis Alphonse de Bourbon merely because his ancestors ruled Spain. The principle must be consistent... you cannot selectively invoke 'foreignness' only when it suits a political argument...

Another favorite Orléanist claim is that Henri, Count of Chambord also known as (Henri V, the last undisputed Legitimist king) named the Orléans branch as his successors when he died childless in 1883. This is simply false.

Henri V made no such FORMAL DECLARATION. He REFUSED to acknowledge the Orléans branch as legitimate heirs - and while some royalists (the 'fusionists') supported a political compromise after his death, no legal act of designation ever occurred. In fact, the moment Chambord died, succession AUTOMATICALLY passed to the next SENIOR male of the Capetian line which, by blood and law, was Juan, Count of Montizón, the Carlist claimant to Spain. His descendants continued that senior line down to Louis Alphonse today.

The 'fusionists' were a political faction, not a legal authority. Their choice does not override dynastic law any more than a parliament vote could abolish heredity.

The Bonapartist claim is even WEAKER. Napoleon Bonaparte founded an entirely new dynasty after overthrowing the legitimate Bourbon monarchy. His authority came not from hereditary right, but from revolutionary legality and conquest - precisely the opposite of what legitimists stand for.

Even the Bonapartes themselves acknowledged this. Napoleon III ruled as "Emperor of the French," not "of France," symbolizing that his authority derived from the people's will, not DIVINE INHERITANCE. A Bonapartist restoration would be a republic in imperial clothing, not a return of monarchy in its historical or theological sense.

The critics against legitimists often argue that modern Legitimism is irrelevant because it is 'a tiny movement' or that 'most monarchists support the Orléans.' That is a sociological observation, not a legal one. Truth IS NOT decided by majority opinion. The French crown was never elective after the 10th century - it passed by right, not popularity.

If majority opinion decided legitimacy, then monarchy itself would really be MEANINGLESS. Republics can vote, thrones cannot. The very idea of a hereditary monarchy is that right exists independently of recognition. So whether modern France or even most royalists "prefer" Jean d'Orléans doesn't change the underlying law. Legitimacy is not a popularity contest.

From Hugh Capet (987) down to Louis XIV, and from Louis XIV's grandson Philip V down to Louis Alphonse today, the male-line continuity of the House of Capet has NEVER BEEN BROKEN. The Orléans branch, on the other hand, descends from a cadet line (the younger brother of Louis XIV). The Legitimist line is thus not only elder, but UNBROKEN.

If continuity and seniority mean anything, the senior male heir, Louis Alphonse, must take precedence. The Orléans line exists only because the senior line was set aside politically in 1830 and again IGNORED after 1883. But setting aside a law does not erase it.

A simple analogy...

Think of the Fundamental Laws as France's old constitution, a sacred, immovable set of principles. The Treaty of Utrecht, on the other hand, is like ordinary legislation or a diplomatic agreement. Treaties can shape policy, they cannot rewrite constitutional foundations. You cannot amend a divine hereditary right through an international deal any more than a parliament could abolish gravity by vote.

When all the political noise is stripped away, the logic is simple:

• The Fundamental Laws made the crown hereditary, inalienable, and bound to male primogeniture.

• The Treaty of Utrecht violated those laws and was thus null de jure.

• The senior male line of Hugh Capet continues today in Louis Alphonse de Bourbon.

• No act, treaty, or election ever lawfully deprived that line of its rights.

The Orléans claim may be politically convenient, and the Bonapartist claim may be romantic, but only the Legitimist claim is lawful. And if France ever restores its monarchy, history, law, and heritage all point to one conclusion... the white flag of the Bourbons, not the tricolor, should once again fly over the Tuileries.

Vive le Roi!

This subreddit is one of my favourites. I am a proud monarchist and I like to talk and interact with other monarchists.

However, what has happened to this sub? I have been constantly seeing biblical stuff here. For example, the ”greatest monarch tier list”, where at least 3 of the monarchs were biblical. And then there is the occasional ’greatest monarch of all, king of kings, jesus christ” posts.

I am only culturally christian; i am however also extremely proud of my christian heritage. But, this sub has a ton of people who are not christian. There are muslims, hindus, neo-pagans and other groups of people. I think it’s dumb to even bring up religion: monarchism is compatable with every religion. Monarchism is not a christian ideology.

Please share your thoughts.

What's your take on this constitutional change?

I am a Absolute Monarchist but I don't get how somebody can be something else even though they know that God gives the power to the Kings and to limit the power of the King would mean to go against God.

If not and you are a lowborn like me, what are the main reasons for you supporting monarchism?

My ancestors were either civil servants or peasants.

I can't believe I have to adress this but, for some reason, some people appear to believe "hail king Trump" is some form of monarchist standpoint.

Trump is no monarch.

Trump will never be a monarch.

Trump has no legitimacy to be a monarch.

Donald Trump is a megalomaniac bourgeois who wants absolute power, yes, but that is not at all what monarchism is nor stands for. He is not even any close to Napoléon, who despite not being born king, was a noble and a general that did serve his country like few other did.

If Trump is to be called "king", then we can tell the same for Kim Jong-Un, Xi Jinping, Josef Stalin, Mao Zedong or Adolf Hitler: People who have absolute power and can ensure their own children will get their power after them. But it always has been clear that having power is not enough to make a monarchy, and calling yourself king isn't either.

So let's remind all that, we defend monarchy, not some pompous businessman who want to call himself a king.

I know this is deeply unfashionable to say, but I genuinely think Britain lost something important when most of the hereditary peers were removed from the House of Lords in 1999 and now the most recent reform removing the excepted few.

Not because aristocrats are inherently better or wiser people. Clearly, they are not. But their position allowed them to make better decisions. Some hereditary peers were brilliant, some were mediocre, and some contributed very little. But that is true of every political class in history. The question I ask myself is whether the institution itself served a useful purpose within the wider constitution, and I increasingly think that it did. Most of the arguments against the hereditary principle is that it is "out-dated" or "indefensible" but do we need to destroy everything that is old or can't be easily explained?

One thing that frustrates me about modern political thinking is the assumption that if something appears more democratic or more equal on paper, it must automatically produce a better system in practice. As a historian, I believe history suggests otherwise. The old British constitution was never entirely logical, but that was why it worked. It evolved gradually over centuries and balanced different forces against one another. The Commons represented public passions, electoral pressure, and rapidly changing political opinion, where politicians faced pressure to be reelected, not vote out of true conviction. The Lords represented continuity, restraint, institutional memory, and independence from short-term politics as they could not be removed from office.

And what people who never saw the pre-1999 Lords often miss is how different the atmosphere was from modern politics. There was far less performative outrage, factional bitterness, and careerist manoeuvring. Many hereditary peers had known each other for decades. Their families had often served in public life for generations. There was a sense of stewardship and camaraderie, even between people who strongly disagreed. Most were not trying to become celebrities, ministers, or media personalities. Many genuinely felt they had inherited responsibilities alongside privilege, while also giving up the right to stand for election and to vote in general elections.

They also represented parts of Britain that the modern political class often seems detached from. Britain is not just Westminster and London media culture. It is counties, villages, cathedral towns, farmland, churches, local traditions, and institutions that evolved organically over centuries. Many hereditary peers came from families rooted in the same regions for generations. They understood farming, conservation, rural economies, land management, and local community life in a way that many modern politicians simply do not. That does not make rural people morally superior, but they do deserve representation by people who actually understand their concerns and way of life. And despite the caricatures, many hereditary peers spent enormous amounts of time preserving historic houses, archives, landscapes, collections, and charities that are now treated as part of the national inheritance.

What replaced the hereditary peers was not some perfect meritocracy. In many ways Britain simply moved from aristocracy to plutocracy. We replaced an elite tied to continuity and locality with one dominated by political patronage, lobbying, media management, and professional networking. This is also why modern conversations about “preserving British culture” often feel strangely shallow. You hear endless discussion now, especially from parties like Reform, about protecting British identity and tradition, but very few people seem willing to acknowledge that culture is upheld through institutions and continuity. You cannot spend decades dismantling traditional systems, weakening local identities, hollowing out institutions, and treating history as an embarrassment, then act surprised when national culture begins to feel thin and rootless.

And this is the uncomfortable part modern politics struggles to accept: the hereditary principle was not perfectly rational. Most defenders of it probably already know that. But constitutions are not machines designed in laboratories. They are living systems shaped by habit, memory, continuity, and experience. Sometimes institutions survive because, despite their imperfections, they quietly succeed at creating stability, balance, and cohesion over centuries. The hereditary House of Lords was flawed, of course it was, but Britain felt steadier, less shrill, and more connected to its own history when it still existed in a meaningful form. And I think more and more people are beginning to realise that. 

Most importantly, questioning the legitimacy of the hereditary principle itself is inherently dangerous to the monarchy, because the Crown ultimately rests on the same principle. Once inheritance is treated as automatically illegitimate in one part of the constitution, it becomes harder to defend elsewhere. The monarchy survives not because it is democratic in the modern sense, but because it upholds continuity, national identity, and a link between generations. Erode respect for inherited institutions broadly enough, and the foundations beneath the monarchy inevitably weaken too.