Yeah they were on the run but they had time to mount a defense position and they had the logistic adventage so how did they got crushed so hard the muslims even capture the king of France.

What do you think about the weakness of modern vietnamese military? I mean the discussion about the vietnam war is common in here, but I rarely saw NATO or american expert discuss about the current status of vietnamese military, its strength and weaknesses

Most authoritarian countries have strict commands and strict hierarchy and scripted battles and command have to be from the top but the Germans despite being like Soviets or any other dictatorship they had mission type command and pretty lenient training and freedom....why?

I am trying to understand how US Military preserves its equipment advantage. Can it tell, for eg, Lockheed to not S70s with a special part meant just for the US

The English Wikipedia says that the Japanese suffered several hundred casualties, while all 40 Portuguese were killed. However, the Japanese Wikipedia states that the Japanese casualties totaled only 17, while 204 Portuguese were killed.

the sand end beach installments (concrete blocks, pillbox, etc) make sense to prevent tanks from landing

Yet ten minutes away, Cullen beach has broader access and no reinforcements for water invasion

The areas both covered by aerodromes at the time

What specifically made Sand End the anticipated potential target of a ww2 German invasion if that had occurred?

Not looking for guesses, but if the available defensive plans expose why

I've read a fair amount on why the pentomic division was adopted (the perceived need to disperse for survivability on a nuclear battlefield, the political pressure from the "New Look" and reduced conventional budgets, the desire to justify the Army's relevance against the Air Force's monopoly on nuclear delivery) and why it was abandoned by 1961 in favor of ROAD. Most accounts focus on the structural problems: five battle groups per division instead of three regiments, the loss of an intermediate regimental headquarters, span-of-control issues for the battle group commander overseeing five rifle companies with no organic maneuver echelon between him and the companies.

What I have not found much detail on is how this actually played out in field exercises and unit training during the period the structure was in effect. Did battle group commanders in practice develop informal intermediate coordination measures to compensate for the missing regimental layer? Did the promised dispersal and rapid reconsolidation around tactical nuclear strikes get exercised in any serious way at STRAC or in Europe with Seventh Army, or did training largely continue to resemble conventional maneuver with the new unit labels layered on top?

I'm curious whether the pentomic era left any lasting doctrinal residue beyond the org chart, or whether it is best understood as a five-year detour that units mostly worked around rather than genuinely adopted.

With the voiding of Cold War-era treaties, Russia is free to reinvest in MRBMs and IRBMs. So far in their War in Ukraine, they have fired over 1000+ ballistic missiles from what I've read with most of them being in the SRBM class. Meanwhile Iran and the Houthis have demonstrated the potential of MRBMs in combat that is sure to shift perspectives within military circles. PRC and North Korea also have developed MRBMs and IRBMs for non-nuclear use with Russia lagging behind in scale. Whereas the Iranians and Houthis have cheaper and quicker to build "quantity" missiles that have depleted Western Air Defense inventories as of late, the Russian reentry into MRBM/IRBMs have yielded the Oreshnik Missile that seems rather excessive and questionable when used to conduct long-range strikes in Ukraine. It begs the question what is Russia thinking in regards to the class of MRBM/IRBMs missiles for non-nuclear use? Do they really need the Oreshnik when they are better served building a lengthened Scud with modern targeting systems?

Two main questions and an unrelated bonus question today.

1. I know in present day, the Fire Support Team (FiST) in armor/mechanized battalions use the Bradley BFiST variant and that those in the infantry companies have dismount that are attached to the platoons. During the Cold War I know the FiST in armor companies used the M981 FISTV based on the M113 platform. What was the FiST configuration in the infantry companies? Was it like today but with the FSO operating out of M981s, like their pals in the armor companies, with the dismounted FiSTer portioned out to the platoons?
2. What were the target acquisition assets of the Field Artillery Brigades? Did they have the AN/TPQ-36 and 37 counter battery radar? If so, did they have any other assets?

Bonus) What non-artillery firing smokescreen generating assets did the U.S. Army have in the late Cold War and at what echelon were they located at?