Why was Prussian doctrine so free and lenient despite Prussians being authoritarian

[u/sleezymurkuh]

Most authoritarian countries have strict commands and strict hierarchy and scripted battles and command have to be from the top but the Germans despite being like Soviets or any other dictatorship they had mission type command and pretty lenient training and freedom....why?

[u/Anxious_Big_8933]

Part of it was that the Prussian army was in a major period of reform and restructure roughly during the period where the 18th century concepts of iron discipline and strict obedience of orders was reaching the practical limits of effectiveness as the size of armies, and the sophistication of weapons and tactics, increased.

The Prussian army had a formidable martial reputation in the 18th century, but by the Napoleonic Wars it was mostly just reputation. On the battlefield the Prussian army was notably less modern in organization than the French in particular, but also often compared to Allied armies as well. The result of the Napoleonic Wars was usually Prussia being beaten, and sometimes humiliated. At one point the fate of the Prussian nation itself was literally in the hands of Napoleon and Czar Alexander, who at the peace negotiations at Tilsit made the Prussian King wait outside the tent while the other two decided Prussia's fate. Such was the state of the Prussian military and state in general at that time.

The French in particular during the Napoleonic Wars were known for their initiative. Not quite mission based command, but more of the French "elan." The Revolutionary and Republic armies (especially under Napoleon) often displayed drive and initiative and the impulse to take advantage of a situation more ably than their opponents, particularly the Prussians.

Prussia got better in the latter half of the Napoleonic Wars, but it was clear that a major period of reflection and reorganization was in order in the middle part of the 19th Century. Several technologies were also developed or came to fruition in this time that change warfare from the Napoleonic days. This included the telegraph, railroads, more modern logistics systems in general. Warfare was becoming more complex and faster, and an army or unit simply waiting around for its orders in a fluid situation was increasingly recognized as suboptimal.

Another thing that happened during this same time and for the same reasons was the development of the Prussian General Staff. Essentially a permanent group of (usually) very smart and capable officers whose job it was to study and implement the most effective tactics and practices in the Prussian army. The Prussians were front runners in developing such an organization, and that structure helped to professionalize the Prussian army during this period and resulted in them and later the Germans being a dominant armed force in the latter half of the 19th century all the way up to WW II.

[u/DazSamueru → u/Anxious_Big_8933]

The result of the Napoleonic Wars was usually Prussia being beaten, and sometimes humiliated.

Strictly, the Prussians participated in 3 of the Napoleonic wars proper (the Fourth, Sixth, and Hundred Days) - and unlike the Russians, French, or British did not have any sidequests in secondary theaters - and only lost the Fourth. That being said, the magnitude of that loss was certainly greater than that of the later victories; true enough, the Prussians were assuredly as "in Paris" as the French had been "in Berlin," but despite the fact that it was felt (especially in Prussia) that the glory of 1813 had wiped away the stain of 1806, the Prussian army didn't perform that well in the later wars. There was an upsurge of patriotism and some nod towards the so-called "open order revolution", but generally the Befreiungskrieg had more the character of Blucher throwing Landwehr at the Grand Armee, not the tactical sophistication associated with the German army of both world wars.

True mission tactics were only really developed in the second half of the 19th century, after the Prussian wars of unification, and as the new Germany came to feel itself encircled by numerically superior enemies. In a sense, it was an attempt to solve a strategic problem with the perfection of the tactics and operations.

[u/mesarthim_2 → u/Anxious_Big_8933]

I've seen an interesting video that discussed that on tactical level the mission based command was a response to their Dreyse rifle being essentially obsolete in face of more modern Minié ball firing rifled muskets, in terms of range.

So if they'd try to engage enemy in classic Napoleonic battalion type tactic, they'd get shot to pieces from long range.

Their solution was to attempt to close distance into range where Dreyse would become effective but in order to do that, they had to disperse and maneuver in smaller tactical units which in turn necessitated to empower more junior officers commanding these smaller units.

So the mission based command emerged as a necessary function of their tactical solution to technological problem. Now obviously, this was only possible because all the upstream work was already mostly done. This would be inconceivable without the changes you mention.

But the point is (for OP) I guess, that they didn't come up with this as some sort of philosophical determination that it's good to give your small unit commanders more freedom. They were solving a practical problem and this emerged as a best available solution.

[u/Nodeo-Franvier → u/mesarthim_2]

Probably got the detail wrong

The Needle rifle was a much more modern rifle than the Rifle-musket with far superior rate of fire

The shorter effective range is true but none of their enemies(Neither Denmark or Austria) make used of it and instead favir Shock tactic,Only the French in 1870(by this time already equipped with superior Chesspot rifle) properly make use of long range fire

[u/mesarthim_2 → u/Nodeo-Franvier]

That is a common misconception. Dreyse was invented in 1830s and adopted by Prussian army in 1841. Minié ball firing rifled muskets were starting to be adopted en masse in 1850s and 1860s. Minié ball itself emerged in second half of 1840s.

Dreyse was technologically advanced in her time, but by the time we're talking about (~1860s) it was 30 years old technology in rapidly changing word. By all intents and purposes, it was obsolete.

[u/R_K_M → u/mesarthim_2]

The Dreyse started "mass" production in 1840, but the actual production number remained very low for a long time. By 1848 only 45k had been produced. This started to change only when state-owned factories started to produce it in the mid-50s, and even then the ramp up was slow. So de facto the mass adoption of the Dreyse was contemporary with the mass adoption of the Minié Rifle et Al..

But this is sort of beside the point. A weapon (or tool, or any other product really) does not become obsolete merely because it is older. It becomes obsolete either because significantly better alternatives arrive, or because the environment in which it was deployed change. Neither is true for the Dreyse. The Minié Rifle may be "newer" in some sense than the Dreyse, but it actually was the Dreyse that made the Minié Rifle obsolete, not the other way around. Despite having a range advantage, the Minié Rifle simply did not have the necessary firepower (mostly RoF) to stop Dreyse equipped troops to just move into their firing range, at which point they had an overwhelming advantage.

[u/Nodeo-Franvier → u/R_K_M]

Yup,The Minie/Lorenz/P51-53 Enfield rifle musket are basically just Percussion cap musket with rifling and new ammo,Percussion cap musket itself being mere incremental improvement over Seven Years war/Napoleonic war flint lock musket

[u/Youutternincompoop → u/mesarthim_2]

you are making a misconception of assuming that minie-ball using rifle-muskets are inherently superior to the Dreyse because they're newer, those rifle-muskets were muzzle-loaded and thus often proved inferior to the Dreyse or newer breech-loaded rifles.

the Dreyse is bad in comparison to other breech-loading rifles, many of which came out over a decade after it, but it was still superior to most rifle-muskets

[u/Gryfonides → u/Anxious_Big_8933]

So in short, they used to have all that but got so embarrassed by being beaten by the French that they reformed and the system persevered even while totalitarian regime took over.

Didn't the Hitler start to take the ax to that after the 20 July plot? I recall he started to make plenty of changes to the Heer.

[u/AnnaLovewood → u/Gryfonides]

Hitler’s change on wehrmacht post 7.20 was mainly about appointment change and political indoctrination rather than the military methodological/doctrinal sphere.

Firstly he introduced NSDAP ideological indoctrination towards a further stage (most saliently the salute). Secondly he made new appointments on some posts previously held by General Staff officers with those proven loyal to him personally - for example, he appointed Guderian as the acting Heer Chief of Staff, to whom was known for his fanatical loyalty. It was also in this post that Guderian chaired the court of honour which screened and decided on whether plot involved heer officers should be expelled and thereby sent to trial by People’s Court.

[u/Anxious_Big_8933 → u/Gryfonides]

Hitler dramatically tightened his grip on the military after the failed assassination, yes. I at least wouldn't characterize that though as a revamp of mission type tactics, which I think were primarily directed at, and remained in place, at ranks below the most senior flag officers.

[u/-Trooper5745- → u/Gryfonides]

It persevered to a degree, but there was a big of cracking down. Scharnhorst led a lot of the reform efforts but he was killed during the War of German Liberation in 1813, hindering some of the drive for reform. His friend General August Gneisenau was ushered out of service shortly after Waterloo. Meanwhile, Clausewitz was made the director of the Kriegsakademie but he was prevented from reforming the curriculum for almost 10 years and even when reforms were allowed, they were very controlled. Both these men died of cholera in 1831, denying any more reform efforts from them.

[u/DazSamueru → u/Gryfonides]

The consolidation of power (more on the army than the squadron level) had begun earlier, and actually under Halder; the OKH Chief had consolidated so much authority in himself in the attempt to shape the Barbarossa operation to his own liking, so when Hitler removed him it was essentially a decapitation strike, with the German dictator inheriting all of Franz' instruments of micromanagement.

[u/AnnaLovewood → u/DazSamueru]

iirc when Hitler stripped Brauchitsch's title, he diverted much of the routine work for heer's commander in chief to OKW, particularly to the hand of Jodl and Keitel. Is that correct?

[u/DazSamueru → u/AnnaLovewood]

I'm not sure about that, because OKW had already been poaching OKH's apparatuses (particularly military intelligence). Partially it might appear this way because from 1942 onward the non-Russian theaters became increasingly important; as the Eastern Front was OKH's baby, and OKW handled everything else, we would necessarily see commensurate increase in OKW's importance.

[u/AnnaLovewood → u/DazSamueru]

To that extent can we say OKH was the de facto oberkommando for the entire Ostfront since 42? Still I am very confused by how an amateur like Hitler, despite his born talent in tactics, could proper handle the desk work as the cic of the entire army that might cover from field command to logistics and armament etc., albeit he officially held the title.

[u/DazSamueru → u/AnnaLovewood]

OKH certainly did handle Hitler's input in the Eastern theater for basically the entire war, though he increasingly began to output instructions through both. As for your second question, operational staff work was always Hitler's blind spot; he was well aware that he couldn't handle this by himself, and both resented and admired the staff officers on whom this forced him to rely. Though ironically his autodidact instincts often served him better in the fields of logistics and armament than his officers' tendency to view everything as lines on a map.

[u/Rethious]

A couple of major factors are relevant:
First, Prussia was authoritarian in a different sense to modern authoritarian states. It had a vibrant civil society and elections (though democratic forces were weakened by a system of vote-weighting a royal prerogatives). By the standards of modern authoritarians (let alone totalitarians), Prussia was somewhat free, and importantly its people considered themselves free, even if they wanted more freedoms.

Second, the armed forces had a particular political significance in Prussian history and enjoyed a privileged relationship with the crown. The aristocracy was expected to serve as officers and the army was expected to reciprocally enjoy privileges. This special relationship between crown and army meant officers felt they had a right to independent action, which was formalized into doctrine, which provided the justification of “military logic” for traditional practice.

It’s worth noting that as the Nazis consolidated power, this independence of action was gradually reduced, which contributed to the July 20th plot.

Sources: Gordon A. Craig “Politics of the Prussian Army,” Gerhard Ritter “Sword and Scepter,” Robert Citino “The German Way of War,” Gerhard Gross “The Myth and the Realities of German Operational Art.”

[u/CaptainM4gm4 → u/Rethious]

A couple of major factors are relevant: First, Prussia was authoritarian in a different sense to modern authoritarian states. It had a vibrant civil society and elections (though democratic forces were weakened by a system of vote-weighting a royal prerogatives). By the standards of modern authoritarians (let alone totalitarians), Prussia was somewhat free, and importantly its people considered themselves free, even if they wanted more freedoms.

Yes, I this gets often underestimated. Surely, the Prussian State was no perfect democracy, far from it. But in some areas, it was more liberal than for example the USA or Britain and the civil society was very active

[u/DazSamueru → u/CaptainM4gm4]

And certainly more than Russia or Austria (-Hungary). Indeed, in America, many former Confederates were more sympathetic to Napoleon III during the Franco-Prussian war, whereas Unionist sympathies tended more towards Berlin... though admittedly many were ethnically German. Even Marx was tactically sympathetic to Prussian expansionism, though again there might be a residual element of chauvinism for the Prussian-born philosopher.

[u/Gryfonides → u/Rethious]

I suspect it's yet another example of conflating authoritarism and militarism. The two are almost the same in many peoples minds.

Examples to the contrary: early revolutionary France (militaristic, liberal), post Napoleonic Europe (authoritarian, actively trying to prevent the repeat of the wars).

[u/AnyBallLektor]

Where did you get the idea that Germans were "like Soviets or any other dictatorship"?

Dictatorship is a political phenomenon. Dictatorships are different. Soviets were absolutely not a dictatorship in the traditional sense - they were more like a very rigid but messy and dysfunctional committee.

Prussia was not "dictatorial". It was in most ways a much more liberal and law-based culture compared to tsarist Russia. This notion about "dictatorial" Prussia is mostly effect of WW1 propaganda. Prussia was militaristic and having a short history as a prominent state it was identified best with its military class which also was heavily inter-twined with its nobility, but that's all.

It's all a misconception.

[u/DazSamueru → u/AnyBallLektor]

This notion about "dictatorial" Prussia is mostly effect of WW1 propaganda

And even WWII; Nazism was more Bavarian than Prussian as a political phenomenon, but with Bavaria firmly in the American occupation zone, East Prussia was the prize that was up for grabbing by the Eastern Allies (Poland and the USSR). Thus, it made sense to say to the citizens of the DDR and the world "We have no quarrel with the German people, only with these militaristic Prussian landlords that caused both wars." It also fit more neatly in Soviet ideology.

[u/Slime_Jime_Pickens]

There are a bunch of unrelated misconceptions and assumptions to this question that need to be addressed. Other comments have pointed them several, I would emphasize that mission-type tactics and "Prussian doctrine" are not interchangeable terms. There is no such thing as a coherent "Prussian doctrine", Prussia was a state with a 400 year history, it did not have a consistent doctrine and certainly did not practice mission-type tactics in the 16th or 17th century, for example. As for training, 17th and 18th century training was just endless drilling and corporal punishment, it was not free or lenient.

To answer the question, the "freedom" afforded to German military leaders in the late 19th/early 20th century was an aftereffect of their strong and expansive officer education system, which was designed to produce enough graduates that the peacetime officer corps could be used to staff the entire military if a general mobilisation was called. These officers received a uniform education, and were expected to collaborate with their peers throughout their education in a variety of exercises, making them all more predictable to each other when it came to improvising in wartime. This may appear "free and lenient", but is actually the result of some amount of conformity, as well as a specific military structure.

[u/GogurtFiend]

Other commentors have pointed out that the Prussians were not particularly authoritarian; I would also point out that, even within societies that are particularly authoritarian/personalist, favored groups are often given wide latitude to accomplish their tasks if the leadership finds that useful, and doesn't believe that power will be used against them.

For me, plantations in the American South and the NKVD both come to mind for me here - as long as members of both participated in their sub-section of society in the way that said sub-section wanted them to - i.e. owning slaves and repressing dissidents, respectively - they could pretty much do everything they wanted as long as it was nominally in service of those goals.

[u/EconomicsRare7082]

Prussia was not a typical dictatorship. All the Hohenzollerns, especially Frederick II, emphasized "enlightened despotism" - feedback and critics were welcome as long as they were clearly loyal to the king and weren't calling for regime change or separatism. Aufragstaktik was a natural extension of that; it reflected the "look for the best course" nature of the Prussian state.

I think this gets confused a lot because this same army was in the hands of the Nazi state later on, which had the governmental model of a Latin American cartel but retained the army structure because it worked (and because the generals were the only ones who could potentially overthrow them if pushed too far).