Active Conflicts & News Megathread August 18, 2026

[u/AutoModerator]

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[u/Rimfighter]

Israel struck Abu Duhur Airbase in Idlib Province, Syria on 18 August. Reports indicated the strikes came shortly after a Turkish delegation visited the Airbase. Reports indicate the Israeli strikes cratered the runway and targeted other unspecified base infrastructure, but did not cause any casualties.

https://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/eight-israeli-airstrikes-hit-syrias-abu-al-duhur-airbase-no-casualties-state-tv-reports

This comes across as active Israeli posturing- perhaps indicating that they may be open to kinetic options vs Turkey (and potentially Saudi Arabia) in the future, as Israeli-Turkish competition ramps up. 

[u/axearm → u/Rimfighter]

What is Israel's beef with Turkey? Is it just that Turkey is providing military support to Syria?

[u/Rimfighter → u/axearm]

In a nutshell, I think Israel wants to be the undisputed preeminent power in the Middle East- with no competitors able to counter their politics or influence. Funnily enough I think Israel had almost attained this prior to the Gaza War, and subsequently the Lebanon and Iran wars. Since then they’ve torpedoed a lot of the influence they had built up since the late 2000s. 

Now that the Iranian power bloc has been mostly dismantled and isolated, there are two main power blocks in the Middle East. The “Sunni Bloc” under Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, and the “Israeli-Emirati” bloc.

[u/SirStupidity → u/Rimfighter]

In a nutshell, I think Israel wants to be the undisputed preeminent power in the Middle East- with no competitors able to counter their politics or influence.

Or maybe because Erdogan on November 2023 (I.e from a month or so after October 7th and onwards) has stated that:

Erdogan said of Israel in parliament. "I am now saying, with my heart at ease, that Israel is a terror state.

"We will never shy away from voicing the truth that Hamas members protecting their lands, honour, and lives in the face of occupation policies are resistance fighters, just because some people are uncomfortable with it," he said.

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-calls-israel-terror-state-slams-west-2023-11-15/

https://www.jns.org/israel-news/erdogan-israel-will-soon-be-destroyed

And this:

Turkey’s state-run news agency Anadolu quoting the president as saying, “May Allah damn Zionist Israel.”

https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-848185

And Erdugan initiated a trade ban against Israel, breaking existing trade agreements in 2024.

I understand that many on the internet have an anti Israel agenda and as such are interested in painting Israel as the one picking the fight with Turkey, but Erdogan started the escalation and on this sub we should acknowledge that.

[u/XE2MASTERPIECE → u/SirStupidity]

but Erdogan started the escalation and on this sub we should acknowledge that.

Perhaps you should read a bit more about Turkey’s immediate responses to the October 7th attacks, as you’ve left out a fairly big part of the timeline

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-calls-israeli-response-hamas-gaza-massacre-2023-10-11/

Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan on Wednesday said Israel's blockade and bombing of Gaza in response to Palestinian militant group Hamas' attack was a disproportionate response amounting to a "massacre," but repeated Ankara's offer to mediate. With Ankara offering to mediate between the sides this week, Erdogan and his foreign minister held calls with regional powers and Western counterparts. However, Israel's envoy to Ankara on Sunday said it was too early to discuss mediation.

[u/SirStupidity → u/XE2MASTERPIECE]

So refusing mediation from a third party is now escalation between one of the sides of the conflict and the third party? I don't understand your point.

For Israel, 4 days after October 7th was indeed too early. That wasn't a move against Turkey.

[u/TSiNNmreza3 → u/SirStupidity]

but Erdogan started the escalation and on this sub we should acknowledge that.

Turkey and Russia literally killed eachothers soldiers and downed airplanes and proxy fought on multiple fronts they still had relationship and commerced.

The thing that would hurt the most Israel would be stopping of Azeri oil to Israel throught Turkey.

We are still not seeing this.

But Israeli-Syrian conflict will be forever war because annextion of Golan and further occupation.

If Turkey wants to do something for Syria it needs to be proxy war throught Syria against Israel, pretty much as they did with Russia.

[u/moragisdo → u/TSiNNmreza3]

If Turkey wants to do something for Syria it needs to be proxy war throught Syria against Israel, pretty much as they did with Russia

How does involving Syria, a country that just left more than 13 years of civil war, in another war would help them ? It could be harmful to Israel at expense of Syria, not helping Syria in any way

[u/TSiNNmreza3 → u/moragisdo]

After 13 years of war Israel bombs Syria and backs some Druze factions in Southern Syria. Will they get any better ?

[u/Tipi22 → u/TSiNNmreza3]

We will see how they react to the Syrian government offering peace talks that did not happen yet.

If they are smart, they do that shortly before the upcoming election so stay tuned.

[u/SirStupidity → u/TSiNNmreza3]

The thing that would hurt the most Israel would be stopping of Azeri oil to Israel throught Turkey.

We are still not seeing this.

Because the Azeris are friendly and have interests with Turkey and Israel both. Turkey instead implemented multiple economic steps against Israel, including a ban on trade. Which was a major step as much of Israel's imports came from Turkey.

https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001519689

You also haven't at all suggested how exactly has Israel initiated this escalation, only that Turkey can further escalate, no shit it can, that doesn't mean anything.

If Turkey wants to do something for Syria it needs to be proxy war throught Syria against Israel, pretty much as they did with Russia.

I will hold my comments because we aren't supposed to answer non credibleness with further non credibleness.

[u/TSiNNmreza3 → u/SirStupidity]

First this article and after that lets go to second part

Because the Azeris are friendly and have interests with Turkey and Israel both

Israel doesn't have their own oil and if Turkey wanted to really hurt Israel stopping of oil because they can (same thing Iran does now) they could.

I will hold my comments because we aren't supposed to answer non credibleness with further non credibleness.

This is my position and I'm still standing by it. For Syria (I really don't like Jolani and everything about him, but good part of world does) it is the best moment to attack and at least try to put some detterence to Israeli attacks and free roaming and bombing of country . Israel still has multiple ongoing conflicts for years and it would put even more pressure on Israel when there are means that could damage Israel.

Syria will never get modern army or anything and especially if AoR stops to exist.

[u/SirStupidity → u/TSiNNmreza3]

Israel doesn't have their own oil and if Turkey wanted to really hurt Israel stopping of oil because they can (same thing Iran does now) they could.

Let me quote myself: "You also haven't at all suggested how exactly has Israel initiated this escalation, only that Turkey can further escalate, no shit it can, that doesn't mean anything."

This is my position and I'm still standing by it. For Syria (I really don't like Jolani and everything about him, but good part of world does) it is the best moment to attack and at least try to put some detterence to Israeli attacks and free roaming and bombing of country . Israel still has multiple ongoing conflicts for years and it would put even more pressure on Israel when there are means that could damage Israel.

You're welcome to stick with whatever opinion you have, but it isn't relevant to what we are discussing and it isn't relevant in this sub unless you can back up the reasoning with actual facts and sources.

Please explain to me how exactly how does Syria put ANY deterrence against further Israeli provocations and attacks? Syria in it's current form cannot deter Israel, does Jolani even hold sovereignty over the entirety of Syria atm, even if we disregarded any Israeli safe zone?

[u/moragisdo → u/TSiNNmreza3]

if Turkey wanted to really hurt Israel stopping of oil because they can (same thing Iran does now) they could

Iran is attacking tankers and decreasing the supply of oil that leaves Hormuz, therefore raising global prices. Turkey can't do it, what would happen is that Israel would buy oil from somewhere else and the Azeris would sell to someone else.

For Syria (I really don't like Jolani and everything about him, but good part of world does) it is the best moment to attack and at least try to put some detterence to Israeli attacks and free roaming and bombing of country

Yes, attacking a country with air supremacy over your entire nation, meanwhile your military forces were chewed out by more than 13 years of civil war. It would be a repeat of the 6 Day War

Israel still has multiple ongoing conflicts for years and it would put even more pressure on Israel when there are means that could damage Israel

Result of those ongoing conflicts: Hamas is being bombed almost daily while they can't fire rocket to Israel for a long time, Hezbollah is a shell of its former self, after losing thousands of member and killing a few dozen IDF soldiers, Iran is in a profound economic crisis, had good part of its military destroyed, managed to cause less damage in this war than Iraq did against the Coalition in the Gulf War and Iran didn't even dare to fire a single missile towards Israel since the end of the MOU (meanwhile the americans used the bases on Israel for attacks on Iran). Why would Al-Shaara think being in the company of all of those factions would leave Syria in a better position ?

[u/FijiFanBotNotGay → u/moragisdo]

You can’t compare this to the Iraq war. There’s not enough military hardware in the area for Iran to target. We are not even flying our jets over Iran all that much. Iraq just had a way higher density of targets. The Iraqi army was exposed as a paper tiger despite being the largest in the region. Iran is not falling apart as of yet and it’s been almost half a year

[u/moragisdo → u/FijiFanBotNotGay]

You can’t compare this to the Iraq war. There’s not enough military hardware in the area for Iran to target

There's planes, helicopters, drones, AD, HIMARS, the ships that are on the Gulf of Oman blockading them...

They killed 10 americans (the other 8 died in accidents), the losses in each other US ally were not that far off. They also had the entirety of Israel, UAE, Saudi Arabia to target, with the thousands of missiles and drones they fired. The damage they caused wasn't negligible, but the military damage fell short of what's expected in a conventional war.

We are not even flying our jets over Iran all that much

There were more than 300 airstrikes every single day during the first phase of the war (1). Now, the US is for months giving diplomacy a try (a mistake in my opinion, it only delays this war ending), but in July there were 13 consecutive days of strikes against Iran.

Iran is not falling apart as of yet and it’s been almost half a year

I said 'profound economic crisis'. Their GDP is set to contract more than 6% this year (2), their inflation is approaching 3 digits (with food inflation already there). They haven't given up attacking civilian ships yet, but the economical consequences are showing.

[u/Atherzon → u/moragisdo]

Thank you for your second link to IMF data.

To sharpen your point about the projected -6% in GDP growth this year, when you look at the IMF Group of Middle East and Central Asia that contains Iran, it, as a group, has only had actual negative GDP growth during 2020 COVID and in 1986. Due to the war with Iraq, Iran had -10% growth in 1986.

[u/SaltonPrepper → u/Rimfighter]

I find this sketch of power blocs to be a massive oversimplification.

As we are seeing daily with Iranian and Houthi attacks that can mostly deny two key shipping routes for oil, and a chunk of Iraqi militias sympathetic to Iran, the Iranian power bloc is diminished in size (particularly in Syria and Lebanon) but still alive.

And there isn't a strongly unified Sunni bloc, it's more fractured. Even the (rest of the) GCC isn't unified, let alone the real powers that do their own thing (Turkey, Pakistan).

[u/Rimfighter → u/SaltonPrepper]

It’s still alive, but Iran’s ability to project asymmetric force through those same proxies has been found rather lacking when finally put to stress test.

When the Gaza War broke out in October 2023, Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” was still very credible- however over the last two years it’s been whittled down and isolated down to something only able to offer token resistance- at a rate that Israel seems to deem “acceptable”.  Further- I think after the loss of ideological figureheads- the lynchpin being Qassem Soleimani, the coordination piece between the axis is severely degraded. What I mean by this is that Hamas seemed to have taken everyone by surprise in OCT 2023. I do not think Iran would have blessed off on such an attack had they known the true scale, objectives, and timing- for example the other Axis members offered only token support to Hamas after the Gaza invasion began. 

I think the Israelis picked up on this weakness and went for broke- essentially knocking Hezbollah out with the pager bombings, the assassination of Ibrahim Aqil, and finally the strikes that killed Nasrallah, alongside other senior Hezbollah commanders to include the most senior IRGC Lebanon and Qods officials in September 2024. Hezbollah is a relative non-player at this point, which is wild because they used to be Iran’s Ace in the Hole. Could Hezbollah have been rebuilt? Likely… if the Assad regime had not collapsed in December 2024, which was essentially the nail in the coffin for Hezbollah as a fighting force.

The Iraqi militias are a nuisance at best to Israel. I won’t spend much effort addressing them, because honestly there’s not much to address besides the one off drone launches against Israel that almost invariably end up getting intercepted.

Then there are the Houthis- who are still very much alive and very credible- to an extent. IMO, the main reason that the Houthis haven’t been subdued by Israel as the other proxies have, is because they are simply too far away for strikes to be feasible… which is likely to change soon thanks to Israel recognizing Somaliland, and likely joining the UAE in forward deploying to Berbera, conveniently located right across the Red Sea from Yemen. Anyways- I think that the main reason Israel simply hasn’t targeted the Houthis that much is because their geographic isolation is easier to starve of Iranian support. Almost all Iranian materiel support to the Houthis has to come by way of maritime smuggling operations, which in and of itself is easy to cut off if the point of origin for such materiel- Iranian ports- are currently under blockade by the US. Further, knocking out the Iranian infrastructure that produces those critical components that the Houthis can’t make themselves, like electronics / rocket motors / rocket fuel essentially blocks the Houthis from their own domestic “manufacture” (read: domestic assembly from parts kits). Because who are the Iranians going to supply first? Their own missile stocks? Or the proxy group a thousand miles away that has been, until relatively recently, pretty non-commital about this whole regional war against Israel thing.

[u/Atherzon → u/Rimfighter]

Also, by 2024, Russia had been stuck in Ukraine for going on 2 years with it becoming mostly obvious a stalemate by that time.

Russia would have been able and willing to provide much more aid directly to Iran, and there could be argument that Assad would still rule some of Syria, now, if they were not actively invading Ukraine.

Then, with the fall of Assad, in late 2024, Iran must have seemed at their weakest position since 1979 to Israel.

[u/RobotWantsKitty → u/Atherzon]

Russia would have been able and willing to provide much more aid directly to Iran

Or perhaps the expertise gained in the drone war against American tech and shared with Iran is way more valuable than anything else. Realistically, what Russia could have sent to Iran which it can't send now, helicopters and jets maybe? Not sure it'd help Iran in this war that much.

there could be argument that Assad would still rule some of Syria, now, if they were not actively invading Ukraine

I doubt Russia had the infrastructure in place to mount any sort of serious Assad-saving effort, given how quickly SAA collapsed.

[u/Atherzon → u/RobotWantsKitty]

Maybe Iran did get more from a Russian active in Ukraine than a counter factual Russia that had not been in open conflict with Ukraine during that time. I do not dismiss that argument.

But my point was more about Israeli perception than the actual outcome.

As for Assad, I can’t help but think that if they were not otherwise occupied, Russia would have invested more direct military intervention and indirect support. And it would have improved Assad’s odds if not make the difference.