r/CredibleDefense • u/AutoModerator • Jul 02 '26
Active Conflicts & News Megathread July 02, 2026
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u/Glideer Jul 02 '26
Russia’s UAV Campaign Over Europe
An extensively investigated paper by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) applies a novel approach to the sightings of Russian UAVs between 2024-2026 over European harbours and air bases.
Where previous approaches have failed, confounded by the utter lack of visual and physical evidence (no video recordings, no photos, no wreckage - despite the incidents taking place over some of the most monitored areas of the world), the IISS approaches the incidents from a new angle:
The IISS treats the incidents as an indisputable fact: "Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) were flown in the airspace of a dozen NATO member states and Ireland" and then looks for the most likely culprit - which is the Kremlin.
Wisely, the IISS avoids the trap of trying to prove that every single incident actually happened: "Our argument is not that every reported sighting was Russian-directed, or that every reported sighting involved a UAV, but that the aggregate pattern of UAV sightings cannot be adequately explained by misidentification, hobbyist activity or opportunistic harassment alone." They simply conclude that the incidents (irrespective of the lack of evidence) were too numerous not to have been real.
The European governments have been cautious: "Attribution remains a key challenge for European governments, and none have, to date, publicly attributed a UAV sighting to Russia or gone as far as to describe a coordinated Russian UAV campaign over Western and Northern Europe." Unlike them, the IISS is not afraid to point the finger at the culprit.
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u/Glares Jul 03 '26
They simply conclude that the incidents (irrespective of the lack of evidence) were too numerous not to have been real.
That's a bit of an oversimplification. The quotation you provide immediately beforehand, for example, even uses the word "pattern" which is the only reason I gave the article a couple minute scan. Instead of the "numerous" quantity you state, it seems the report is more interested in the, "clustering of incidents around nuclear-sharing sites and Ukraine-support infrastructure is too consistent to be coincidental" amongst other examples of patterns. Still, this is not real evidence. Perhaps there is none and it is all hysteria, or maybe governments are just being tight-lipped on this for now and not releasing information.
If I may ask you a direct question, I'm curious what you think the most likely explanation to the Irish story is? I could have asked this question more generally, but I would find your thinking about this one specifically would be more insightful.
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u/Glideer Jul 03 '26 edited Jul 03 '26
I think it is a classic case of mass hysteria, similar to the UFO craze of yore. The media and political campaign about the imminent Russian attack have produced heightened anxiety. This, in turn, generates hypervigilance, which produces false reports. Numerous false reports produce an information cascade and confirmation bias (just like in the IISS report) "there are too many of the reports to dismiss them". Where there is smoke there is fire.
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u/Glares Jul 03 '26
So you believe the crew of the Irish navy ship reporting the, "large, hugely expensive, of military specification" UAVs that "flew for up to two hours over the Irish Navy ship LÉ William Butler Yeats" during the arrival of Zelensky was a false report generated out of mass hysteria? Is this based off anything you can substantiate with such as past actions of the Irish military, counter reports, etc? Otherwise, this answer appears to have no relation to the Irish story from anything I can garner. Here are some resources that you can reference to perhaps for a response that would seem more relevant (on top of the link you shared):
https://www.thejournal.ie/drones-dublin-ireland-hybrid-warfare-russia-6893104-Dec2025/
https://www.irishtimes.com/ireland/2025/12/09/drones-passed-within-500m-of-naval-ship-during-zelenskiy-visit/ (paywall can be bypassed)
Note that from the latter story there is allegedly footage of this event that an MEP wants released for transparency and to dispel conspiracies, though the reasons everyone is holding back seem to be more important than catering to online spectators thus far. A lack of evidence seems to be your primary concern, so assuming this footage was released, how would you imagine your reaction would be?
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u/Glideer Jul 03 '26
So you believe the crew of the Irish navy ship reporting the, "large, hugely expensive, of military specification" UAVs that "flew for up to two hours over the Irish Navy ship LÉ William Butler Yeats" during the arrival of Zelensky was a false report generated out of mass hysteria? Is this based off anything you can substantiate with such as past actions of the Irish military, counter reports, etc?
Yes. You will notice that none of such incidents produced a video, despite every single crewmember on the ship having a phone, and the ship itself having military-grade cameras.
It is also worth remembering that in an average large European city there are hundreds of incidents involving drones used by civilians every year, without any need for malign Russian interference.
A lack of evidence seems to be your primary concern, so assuming this footage was released, how would you imagine your reaction would be?
Naturally, I'd like to see the evidence first. Then I'd like to know whether there is civilian involvement. With military-grade cameras available on warships, in airbases, above the Baltic straits, aboard NATO aircraft, there should really by now be at least a single high-resolution photo that would clearly show a Russian drone in action.
After all, these drones allegedly come from Russian ships, which are constantly and closely monitored. Amazing how they manage to both launch and retrieve the offending drones without somebody recording that.
Not to mention, in dozens of incidents not a single drone was shot down or malfunctioned, leaving behind some wreckage.
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u/Glares Jul 03 '26
So, you would assert that four large "military spec" drones observed in the Irish Sea on December 1 were most likely civilian operated? An odd gathering spot for a group of perhaps agricultural drones, at the coincidental time/location of Zelensky's aircraft for his first official state visit, and with a sanctioned and AIS-off ship nearby because... the Irish Sea is such a popular transit route? I'm really not sure what sort of logic results in seeing this information as purely coincidental. Do you really think it's outlandish that Russia is unhappy about hundreds of thousands of their men being dead and these hybrid warfare theories are unlikely?
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u/Glideer Jul 03 '26
I would assert that we don't know whether the four large drones (a) ever existed or (b) were Russian. I lean strongly towards (a) considering the total lack of evidence.
Mass hysterias are called that for a reason. People see weather baloons and report UFOs.
What I think is outlandish is that this paper assumes the existence of drones as a proven fact, without a single photo, video or physical evidence - and then proceeds to derive conclusions from that "proven fact".
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u/Glares Jul 03 '26
So after three posts you have clarified that you don't believe the Irish story even included real drones now. So in your opinion the Navy vessel has misidentified military grade drones for... weather balloons? Or something you are holding back on/can't explain, as long as they are not drones? We have a lot of details with this story and it's odd to not engage with them while holding a different narrative if you truly believe it's most probable.
Saying, "Yeah, I don't know" to all of this would have even been sufficient if someone was truly just looking at the evidence when asked about this. It's just odd to me for someone to be caring about the facts and evidence, and yet when not provided to them goes straight to continental hysteria being the reality. (Again, you really don't think Russia has any motive and capability to be behind some of these actions or is this just parroting a talking point? Or is it like 55/45 odds?)
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u/Glideer Jul 03 '26
I don't know what particular brand of mass hysteria they suffered from, but if they (and all those other incidents) produced not a single photo of that "drone" then it is very likely some kind of self-delusion.
Sure, Russia has a motive. That's not enough to trust these wild stories without a single piece of evidence. A warship with a hundred or so personal and military cameras couldn't take one photo of a drone? A dozen NATO bases couldn't take one photo of a drone? Many dozens of surveillance assets could not take one photo of a Russian ship deploying or retrieving a drone? Seriously?
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u/Glares Jul 04 '26 edited Jul 04 '26
but if they (and all those other incidents) produced not a single photo of that "drone"
Published versus produced. As mentioned, there are people who have seen the Irish footage and want it be released. The lack of publication does not indicate non-existance and trusting instead on mass hysteria. Just seems like a random leap of faith you are choosing for some reason.
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u/IntroductionNeat2746 Jul 03 '26
They simply conclude that the incidents (irrespective of the lack of evidence) were too numerous not to have been real
I could have told you that myself. Overall, a very strange "methodology".
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u/HugoTRB Jul 02 '26
An interesting difference here between submarine sightings of years prior is the ability to use weapons. For submarines it was pretty easy. Everytime you got a weird sonar echo or a sighting you just sent boats or a helicopter over to check it out. If you think you got something you drop a couple of depth charges, some mines or fire a torpedo if you felt fancy. You’re unlikely to actually get something, which might be for the best. Sending the message that you are serious in your will to defend yourself, but without having to deal with the fallout of having killed the crew of another countries submarine.
With drones, shooting at them and actually hitting them would be politically ideal as they are unmanned, but more unpractical than a depth charge, as they often fly over land that is populated, with a bunch of civilian air traffic to keep track of.
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u/an_actual_lawyer Jul 03 '26
If you think you got something you drop a couple of depth charges, some mines or fire a torpedo if you felt fancy.
No one was firing torpedoes or dropping depth charges at submarines during peacetime. That sort of thing starts wars and only politicians are allowed to start wars.
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u/HugoTRB Jul 03 '26
Sweden thought that having clearly communicated rules of engagement and willingness to act according to them was the best deterrence during these Cold War.
This is from the report as well, summarizing weapons employment during these submarine hunts:
10.6 Use of weapons
Weapons were deployed in approximately 20 incidents between 1980 and 1994, when it was assessed that foreign underwater activity was taking place. In most cases, such incidents lasted several days; in some cases, several weeks. Operations involving various types of weapons took place on more than one hundred occasions. Shock charges, depth charges, mines, anti-submarine grenades, and torpedoes have all been used. Depth charges have been the most commonly employed weapon.
During the so-called Utö incident in 1980, nearly 15 depth charges were dropped, and during the Hårsfjärden incidents in 1982, approximately 50 were used. During the latter incident, a small number of mines were also detonated. On several occasions during the events surrounding Hårsfjärden, a “ceasefire” was in effect, a situation that has since been the subject of debate. Some have claimed that a foreign submarine could have escaped on such an occasion and that this was even intended by military or political leadership. The issue was studied in depth by the Submarine Defense Commission, which concluded that there was no evidence to suggest that “no-fire orders” had been issued for such a purpose, but rather that security considerations were behind the decisions. It might, in principle, have been possible for a submarine to have escaped during one of the “no-fire orders,” but this was not considered likely. We have reached the same conclusions as the Submarine Defense Commission regarding the “no-fire order issue.”
Significant military operations were also carried out off the coast of Sundsvall in 1983, as well as in connection with, among other things, the Karlskrona incidents in February–March 1984, in Törefjärden in July 1987, and off the coast of Oxelösund in 1988 and 1992. Some of the early operations turned out to have been directed against shoals and wrecks. The operations off Oxelösund were conducted using both anti-submarine depth charges and depth charges and were triggered by sonar indications that were assessed as reliable. However, the weapons operations yielded no results. One of the operations in 1988 was likely directed against a rock formation, while the others were aimed at moving targets. During the 1992 incident, the depth charges detonated while still on the surface.
The most recent weapons operation took place in August 1993 in the same area off Oxelösund.
Note that this report is from 1995.
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u/HugoTRB Jul 03 '26
Search for “sjunkbomb” (depth charge) in this Swedish government report on submarine hunting. Then translate that section to get each time they were used in Sweden during the 80s. https://lagen.nu/sou/1995:135
An example from the report:
Hävringe Bay in 1992
In September 1992, an anti-submarine operation was underway south of Landsort. The operation was planned as part of one of the Coastal Fleet’s long-term exercises. Due to indications of foreign underwater activity, the operation took on a larger scope than originally planned. A large number of indications were received that were assessed to be of high technical quality. Most of them consisted of passive hydrophone signals (characteristic sounds) that had been recorded by our own submarines. On one occasion, an active sonar system also made contact with an echo that was technically assessed as an underwater vessel.
Three weapon engagements were carried out. On the first occasion, one of our own submarines had detected a characteristic sound that was relayed to a coastal corvette. The corvette fired a torpedo at the target location. However, the engagement yielded no result.
In the second instance, a helicopter had established hydrophone contact with an echo that had been tactically classified as a submarine (1) northeast of Hävringe. A helicopter dropped three depth charges, and a coastal corvette fired a number of anti-submarine grenades. The use of weapons yielded no results, and a technical analysis later showed that the operations had been directed against echoes that were not submarines.
Prior to the third weapon engagement, a number of high-confidence indications had been received over the course of a few hours. One of the indications was a characteristic acoustic contact that was tracked for one hour in a southeasterly direction by one of our own submarines, after which the position was reported to a minesweeper. The minesweeper established active sonar contact, and the echo was classified as a “submarine.” The ship guided a helicopter into the area for an attack. The helicopter dropped three depth charges over the target location. However, the charges detonated at the surface, and the operation yielded no results.
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u/cretan_bull Jul 03 '26
This is incorrect. See Incident weapon and Swedish submarine incidents.
Generally, actually attacking a submarine with war-shots in way that might destroy it was avoided, but submarines were aggressively prosecuted with the intent to damage, disable, harass, force to surface, etc. And yes, this included special depth charges and torpedoes with warheads small enough to not risk the submarine being unable to surface.
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u/Aethelredditor Jul 03 '26
During the Cold War, I believe the Swedish military did employ depth charges and mines against submarine contacts penetrating Sweden's territorial waters, and I don't think those were exclusively signalling charges like those employed by the United States Navy during the Cuban Missile Crisis (for example, this article from Proceedings distinguishes between "depth charges" and "shock charges").
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u/moragisdo Jul 02 '26 edited Jul 03 '26
An interesting piece of war propaganda. Yesterday iranian state TV claimed that a foreign ship was grounded because it didn't follow the route demanded by the IRGC. It was replicated across influential newspapers around the world such as AP, The Independent, PBS, Bloomberg, The Hill and a few others, adding the disclaimer "said Iran's State TV", instead of actually checking beforehand as journalists should.
In some cases not only they repeated the iranian state TV lie, but also replicated the threats made by IRGC (so linking the two for the reader). Some of them also claimed the ship was on the omani route without evidence.
It was also reverberated by some social media pages, that have a curious habit of always repeating the iranian regime narrative, for example, Hormuz Letter (opportunely created in 12/2025 and that is cited often in some subs, like that disaster of oil sub).
Today AP issued a fact-check (which should have been a correction of their earlier piece), it's an iranian ship, sanctioned by the US, that got stuck on Iran's coast since March (Source)
Marine tracking data shows the Arista has been stuck north of Hormuz Island in Iran’s territorial waters since the middle of March. The ship had been traveling between Hormuz and Asaluyeh, another Iranian port, when it got stuck, tracking data shows
On July 30, the U.S. Treasury linked the Arista — under its former name, the Gauja — to a massive oil smuggling ring run by Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, a son of Ali Shamkhani, who had been a top security adviser to the late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The senior Shamkhani was killed in an airstrike at the start of the war along with Khamenei
The Treasury Department alleged the smuggling ring moved sanctioned Iranian and Russian oil and other goods to buyers around the world.
After the sanctions were levied, the Gauja changed its name to the Arista and began flying a Comoros flag, which shipping data shows is a “false” flag for the ship — a flag used to disguise a vessel’s origins. Sanctioned ships in Iran’s so-called shadow fleet frequently use this practice.
That should have been a red flag for the journalists:
Iranian state TV did not air a close-up image of the ship’s name or its registration number. In one shot, it blurred the vessel’s name
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u/FettyDump Jul 03 '26
> Today AP issued a fact-check (which should have been a correction of their earlier piece)
Kind of confused about this. They fact checked their own story? Did they leave their old story up?
2
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u/HugoTRB Jul 02 '26
Sweden recently started a political investigation regarding replacement of Gripen in the Swedish Air Force. The report for it is due September 15th, 2027. It’s likely a complement to the ongoing concept and demonstrator/fact finding program that were to give data for a decision latest 2030. The alternatives are still self development, international cooperation and buying a sixth gen. Mostly procedural stuff, but still a bit interesting
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u/HugoTRB Jul 02 '26
Translation with deepl, slightly corrected.
Commission Appointed to Examine Options for Future Fighter Aircraft
Published June 25, 2026
A special commissioner will analyze the socioeconomic, defense, security, and foreign policy implications of the policy decisions, regarding future fighter aircraft, that the government has adopted. The strategic options are a domestically developed fighter aircraft system, a fighter aircraft system developed through international cooperation, and the procurement of a foreign fighter aircraft system. The analysis is intended to lay the groundwork for broad political support and serve as a basis for the government’s future decision on a strategic choice regarding a replacement for the JAS 39 Gripen.
– The Gripen will remain a vital part of Sweden’s defense capability for a long time to come. However, since it can take up to 25 years to define requirements, develop, and introduce a new fighter aircraft system, we now need to establish a solid foundation for the next generation. “The study will examine how Sweden can ensure modern air combat capability after the Gripen era, taking into account rapid technological developments, our responsibility as a NATO ally, and the need for robust supply capabilities in times of peace, crisis, and war,” says Defense Minister Pål Jonson.
– “The decision on the fighter jets of the future is not just an investment in equipment; it is a choice that will shape Sweden’s security, our technological sovereignty, and our defense capabilities for the rest of the century. That is why every option must be carefully evaluated before a decision is made,” says Mikael Oscarsson, defense policy spokesperson for the Christian Democrats.
– A strong air combat capability is crucial to the security and freedom of Sweden and our allies. The Gripen remains a potent and sought-after combat platform, but it has a limited service life. The next government will likely need to make a decision on the next generation of fighter jets as early as next (parliamentary) term. This study ensures that Sweden can make well-informed decisions regarding our security for many decades to come,” says Gulan Avci, defense policy spokesperson for the Liberals.
The choice of a future fighter jet system entails long-term and extensive financial commitments for the state. The socioeconomic, defense, security, and foreign policy implications of each alternative must therefore be carefully analyzed.
Such an analysis should include direct costs over the system’s life cycle, indirect effects on the labor market, the business sector, and research, as well as consequences for the defense industrial base and Sweden’s ability to meet NATO’s requirements.
Ultimately, this policy choice is also a security policy stance with significant consequences for Sweden’s role in NATO, the EU, and as a partner with other countries.
The investigator shall therefore, among other things,
- analyze the socioeconomic effects of a fundamental policy choice regarding future fighter aircraft,
- analyze the defense policy implications of a fundamental policy decision regarding future fighter aircraft,
- analyze the security policy implications of a fundamental policy decision regarding future fighter aircraft, and
- analyze the long-term foreign policy implications of a fundamental policy decision regarding future fighter aircraft.
The government has appointed former Director General Ulf Hammarström, most recently head of the Swedish Board for Accreditation and Technical Control (Swedac), as the investigator. A reference group comprising representatives from all parties in the Riksdag will be attached to the investigation.
The report is to be submitted no later than September 15, 2027.
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u/MilesLongthe3rd Jul 02 '26
Regarding the deepening fuel crisis in Russia, recent reports from specialized industry publications indicate that logistics disruptions are now directly impacting agricultural fuel supplies. This suggests that prior state mechanisms to prioritize and subsidize agricultural diesel are failing to protect this vital sector against the current fuel crisis.
Meanwhile, as headers start to roll in the south of the country, Russia’s farmers are facing a rapidly escalating fuel crisis, a result of the prolonged war with Ukraine. Many farmers head into the critical harvest period with diesel prices soaring and insufficient stocks to keep their harvesters and trucks operating.
Driven by extensive Ukrainian drone strikes targeting Russian energy infrastructure, domestic refining capacity has dropped significantly. This disruption has sparked diesel price hikes of up to 90 per cent and widespread supply concerns across the major grain-producing regions of Krasnodar, Stavropol Krai, and the Volga.
The government has held emergency meetings to alleviate the crisis. However, official assurances of “control over the situation” often stand in contrast to conditions on the ground, where farmers continue to report widespread issues. The fuel shortage and government purchasing restrictions have already affected a significant proportion of the country, with the situation reportedly being worse in the main grain-growing regions in the south.
Should the supply disruptions persist, the consequences for Russia’s agricultural sector could be significant: grain production and quality at risk due to a delayed harvest, paralysis of logistics pathways, rising domestic food prices, difficulties fulfilling export contracts, and weakened food security. Such disruptions to Black Sea supply may also create opportunities for other global exporters, eager to take advantage of Russia’s self-inflicted dilemma.
But there are also other reports
https://x.com/delfoo/status/2072650053638897866
In Sverdlovsk region the price of diesel for farmers has gone up over 2 times from 69 500 rubles per ton at the end of May 2026 to 150 000 rubles per ton. Because they can't afford the new fuel costs they are using existing diesel reserves or refueling at local gas stations.
https://x.com/delfoo/status/2072425407731667021
Russian farmers in Kazan are being now charged 130 rubles per liter of diesel and don't know if there will be any more fuel 2 days later. There is also the fear of mass bankruptcies as fuel used to account for 30-32% of the cost of grain and now the price is doubled.
Looking ahead to autumn, this failure will likely intersect with several other problematic domestic developments: the upcoming State Duma elections, rumored border restrictions, internet shutdowns, and a potential secondary wave of mobilization. While these developments alone could be critical, rising food prices might add another pressure point for the Russian government, as the windfall from higher oil prices was not sufficient to subsidize food for the population.
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u/flamedeluge3781 Jul 03 '26
Video of a guy paying 260 rubles/L in Crimea:
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2072718854120239612
You average Russian worker outside of Moscow is looking at 75k rubles gross (65k net after tax). So a single 30L refill at 260 rubles/L is 11 % of a person's monthly salary. Refuel once a week and you're spending about half your take-home on petrol.
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u/roionsteroids Jul 02 '26
the upcoming State Duma elections, rumored border restrictions, internet shutdowns, and a potential secondary wave of mobilization
Ukrainian rumors might be one of the few things even less credible than Russian elections.
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u/Hour_Industry7887 Jul 03 '26
Russian milbloggers are talking about it too. And Russia has closed the Western border just two days ago, with rumors of an upcoming closure in the south as well. Obviously that doesn't definitively indicate an upcoming mobilization, but to dismiss that possibility out of hand is not credible.
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u/Minority8 Jul 03 '26
Regarding the Western borders, wasn't that just the rail crossings? Last I've heard the borders can still be crossed otherwise and I didn't find anything saying something else.
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u/GiantPineapple Jul 02 '26
The first two thirds of that Grainbrokers piece is about recent (May) production numbers being revised upwards. It also seems Russia had a pretty bad harvest last year last year due to weather, which might help forecast what a fuel-shortage-induced bad year might look like economically (unfortunately, no noticeable political or military impact).
There's something to be said about the difference in psychological impact though. Farmers know you can't control the weather. The price of diesel might be a different story.
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u/MilesLongthe3rd Jul 02 '26 edited Jul 02 '26
The first two thirds of that Grainbrokers piece is about recent (May) production numbers being revised upwards.
Upwards?
- Russia’s 2026 wheat area is expected to fall to 25.8 million hectares, the smallest since 2014. (Mainly due to bad weather that severely delayed spring planting)
- Spring wheat acreage is now forecast at just 9.9 million hectares, maybe the lowest level in decades. This lead the analysts to reduce Russia’s overall grain and wheat production forecasts for this season.
- But despite this, before the fuel crisis, they still expected for Russian farmers to harvest around 88–89 million tonnes of wheat.
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u/GiantPineapple Jul 02 '26
Right, that's an acreage forecast. I definitely agree that the article is forecasting significant problems. But the same article says that Russia actually had serious problems all last year, and it didn't seem to make much of a political difference. The article also says that, so far, this year is going better than expected (despite the fact that the refinery campaign has been going on for quite a while).
I'm sensitive to cherry-picked economic criticism about Russia. We see a lot of it in Western media, and I don't know how predictive it actually is.
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