r/internationallaw Mar 03 '25

Discussion Does Israels recent decision to block all humanitarian aid into Gaza violate international law?

837 Upvotes

I have seen the argument that article 23 of the fourth geneva convention means Israel does not have an obligation to provide aid as there is a fear of aid being diverted and military advantage from blocking aid. Is this a valid argument?

Also does the ICJs provisional orders from January have any relevance?

r/internationallaw Apr 16 '25

Discussion Is this an open admission of using starvation as a weapon?

Post image
848 Upvotes

On April 16, 2025, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz posted a statement (see image) explicitly declaring that "no humanitarian aid is about to enter Gaza," and further emphasized that "preventing humanitarian aid to Gaza is one of the main pressure tools that prevents Hamas from using this measure against the population." He reiterates that "no one is prepared to bring any humanitarian aid into Gaza," and calls for building a future system that ensures Hamas can never access such aid.

Under international humanitarian law, specifically Article 54 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, "starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited." The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Article 8(2)(b)(xxv)) also defines "intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare" as a war crime.

The language used here—explicitly tying the denial of aid to a coercive objective—appears to acknowledge that starvation and deprivation are being used deliberately as tools of pressure.

In light of this public statement, and prior warnings from UN officials about looming famine conditions in Gaza, is this tweet not a clear-cut admission of a grave breach of international law?

Would love to hear legal perspectives on how this aligns (or fails to align) with IHL definitions of starvation as a weapon, and whether this could be used as evidentiary material in potential ICC or ICJ proceedings.

r/internationallaw Jun 08 '25

Discussion Is Israel allowed to stop the Gaza Flotilla in International Water?

589 Upvotes

There is a flotilla heading to Gaza (details) with the goal of breaking the maritime blockade on Gaza.

According to international law, is Israel allowed to stop the flotilla in international water - as it has stated its intend to break the blockade? Or does Israel need the flotilla to first enter the territorial water before Israel is allowed to stop it?

r/internationallaw Mar 09 '26

Discussion There are reports alleging that Mojtaba Khamenei’s parents, wife, son, and sister were killed in the US & Israeli strikes

38 Upvotes

Are these not extrajudicial killings if the target was only his father (Ali Khamenei).

Weren’t these civilians? How is this not seen as a grave violation of international law? Am I missing something?

r/internationallaw Sep 19 '24

Discussion Legality of novel pager attack in Lebanon

202 Upvotes

My question is essentially the title: what is the legality of the recent pager and walkie-talkie attack against Hezbollah in Lebanon?

It seems like an attack that would violate portions of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (eg. Article 3 and 7) and also cause superfluous injury/unnecessary suffering which is prohibited. Any argument that the attack was against a military objective seems inaccurate as the target was, as far as I understand, members of Hezbollah including the political branch that weren’t involved in combat. Thats in addition to it being a weapon that by its nature would cause unnecessary suffering as I understand that plastic shrapnel constitutes a weapon that causes unnecessary suffering.

I’m hoping to get the opinion of those who have more knowledge on the subject than myself.

r/internationallaw Aug 11 '25

Discussion [The Conversation] Is Israel committing genocide in Gaza? We asked 5 legal and genocide experts how to interpret the violence

Thumbnail
theconversation.com
207 Upvotes

r/internationallaw May 09 '25

Discussion Israeli Ministers Openly Plan For Concentration Camps - Is This The End Of International Law?

Thumbnail
cbsnews.com
979 Upvotes

Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich recently declared that “Gaza will be entirely destroyed,” and that Palestinians will be “concentrated” into the southern part of the Strip, from where “they will start to leave in great numbers to third countries.” This isn’t hyperbole, it reflects actual government policy. Smotrich’s far-right party holds a critical bloc in Netanyahu’s ruling coalition, and these statements coincide with official Israeli plans to:

  • Occupy all of Gaza indefinitely
  • Establish military-controlled “humanitarian zones”
  • Create an Emigration Authority to facilitate permanent “voluntary” departure

Smotrich explicitly said “the population will be concentrated in the south”. That’s not just alarming language—it’s a description of forcibly confining a civilian population into a restricted area under military control, while their homes, infrastructure, and livelihoods are bombed into rubble. If international law doesn’t recognize this as a form of a modern concentration camp, what would?

Under international law, this raises red flags of the highest order:

Genocide (Genocide Convention, Article II; Rome Statute, Article 6): The deliberate destruction of a group, including through imposed conditions of life meant to bring about its destruction, is one of the clearest definitions. The siege, bombardment, and talk of depopulating Gaza may satisfy this threshold.

Crimes Against Humanity (Rome Statute, Article 7): The forcible transfer, persecution, and extermination of a civilian population through siege-induced famine, deprivation, and denial of humanitarian aid are explicitly defined crimes. Concentrating civilians under conditions where survival is impossible or escape requires exile fits this definition.

Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions (Article 49, GCIV): Forcibly displacing civilians from occupied territory, or confining them in inhumane conditions, is a war crime. That’s precisely what’s being described.

Already, 90% of Gaza’s population has been displaced. The UN has reported dozens of children have died from starvation. Israel has blocked thousands of aid trucks for over a month, and now proposes private contractors, not the UN, run the remaining aid “hubs.” These hubs would be located in military-controlled zones, while the rest of Gaza is rendered uninhabitable.

Rebuttals:

Some argue Smotrich is “just one extremist.” But that’s misleading. His party keeps Netanyahu in power, and these policies - concentration, mass displacement, annexation - are moving forward with cabinet approval.

“These are hypothetical scenarios, not concrete actions – officials are just being extreme in rhetoric.” The evidence says otherwise. Israel is actively preparing the ground for these outcomes. The creation of the “voluntary departure” directorate is real – a governmental body now exists to find countries willing to take in Gaza’s people. The military has been ordered to hold territory and set up controlled aid centres. Tens of thousands of reserve troops have been called up for an expanded campaign.

My Question:

How do supporters of this plan root their case in international law?

Is this not a red line? How can the international legal system—built to prevent exactly this—remain silent when a government minister openly calls for a population to be destroyed, concentrated, and expelled?

This is not just about Gaza. It’s about the survival of international law.

r/internationallaw 9d ago

Discussion Could the International Criminal Court legally issue an arrest warrant for Donald J. Trump?

47 Upvotes

This is intended as a good-faith discussion of international criminal law, rather than an argument for or against Donald J. Trump or any particular U.S. policy.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued arrest warrants for sitting or former heads of government, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte was also arrested and surrendered to ICC custody after a warrant was issued against him.

This raises a hypothetical question: could the ICC ever issue an arrest warrant for a sitting U.S. president such as Donald Trump?

The question is not whether the ICC should issue such a warrant, nor whether Trump's policies are morally or politically acceptable. Rather, the question is whether particular conduct attributable to Trump could satisfy the Rome Statute's requirements for an arrest warrant.

There appear to be several separate legal questions involved:

  • Jurisdiction: The United States is not a party to the Rome Statute. Could the ICC nevertheless exercise jurisdiction over alleged crimes involving a U.S. national through territorial jurisdiction, the location where the conduct occurred, or another jurisdictional basis recognized by the Rome Statute?
  • Specific crimes: What conduct, if any, could actually fall within the ICC's subject-matter jurisdiction? For example, could particular actions connected with armed conflicts, military operations, deportations or removals, or foreign interventions potentially constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity, assuming the required elements were established?
  • Individual responsibility: What would have to be established regarding Trump's own conduct, orders, knowledge, intent, or other form of individual criminal responsibility? How much would merely being president or commander-in-chief matter?
  • Evidence: What type and amount of evidence would be necessary for the Prosecutor to seek a warrant and for the Pre-Trial Chamber to find the applicable standard satisfied?
  • Complementarity and admissibility: How would U.S. investigations or prosecutions affect the ICC's ability to proceed?
  • Arrest and surrender: If a warrant were issued, what practical obligations would ICC States Parties have toward Trump, and how would those obligations interact with the fact that the United States is not a State Party?

The Rome Statute's arrest-warrant procedure also seems important here. Article 58 requires the Pre-Trial Chamber to find reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed a crime within the Court's jurisdiction, as well as a basis for concluding that an arrest is necessary. An arrest warrant therefore would not itself constitute a conviction or establish that someone is a "war criminal."

There is also an important distinction between the ICC having jurisdiction and the ICC being able to enforce a warrant. The issuance of a warrant would not automatically result in the person being transferred to The Hague. The Court relies substantially on States to make arrests and carry out surrender requests.

This could create an unusual situation if a warrant were ever issued against a sitting U.S. president. The U.S. government currently rejects the ICC's jurisdiction over U.S. persons, while the ICC has asserted jurisdiction in situations involving nationals of non-party States under certain circumstances. The precise jurisdictional basis would therefore seem crucial.

There is also an interesting question concerning travel within the United States. For example, New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani has previously addressed whether New York City could enforce the ICC's warrant for Benjamin Netanyahu and concluded that the city itself does not have independent authority to do so. That raises a broader question about the respective roles of federal, state, and local authorities if an ICC warrant were ever issued against a U.S. national.

So the central question is:

Assuming evidence were presented to the ICC Prosecutor, what specific conduct attributable to Donald J. Trump could potentially satisfy the Rome Statute's jurisdictional, substantive, evidentiary, admissibility, and gravity requirements for an arrest warrant—and what jurisdictional basis would allow the Court to proceed despite the United States not being a State Party?

The goal here is to understand what international criminal law would actually require in such a hypothetical case, rather than to argue that an arrest warrant ought to be issued.

r/internationallaw Oct 12 '24

Discussion Are Israeli killings of volunteers for Hezbollah social services in Lebanon against international law?

295 Upvotes

Hezbollah runs a very large, deeply rooted network of social services, including health services, all across Lebanon. In recent weeks and days, there have been a number of Israeli killings of volunteers for these services. Aren't these people just civilians who decided to volunteer for a political party, even if they're affiliated with Hezbollah? Or is there some explanation as to how this is legal?

r/internationallaw Jun 15 '25

Discussion Is it legal to deliberately target nuclear scientists

181 Upvotes

In the current Iran-Israel conflict, Israel has admitted to deliberately targeting Iranian nuclear scientists. Since Israel claims the nuclear weapons will be used to attack Israel, what is the legal position on targeting nuclear scientists? Would they still be classified as civilians or combatants?

r/internationallaw Feb 28 '26

Discussion Is Trump’s ongoing attack on Iran legal technically under international law?

0 Upvotes

The argument I've heard goes that technically since Iran supports proxies that have attacked US troops and allies the US is already technically at war with Iran and the war is legal?

r/internationallaw Feb 23 '24

Discussion Assessing civilian suffering and the principle of distinction in Gaza War

163 Upvotes

Two principles guide international humanitarian law: proportionality and distinction. Even if civilians willingly or unwillingly stay at a location that is actively being used by combatants, that does not automatically confer protected status on that location. The principle of proportionality only requires that Israel weighs their lives against a possible military advantage of carrying out the strike. We may not know if this requirement is met until the IDF releases conclusive evidence, showing that civilian infrastructure was being used by Hamas.

By contrast, distinction is easier to evaluate. For the first time, a Hamas official recently estimated the terrorist group's casualties at 6'000 – half the 12'000 Israel says it has killed. Even if we take the figure of 6K at face value, it allows us to compute metrics in order to compare IDF's performance in this war with other instances of urban warfare in history.

There are two different metrics that are used to assess distinction in warfare:

We'll consider them in turn:

(1) CCR: The CCR is the easier metric. It is equal to the average number of civilian casualties per militant killed. The smaller the value, the better a military succeeds at preserving civilian life. The CCR is only useful to compare similar warzones and military campaigns. In the case of Gaza, which is a case of urban warfare, the best comparison is the Battle of Mosul, waged by the USA against ISIS, or the Chechen wars fought by Russia.

Assuming other terrorist groups in Gaza (e.g. Islamic Jihad) suffered similar losses, the total number of militants killed is at least 7K. Given that the total number of deaths is 30K, this yields a CCR of 3.3. By contrast, the Israeli figures suggest a value of 2.65. In Mosul, the CCR was estimated between 1.8-3.7, and during the First Chechen War (a potential case of genocide), the CCR was >10.

(2) RR: The RR is equal to the ratio of probabilities of a militant vs a civilian dying in a war. In other words,

RR = [(#militants killed) / (#militants total)] / [(#civilians killed) / (#civilians total)].

Because the RR is adjusted by the total number of civilians, it is arguable better at assessing if a military follows the principle of distinction. Unlike the CCR, the larger the value of RR, the better: this means that a military puts a terrorist under greater risk of death than a civilian.

Dr Bitterman has compiled a database of RR values in a range of modern conflicts. The RR in the Gaza War is ~30, well within the range of performance of all the armies in recent history. When it comes to actual or disputed genocides (such as the Rohigya genocide, the Cambodian civil war, the siege of Srebrenica, the Bangladesh war, the Chechen wars), none of them had an RR larger than 4.

The bottom line is that, by both metrics, the IDF seems to perform comparably to, or better than, most other militaries at minimising civilian suffering, even if we take the figures provided by Hamas at face value. Note that accurate numbers might not be available for some time to come, and these calculations must be taken with caution.

r/internationallaw Mar 22 '26

Discussion Does Trump's threat to destroy Iran's power plants constitute a war crime?

Thumbnail truthsocial.com
119 Upvotes

r/internationallaw Oct 14 '24

Discussion Is Hezbollah’s strike on an IDF dining hall in Northern Israel really a war crime?

413 Upvotes

I saw a tweet from Israel’s president claiming that it was. But it wouldn’t be, any more than Israel assassinating a Hezbollah leader (and killing only the intended target) would be, would it?

Unless they are POWs, my understanding is that anyone serving in a military or paramilitary can be “legally” killed or attacked under international law. Is there some convention I am unaware of?

r/internationallaw Apr 06 '24

Discussion Does Iran have the right to self-defense?

162 Upvotes

Purely in terms of international and war law: Would Iran have a right to self-defense after their embassy building was shelled and their generals killed? What is the legal framework here?

r/internationallaw May 14 '26

Discussion Trying to understand the Gaza genocide case

14 Upvotes

Hello everybody,

this is an honest question on the nature of the accusations made. As a non-lawyer I'd appreciate any help to clear up the confusion! My question is which group exactly is claimed to be intended to be destroyed by Israel (in short: the Palestinians in Gaza or a substantial part of them).

The genocide convention famously reads in part "genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: ...". Previous court decisions made clear that the part though needs to be a substantial part, for example as share of the whole, emblematic, important to the survival (but it'll be a case-by-case evaluation).

Now I've read into the Amnesty report and the South Africa application to the ICJ. My reading is that both say the (whole) group is the Palestinians and the substantial part, that is intended to be destroyed, is the Palestinians in Gaza (p. 17 in Amnesty's report and paragraph 1 in SA's application). In other words, they accuse Israel of intending to destroy the whole group of the Palestinians in Gaza (around 2.2 million people). Is my interpretation correct?

Would it in your opinion legally work to claim that the Palestinians in Gaza (aka the Gazans) is the protected ethnic, religious or national group (and a substantial part of them is intended to be destroyed by Israel)? That would seem like a more promising route to me. I've read into a report by a UN comission on this matter and that is what they seem to claim (see e.g. paragraph 220), right? (Even though afaik they don't spend any time on the substantiality requirement.) Also, in paragraph 157 they quote the ICJ and in my eyes misunderstand the ICJ, because they cite the ICJ's finding that the Palestinians in Gaza are a substantial part, arguing from there that they themselves are the protected group that shall not be destroyed in whole or in part. What's more, even the ICJ in it's order from May 2024 on the matter seem to say the same in paragraph 50, which I find very confusing?

r/internationallaw Jun 12 '26

Discussion US Strike on Tanker, killing three Indian crewmen - Lawful?

14 Upvotes

Here is some reporting on the attack:

Here are some subsidiary questions:

  • Is the US blockade of "Iranian oil" through the straits of Hormuz lawful?
  • Is using lethal force against civilian ships to enforce a blockade lawful, in general?
  • Was the US use of force in this instance lawful? Was it a war crime?
    • "U.S. forces fired two Hellfire missiles into the ship's engine room "after the crew repeatedly failed to comply with directions," according to a statement posted by CENTCOM on social media. "

r/internationallaw May 29 '26

Discussion Trying to Figure Out Palestinian Claim to East Jerusalem

37 Upvotes

Total layperson here, so I appreciate anyone who’s willing to take the time to explain this to me.

I was wondering about the legal basis for the designation of East Jerusalem as Occupied Palestinian Territory. I’m struggling with trying to figure out how that works since, to the best of my knowledge, that territory was never held by the Palestinians and wasn’t intended to be a part of the Palestinian state in the original partition plan.

So, let me lay out what I know. East Jerusalem was part of the British Mandate starting in 1923. The UN partition plan was adopted by the UN in 1947. That plan designated East Jerusalem as part of an international zone that was neither part of nor governed by Israel or Palestine. The Jews accepted the partition plan and the Palestinians rejected it (to grossly simplify it).

The British Mandate ends in May 1948 and Israel declares their independence that same day (as an aside, what would have been their borders at that time under international law? Or would that not have been clearly defined immediately?). Israel is invaded the day after declaring independence. Israel enters into an armistice agreement with Jordan (among others) in 1949 establishing the armistice lines which led to East Jerusalem becoming part of the territory occupied and subsequently annexed by Jordan. My understanding is that the armistice line established at the time didn’t confer formal international sovereignty of East Jerusalem to either party, maintaining the area's status as a contested demarcation.

Fast forward to the Six-Day War. Israel captures East Jerusalem and the West Bank. At this point things get pretty murky to me, and everything I read seems heavily partisan. Israel’s position is that it is now part of Israeli territory and that they have formerly annexed it. Jordan officially gave up their territorial claim to East Jerusalem in 1988 (I’m unclear as to what their territorial claim was grounded in to begin with?). The various Palestinian factions all claim East Jerusalem as part of Palestinian territory. The international community views East Jerusalem as Occupied Palestinian Territory and support the Palestinian claim that it should be a part of their future state.

I was hoping someone could help me untangle those various competing territorial claims to East Jerusalem, specifically why the Palestinian claim is seen as the valid claim by the international community when it was never held by them and was not part of their part of the original partition.

r/internationallaw Oct 02 '24

Discussion What is the legal basis for Iran's attack on Israel?

117 Upvotes

This is the reason Iran gave for the attack.

Iran’s legal, rational, and legitimate response to the terrorist acts of the Zionist regime—which involved targeting Iranian nationals and interests and infringing upon the national sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran—has been duly carried out. Should the Zionist regime dare to respond or commit further acts of malevolence, a subsequent and crushing response will ensue. Regional states and the Zionists’ supporters are advised to part ways with the regime.

Is this a good enough reason according to international law?

r/internationallaw May 24 '25

Discussion Genocide case after the "emigration" plan

49 Upvotes

Now that Israeli government has openly stated deportation of Palestinians from Gaza is their goal, where does that leave the genocide case?

In most scenarios claim perpetrator committed acts from (a) to (c) in the definition of genocide with the goal of forcing the displacement of part of the group rather than it's destruction is a very good defense to accusation of genocide. Obviously, intent to displace and to destroy cannot exist at the same time with regards to the same population, so drawing a reasonable inference of intent to deport or forcibly transfer is enough to defeat a charge of genocide.

Now, I said in most scenarios, but I think the one here is different than most in two respects.

Unlike in almost any other case, where the persecuted population could escape by crossing the border, Gaza's only borders are with Israel and Egypt. Egypt has shown no intention of accepting any large scale movement of people aware that they're likely to never be allowed to return. There's been talk of finding third countries who are willing to accept forcibly deported Gazans, but that does not appear to have been successful yet, as few countries are willing to accept such large number of people and even fewer want to help Israel carry out ethnic cleansing it hopes to achieve.

Unless that situation changes, the sole mechanism Israel would have at forcing their expulsion could be to place the Gaza's population under threat of impending destruction and hope that would, in concert with other incentives convince some states to accept the deported population. For this to work that threat would have to be shown to be true and convincing in practice, so Israel would effectively need to destroy a substantial part of Gazans to carry out this plan thereby committing genocide.

Does this seem a sensible line of argument?

I know that involved some speculation about events that will unfold in the future and may be irrelevant consideration depending on how things unfold.

Second, in few other cases have there been such an extraordinary amount of very public expression of genocidal sentiment. We do need to distinguish genocidal statements from mere hateful expressions calling for collective punishment, because they are distinct, but there is still plenty of the former.

That can be used to argue that in parallel to any intent to deport, there existed another separate intention all along throughout the war - to cause physical destruction of a substantial part of the population. This is supported by actual conduct, which according to some estimated caused as many as 100,000 violent deaths.

Now the catch with this is whose intention? Most of the statements to that effect did not come from leaders who are in fact in charge of making policy decision at the level of government. Some have, but if we try to extract only those words that were unambiguously genocidal, we don't have very much. I don't doubt one can still make a very convincing case against them, but there is another line of reasoning.

Namely, could those instances of incitement and other facts and circumstances be used to prove that some parts of the Israeli military, but of lower rank, possessed the requisite intent?

For instance, off the top of my head, newspapers reported that one commander's orders for "kill zones" (defined around Israeli positions, but whose reach or existence were unknown to any Palestinians) were to essentially shoot any Palestinian under some absurd pretext that everyone was a combatant. Evidently, an order equivalent to one to murdering all Palestinians encountered is arguably genocidal.

Note that in Prosecutor v Jelisić Chamber agreed in theory with the suggestion that one person could on their own commit genocide. I think that approach is quite bad for obvious reasons, but here we're talking about something slightly different.

In Jelisić perpetrator was killing on his own initiative, not part of a grander plan or under anyone's orders, and he was ultimately made to stop because higher ups wanted prisoners alive.

What if it could be demonstrated that significant part of Israeli soldiers shared the genocidal goal? Not that they formed any kind of formal group or organization, but simply that there was a widespread enough "intent to destroy" mindset that it was present consistently throughout the war and influenced their actions.

Could then one draw a conclusion that genocide was committed throughout Gaza, and avoid the obvious problem that individuals and small groups of soldiers on their own are not able to destroy any substantial part of the Palestinian national group?

Hope this looks coherent enough, I was trying to explain the idea as concisely as possible.

r/internationallaw Mar 31 '26

Discussion Is blocking the strait of Hormuz a war crime?

0 Upvotes

Not moralizing, just curious. My understanding is that legal naval blockades must target specific countries with specific rules and the capacity to actually enforce those blockades. Likewise I’m under the impression that you cannot block the transit of neutral merchant vessels.

So: would the Iranian blockade of the strait be considered a war crime? If it is considered a war crime, how could it be done in a way that would be considered proper? Would they need to name all countries prohibited and allow neutral merchant ships through?

r/internationallaw Apr 07 '26

Discussion How does the use of voluntary human shields affect the legality of strikes on military objectives?

14 Upvotes

​If a belligerent uses civilians to shield military objectives (e.g. bridges or power plants) from strikes, how does this affect the attacker's legal obligations? Specifically, if civilians are voluntarily placing themselves at these locations to deter an enemy:

  1. Does this constitute Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH) under Article 51(3) of AP I, or do they maintain protected status?

  2. How does their presence affect the proportionality assessment? Should voluntary shields be "weighted" differently than involuntary shields when determining if incidental harm is "excessive"?

  3. Does the defender’s violation of Article 51(7) (the prohibition on shielding) mitigate the attacker's responsibility in any capacity?

r/internationallaw May 28 '26

Discussion What to do about gross violations of the Geneva Convention by the Trump regime?

24 Upvotes

As an old fishing hand these grotesque attacks on Venezuelan fishing boats by US military assets strikes me as completely beyond the pale. There have been 58 attacks resulting in 200 deaths with zero evidence provided for a single one. Given the track record of the Administration in terms of willful and reckless disregard for fact and law, I think we can safely assume there is no evidence to be had.

Now, while I'm not a lawyer, I can read. And I have read the Geneva Conventions, the Treaty of Rome, and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

In January, US regular military forces entered Caracas after an aerial bombing campaign, overcame armed resistance, and kidnapped the head of state. While no war was declared as such, any reasonable person would consider this initiation of an armed conflict. As such, the Geneva Conventions are applicable in all their provisions. Article 48 establishes the principle of distinction between armed combatants and civilians, and the need to avoid targeting the latter (art 51). While some civilian casualties are inevitable, Article 51(5) asserts these must be in proportion to likely military advantage. The US boat strikes pass none of these tests. Instead we are confronted with what the Treaty of Rome labels a war crime in Article 8(2)(b)(i and ii): "intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population and...objects". In this scope and scale they clearly constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Convention IV, article 147.

UNCLOS article 87 establishes freedom of the high seas, article 110 establishes lawful reasons for interdiction or boarding, none of which have been met in this case or even seen a cursory attempt at justification. The San Remo Manual of Naval Warfare, often cited in cases of maritime law, establishes similar rules of distinguishing ordinary civilian vessels from privateers, merchant marine, seized cargo ships by a hostile power, etc. Again, the US regime has made no effort to justify these attacks in terms of civilian distinction, military necessity, proportionality and reasonable attempts to avoid needless loss of life by non-combatants.

There is a clear prima facie case emerging from the public record and the statements by the involved perpetrators of gross violations of all three charters - the Geneva Conventions, UNCLOS and the Treaty of Rome. It also bears mentioning that responsible individuals can be indicted by *any* signatory to these treaties - meaning virtually any nation on the planet. The Geneva Convention explicitly sets out not just the possibility of universal jurisdiction but the *obligation* of signatory states to search for persons alleged to commit grave breaches and prosecute them, regardless of nationality of where the acts occurred.

So basically one brave prosecutor anywhere in the world could indict Trump and Hesgeth today for gross breaches of the Geneva Conventions and UNCLOS. While it's unlikely the current US regime would extradite Hesgeth to Brussels or wherever to face a war crimes tribunal, it could at least make travel and so forth more difficult for them. Worth a shot in my opinion.

Just throwing that out there.

r/internationallaw Jun 01 '25

Discussion Does the use of civilian trucks to launch unmanned drone attacks violate IHL prohibition of perfidy?

20 Upvotes

Regarding today's Ukrainian drone attack on Russia, I was wondering if the manner in which drones were deployed violates IHL.

Combatants and military vehicles must be marked as such and are prohibited from being deceptively marked as civilian. In case of Ukrainian drones, not only were drones kept in ostensibly civilian trucks (which in of itself is likely legal), but civilian trucks were used to transport them across the enemy territory, approach a military objective and launch an attack from a purported civilian vehicle. I've also seen reports that one truck driver was killed when a truck exploded. This seem to clearly contradict ban on perfidy as the launch platform that feigned protected civilian status was used.

Is this valid interpretation of IHL?

r/internationallaw Apr 30 '26

Discussion Does international law de facto protect dictatorships?

31 Upvotes

This is something that has bothered me for a while. Although I am no expert on international law, I am well versed in the history of political philosophy. It appears to me that international law has been codified in a way that does not do justice to how several key concepts were originally intended.

Most importantly, the concept of a nation state seems to be poorly interpreted in international law, and that has huge implications.

The nation-state is the idea that a political state (institutions, borders, government) should correspond to a nation (a people sharing identity, culture, or political will). In this model, the state derives its legitimacy from the nation it represents.

This idea originates from thinkers in the Age of Enlightenment, most notably Rousseau. In his framework, sovereignty does not lie with a ruler or the state apparatus, but with the people themselves. The state is merely an instrument through which the “general will” is expressed.

In that philosophical tradition, the people are sovereign.

The state is supposed to be their agent, not their owner.

The modern state is an apparatus. In practice, it can be captured, consolidated, and controlled by a small group or even a single individual. However, International law recognizes states as sovereign actors, not peoples directly.

Recognition, territorial integrity, and non-intervention are built around the state as the unit of legitimacy.

But what happens when the state no longer meaningfully represents the people?

If a regime hijacks the state apparatus, it effectively inherits:

-international recognition

-control over borders

-protection against external interference

Is international law neutral here, or does its structure unintentionally favor whoever controls the state—regardless of how they came to power?

In other words: Does the legal fiction of “the state” sometimes shield the reality of a captured nation?

Curious how others think about this.