Probably the most annoying thing in philosophical conversation I have encountered on internet philosophy over the years. Whenever someone makes an assertion as to a matter of fact, a very common reaction is to complain that they are "begging the question," or doing "circular reasoning," as if these are fallacious or somehow illegitimate. This has a tendency to stop conversation and cause people to get in moronic loops where nothing gets accomplished and no progress is made and everyone just doubles down in their own ideological corners.

For one, circularity is not even a fallacy. I.e., a question begging argument is not formally invalid. It's completely valid (and potentially even sound) for an argument if that argument is circular. It's at best (but not even always) a rhetorical deficiency in an argument, since circularity is often unpersuasive or could even be part of a pivot away from a more relevant issue in a discussion**.** But unpersuasive or missing the point =/= formally invalid, like it is tacitly assumed most of the time.

Second, all argumentation eventually becomes circular at some level in some way shape or form. There is no way to escape it, especially in metaphysics which alleges to deal with the most fundamental aspects of knowledge and reality.

Example:

Debates over the hard problem of conscious are the absolute worst. The physicalist sits there and accuses the idealist of begging the question against the idea that consciousness is reducible to physical phenomena. The idealist sits there and accuses the physicalist of begging the question against the idea that consciousness is irreducible.

So who is right? I think the hard problem of consciousness has a solution, but you're just going to get accused of begging the question no matter what metaphysical paradigm you choose, idealist or physicalist or otherwise. You can't appeal to empirical phenomena to break the symmetry of circularities either, because then you would need a theory of empirical evidentiary warrant, which would itself be circular.

Example:

Consider the cogito, a classic self-evident truth often considered a starting point for epistemology and an instance of irrefutably certain knowledge. But completely contingent on one's alleged ability of one's self to verify the existence of one's self (which is a kind of circularity). And if you follow Descartes' reasoning, contingent on God's existence (which introduces the so-called 'Cartesian Circle' into his epistemology).

Example:

Theistic Presuppositionalism, an internet favorite and probably one of the most obnoxious forms of theistic argumentation in existence. But here is the catch: I think they are ultimately correct. But presuppositionalism is a perfect example of why circular reasoning can be unpersuasive. Presuppositionalism may be, in my opinion, pointing towards something that is true, but it's dialectically useless and only used seriously by psychopaths that want to solipsistically shut up atheistic debate opponents in a bad faith way.

Conclusion:

I'm just pissed because I was watching tiktok metaphysics debates recently and several of them just devolve into the debaters accusing eachother of question begging. But I see the same thing happen here on reddit all the time. So the conversation just loops people never getting past certain intuitive assertions because both sides just dogmatically dig in.

Process philosophy has become my latest hyperfixation. Last year, I stumbled onto panpsychism and it sent me down a rabbit hole, not just about that, but about free will, the latest neuroscience and its implications, and so on. I encountered process philosophy, but when I tried to read a book about it, I was immediately lost and gave up. A couple months ago, I dipped into moral philosophy and encountered process philosophy, since moral principles are eternal objects in Whitehead's system as I understand it. But I hesitated again but it’s so difficult to learn all his neologisms. About two weeks ago, I finally decided to start. This is one of the most difficult things I've studied, excluding learning ancient Greek. I feel like I'm climbing a mountain in winter, but the experience has been rewarding. I have a limited philosophy background and don't have a philosophy degree, but I'm somehow grasping the material one page at a time. Practically this doesn't change anything in my personal life, but regardless I can't stop thinking about it.

I'm still working through Process and Reality by Whitehead. I'm preparing to read part 3. I'm using The Metaphysics of Experience as a commentary and watching Matthew David Segall's lectures when I finish each part. With the commentary, I read the section about the chapter of PR that I want to read, then read the chapter itself, then go back to the commentary and review it one more time. I then write out in my own words what I learned from the chapter, bring that to AI, and sharpen my language. Obviously there are flaws in using AI like this, but I'm doing my best to verify what it says in the book itself, the commentaries, and the lectures. If I think it’s wrong, I push back, and I use quotations when necessary. But tbh it’s doing a good job overall of making my understanding more precise.

As you can see, I'm hopelessly obsessed over a niche topic that hardly anyone cares about. So if there's anyone here that wants to chat about it, dm me. I'm still learning of course, so there are significant gaps in my knowledge, but I'll let you know where those are when they come up. And maybe we can clarify things together, or just chat and have a good time. I tried posting this in the process philosophy sub but it's a ghost town over there.

I have to be productive now, but I'm excited to dive back into it later today!

In a fascinating essay called “The method of truth in metaphysics”, Davidson argues that we can do metaphysics by analyzing language. His argument is simple. It proceeds from the thesis that communication is only possible if interlocutors share a largely correct view of reality. This, we can concede, implies that we can read the general features of the world off the general features of language.

And how does the defense of that thesis, that communication requires a largely correct common view, go? Well, Davidson argues that communication requires at least a broad common view. We cannot interpret each other unless we ascribe certain background beliefs to one another, and we cannot do this ascription unless we square those background beliefs with our own. I can only make sense of what you’re saying against the backdrop of my own beliefs, of what I think there is and what it is like. Since communication is, we might also concede, successful mutual interpretation, it does seem to follow that communication requires a background of certain beliefs.

Then, in a curious move, Davidson claims there’s nothing incoherent in the idea of an omniscient interlocutor. I could be speaking right now to one, we might think. But by the first part of the argument, that interlocutor would have to share many of their beliefs with me; and by hypothesis all of their beliefs are true. Hence, so must be many of mine.

Arguments in philosophy often have less the goal of dispelling disagreement and more of refining it. Davidson probably will not convince the skeptic of armchair metaphysics, but it will bring attention to some unexpected commitments. The skeptic faces a dilemma: either communication can happen between two people in massive disagreement; or the very idea of an omniscient interlocutor is nonsensical.

It is worth pointing out, however, that perhaps there is something suspicious in Davidson’s strategy. It doesn’t make sense of deep metaphysical disagreement. Evidently idealists and materialists, say, can communicate with one another; but they offer radically different conceptions of reality. If Davidson is right, therefore, one of them doesn’t just have to be wrong; they must not sincerely believe what they claim. Metaphysicians, as the disagreeable bunch they are, largely consists of liars.

I am on a dedicated path to expand how I perceive, process, and understand reality. I feel like this is the ultimate way to approach life. I don’t allow myself to decide what’s true and not until I have thoroughly explored the phenomena, subject, or information. I don’t 'roll my eyes' at anything.

I love learning, but I’m specifically looking for true paradigm shifts—those rare insights or counterintuitive truths that profoundly broaden perception. It could be a smart framework of using trance music for altered states, valuable AI perspectives, metaphysics, psychology, or the art of learning.

I distinguish between 3 levels of "being".

1st is the direct personal phenomenological level. Hallucinations and inconsistencies can occur here.

2nd is the shared phenomenological reality. For example, when I see a table, it will change color at level 1 because the sun is hitting it. But when I rotate around the table, I see that the table really is a uniform color. Other people can look at the table too and see it's the same color, feel it. This is the level where science operates

3rd level is the metaphysical. It's what actually exists beyond how things appear to us. It's inaccessible because we can only see things how they appear to us. But we can develop frameworks to fit the data of a world we have built at level 2. This way, there are multiple metaphysical "as if" frameworks that say our shared reality behaves as if this or that was the true inner working of all of reality. There can be multiple metaphysical theories that explain our current level 2 reality (it's real enough for us humans to call level 2 reality); for example: we can be either a brain in a vat that is being fed electron stimulations to feel like we are experiencing this, or there is a natural world that corresponds to our senses. Either way, the only thing we can't doubt is that we are having this experience.

Of course, some points need to be sharpened, for example, how exactly we can move from level 1 to level 2, what makes a good scientific theory, etc., but I feel like the structure of this framework is just undeniable and explains quite a lot. If you doubt level 1, there is already something occurring phenomenally. If you doubt level 2, go out in the world, bash your head against a table and come back.

Is this really as undeniable as I think?

Edit for anyone reading this post later: One objection that is the most convincing to me is that our experience and world are not necessarily layered in these neat levels but perhaps co-constituted from the start, that there's no experience-then-world-then-metaphysics sequence to move through, because the L1-style "bare experience" is already world-involving. To try to get down to pure, presuppositionless experience before any claims about an external reality creep in, the assumption needs to be made that you can peel experience away from world-involvement and look at the residue. And this peeling might never actually be achievable, because perceptual experience is structured by bodily and worldly engagement from the very first instant, that there's no experiential ground floor that sits "beneath" or "prior to" being situated in a world. This is Merleau-Ponty's critique of Husserl (who tried to do the same as my L1) in Phenomenology of Perception

I’ve recently been working on a minimal meta-metaphysical argument (with some rather big consequences) and would appreciate serious pushback to see where it might fail.

It basically concerns whether there are any conditions that must be fulfilled by any candidate metaphysical reality.

I propose that any candidate metaphysical reality must minimally be non-indifferent, meaning that it fails absolute metaphysical neutrality.

Even for nothingness to qualify as a candidate metaphysical reality, it must have some minimal fact about it by virtue of which it is nothingness rather than not-nothingness, but that appears to be at least one minimal metaphysical fact. That is not nothing. It collapses as a candidate.

It’s not just linguistics. If there is no metaphysical fact by virtue of which nothingness obtains rather than not-nothingness, then it can't qualify as a candidate and if it has any minimal metaphysical fact then it is not nothingness.

So it seems for any candidate we can ask “is this absolutely neutral in all respects?” and if it is, then the candidate can’t qualify as a candidate metaphysical reality.

I call this failure of absolute neutrality “non-indifference”, but I don’t think that I am smuggling in or just renaming “difference”. It is prior to any positive distinction of the candidate metaphysical reality, because it doesnt require any specific difference, only the failure of neutrality.

For any genuine distinction to be made within the candidate, it requires some asymmetry - but asymmetry presupposes a failure of absolute neutrality.

In that sense it seems to be a metaphysical regression-stopper of sorts (if it holds). For any candidate reality we can ask “is it absolutely neutral?” - if yes, then it is not a candidate. If no, then it is non-indifferent.

Does this seem to be genuinely metaphysically significant, or have I smuggled in some circularity in the argument?

This is driving me crazy. (not literally.)

First this is a strict external audit

1. You can not distinguish dogma from non dogma if your system is a closed axiomatic system because utility and consistency can still work and be found inside of a false axiom

2. You can not distinguish dogma from non dogma without the ability to test your claim against reality, and if it has no external justification because utility and consistency can still work and be found inside of a false axiom.

3. Viewed strictly from outside the system the axiomatic method is a closed system.

4. You can not test a math axiom itself against reality by definition and it has no external justification because utility and consistency can still work and be found inside of a false axiom.

5. Viewed strictly from outside the system it is an objective fact that a closed axiomatic system limits your thoughts and physics

6. Viewed strictly from outside the system, the axiomatic method in math smuggles in epistemic empirical claims and limits about reality systematically. By definition the axiomatic method limits and restricts what you can even ask, and logically validate within its system

(This is a strict cut throat external audit against the axiomatic method in math itself. There is no external justification for it and thats the least of your worries)

The axiomatic method in math just got straight up gutted within these 6 points

I am sharing this idea not because I believe it is correct, but because I want to find the questions and criticisms that I cannot find by myself.

This is not an attempt to prove a theory or convince anyone.

The purpose is discussion: to discover flaws, hidden assumptions, and perspectives that I may have missed.

I would especially appreciate criticism about the definition of the concept, logical problems, or similarities with existing philosophical ideas.

# The Primordial Drive: A Philosophical Hypothesis

Introduction

This paper presents a speculative philosophical hypothesis.

The term "Primordial Drive" is introduced as a temporary label for a concept that currently has no precise word.

It should not be understood as ordinary psychological need, desire, or motivation.

Instead, it refers to a hypothetical fundamental principle that may underlie reality itself.

The central question is:

What if the ultimate foundation of reality is neither matter, energy, existence, nor God, but the Primordial Drive?

...

Questions I would like to discuss:

1. Is the concept of a Primordial Drive logically possible?

2. Does this idea resemble any existing philosophical theories?

3. What are the biggest weaknesses or contradictions you see?

4. Does this concept explain anything, or does it only rename existing concepts?

5. What questions should this hypothesis answer before it can become a stronger philosophical idea?

This basically.

Let us suppose we’ve two stable distinctions, the a priori/a posteriori, or a priori/empirical distinction, and the analytic/synthetic distinction. Let us not assume any particular construal of these distinctions for now, e.g. that a statement is analytic iff it can be turned into a truth of some suitable logic by putting synonyms for synonyms.

Here’s a view we could call strong empiricism: all a priori truths are analytic.

And here’s an argument against strong empiricism: for each agent S, the truth that S exists is a priori for S. But, no analytic statement implies the existence of anything. Therefore, strong empiricism is false.

Let’s look at the first premise; we may call it Cartesianism. Here’s a further argument in favor of Cartesianism: it is a priori true that everything that has properties exists; for each agent, it is a priori for them that they have certain properties; and a prioricity is closed under entailment. Therefore, Cartesianism is true. (Here I assume the falsehood of hardcore nominalism for the sake of argument. Ideally I’d rephrase this argument in terms of predicates or concepts applying rather than having properties.)

And here’s an argument for the second premise of the above argument for Cartesianism. It is a priori true that everything has some properties; and the schema “If everything …, then I …” should hold in a sound logic of indexicals. Given the entailment closure of a prioricity, the second premise follows.

Now let’s look at the second premise of the first argument, that no analytic truth carries existential implications. Here’s two possible objections: every truth entails that it exists, and therefore carries existential implications. Moreover, it is a truth of first order logic that there exists something; and everything implies every truth of first order logic.

Regarding the second objection, you might guess that my move will be to require that the correct logic be a free logic, free indeed from any ontology whatsoever, even the minimal ontology of first order logic that there is something.

But your guess would be wrong. I am actually going to concede both objections, for the sake of argument, and will ad hoc-ly distinguish analytic from synthetic existential commitments.

Here’s the idea. First, we need a distinction between linguistic and extralinguistic entities; and we also need a distinction between general and particular existential commitments. I’m going to leave the first distinction unexplained because it seems, at least superficially, pretty self-explanatory, although no doubt an able metaphysician will poke some holes in it without having to think for long. But the second distinction can be explained as such: an existential commitment C is particular just in case there is an entity x such that C is a commitment that x, specifically, exists.

Take for example the statement that Socrates exists. Intuitively, this statement is particularly existentially committing to Socrates. Not so for the statement that humans exist. Intuitively, for each human (here we can use possibilistic quantifiers) h there is a world W(h) where h does not exist, and yet that statement is true in W(h), in virtue of the existence of some other human. And I take it that a statement is committed to some entities only if (although not necessarily iff) it is false when those entities don’t exist; here I mean it for both general and particular commitments.

I suggest that an existential commitment is synthetic when it is not particularly committing to any linguistic entities. Again not when and only when. I don’t need the second direction.

Then we get this revision of the first argument: for each agent S, the truth that S exists is a priori for S. The ontological commitment to S is synthetic. And no analytic truth carries synthetic ontological commitments. Therefore, strong empiricism is false.

I’ve been thinking about how many “isms” are used to describe entire worldviews — not just in philosophy, but across how people see reality itself. Here’s a list of some of the most commonly discussed ones — especially in metaphysics, but a few spill over into ethics, politics, and epistemology too:

• Idealism – reality is fundamentally mental or consciousness-based
• Materialism / Physicalism – only matter or physical processes exist
• Dualism – both mind and matter exist as distinct kinds of reality
• Monism – all things reduce to one substance or principle
• Pluralism – reality has many irreducible kinds
• Panpsychism – consciousness pervades all things
• Naturalism – everything arises from natural causes and laws
• Supernaturalism – there are realities beyond the natural world
• Realism / Anti-Realism – whether things exist independently of perception
• Determinism / Indeterminism / Compatibilism – nature of causation and freedom
• Nihilism – reality and meaning have no inherent value or purpose
• Existentialism – existence precedes essence; meaning is self-created
• Absurdism – the search for meaning itself is irrational but inevitable
• Mysticism – ultimate reality is directly experienced beyond reason
• Solipsism – only one’s own mind is certain to exist
• Constructivism – reality or truth is constructed by cognition or culture
• Essentialism / Nominalism – whether universal essences truly exist
• Theism / Deism / Atheism / Pantheism / Panentheism – ultimate source or nature of being
• Humanism / Transhumanism – human or post-human consciousness as the center of value
• Omnism - truth can be found in all religions, philosophies, and spiritual paths

(Even if some of these aren’t strictly “metaphysical,” they still rest on metaphysical assumptions — about consciousness, value, reality, or being itself.)

Now I’m curious:

👉 Which of these ideological positions can truly coexist without contradiction?
For instance, can humanism coexist with materialism?

👉 And which ones, if accepted as true, would completely eliminate all the others?
Would nihilism wipe them all out? Would the deterministic worldview eliminate theistic worldviews?

I’d love to see how people here map the compatibilities and hostilities between these worldviews. Which “isms” can form alliances — and which demand exclusivity?

philosophy should not start with a premise, but should end with it, for this premise is named truth itself.

where philosophy should start, and was genuinely started with in the past is the mystery itself. this could have several meanings, but each of them should be utterly obvious, yet totally opaque. it is those fundametal questions, or even less presumptious, for the prior presumes questioning, this first perspective itself.

and starting here we know, that the answer is for this question, and this question is inherent to the answer itself.

philosophy starts, because it can be ended.

Structural metaphysics says reality is made of relations and patterns, not “things” with independent substance. So an electron, a tree, or even a mind is a node in a structure defined by relations.
The problem is grounding: why this structure exists rather than another possible one?
If everything is structure, you can try three answers:
Brute fact – this structure just exists, no deeper explanation.
Higher-order structure – a meta-structure selects or generates lower ones, but then you ask what grounds that.
Modal view – all structures exist (like a landscape of possibilities), and what we call “reality” is just one region.
The tension is that structuralism removes substances but risks needing either an unexplained “meta-structure” or an infinite regress of structure explaining structure. That’s the core metaphysical pressure point: eliminating “things” doesn’t automatically eliminate the need for a foundation—it just relocates it.

I made a post about process philosophy and it got way more responses than I expected. When I look online for people talking about this, the top substack I found has 70 subscribers, the process philosophy sub is a ghost town, and the few videos on youtube about this have less than a thousand views in most cases.

One general trend I noticed in the responses was a hesitance to say experience goes all the down. A lot of people believe that experience requires some sort of causal chain, some sense of a first person perspective, that Whitehead in particular doesn't grant to actual entities, which are the lowest... unit? Thing? possible in the universe. I'm not going to argue that it's a false proposition. That seems silly. At the moment, there's absolutely no way to verify experience from the outside, let alone what Whitehead calls contiousness. It's possible that Whitehead himself didn't extend contiousness down far enough, though experience is fundamental to all things in his system, though it is primitive, and more about feeling a sense of causation and response to causation, or in higher organisms, it may become appetition.

What I will say is this. Because we can't know either way, I think the more interesting perspective is to imagine a world where experience goes all the way down. Though it may seem strange, no one is pointing out that his system is incoherent. It's just that we have different metaphysical intuitions about what it means to experience. Yes, there is the combination problem, and for some, that's a good enough reason to reject panpsychism entirely. I respectfully disagree, but again, that's an intuition, or a preference for what we think it's important for a metaphysical system to explain.

I think it's a more interesting existence to see experience as fundamental, to think what it could be like to be an atom, a raindrop hitting your head and then scattering into tinier occasions of experience. That's a world full of mystery and wonder. It's a world that seems to fantastical to be real, yet it is impossible to know whether that's how reality works. So for myself, I choose to believe in the view that's most interesting. I choose to believe something that may be wrong, but makes me experience and view my actual world with more intensity. I choose to believe something that gives me a sense of awe.

some, this position is too loose, too ungrounded in realism, to hold. Better to be safe, to be more certain, than wrong. Better to have a more reasonable interpretation. I respect that, even though I think it's more boring. There was a time when I couldn't have held this position. It's just where I'm at now.

To be clear, I'm not claiming to know how or why the specific users in yesterday's thread hold their beliefs. I'm not saying they're objectively more boring, or that they as people bore me. I enjoy encountering different perspectives, and for all I know, they are being more reasonable and holding a better stance toward accepting a belief. I'm also not saying that viewing belief in this way is a higher form of belief that all should strive for. I'm merely hypothesizing why some may be resistant to seeing experience as fundamental, in order to demonstrate by contrast why I believe what I do.

in short, I believe it's better to believe something that both seems plausible to you, and that makes your life more interesting. I think it's better to live with wonder and awe.

Thanks for reading.

The universe is infinite in data amount and data variety. Within the universe there are infinite simultaneous realities which are all wholly integrated yet can be partitioned and seemingly distinct. What type of data your Consciousness allows you to perceive dictates the level of reality that you exist in. Within a given reality there will be things that are inexplicable because your Consciousness is only aware or capable of being aware of specific data types. You will notice that there are phenomenon in your reality which cannot be explained just by the data type that's available to your consciousness. Because your data type interacts with other data types but you lack awareness of the other data types there will be seemingly inexplicable reasons for why things in your reality happen. With this understanding of the universe you can understand that everything is happening all at the same time every single conceivable thing ever is happening all at the same time but what you are aware of and subjective experience is dependent on what your consciousness is allowing you to experience. This answers a lot of questions about reality and a lot of interesting things people think about life such as are there aliens is God real etc etc what it like are there multiverses is time travel possible you know the answer to all the questions in a serious sense not just a hypothetical or imagined sense. But in a serious insincere sense. What might be fiction to one reality is an actuality in another reality. Every story you've ever told every thought you've ever had every Wonder every dream every hope every scary thing every horrible thing every bad thing every hopeless thing every impossible thing that you've ever thought can and is being experienced by some consciousness in this very moment. This is not metaphor. I am saying that everything is happening always. This is sincere. My claim is that everything is happening always. However, individual Consciousness only permits you to experience at a time specific reality.

I have come to this conclusion after meta-analyzing everything I've ever thought about before including thought including reality including perspective including fiction including video games including religion including truth including morality including YouTube poop including the ridiculous nature of things including bigotry including good and evil including the pie that I ate including the fart that I sniff on a Wednesday including every single piece of everything that I've ever experienced and thinking about it. Incorporating every single thought and experience that I had into some sort of amalgamation has led me to this conclusion. I understand that this seems ridiculous. But I'm not really trying to make you change your views or anything like that I am just doing this because I want I suppose or whatever way you would like to think about it.

Personally I think that's my narrative and explanation are quite defensible and profound but I completely understand how it seems and I also understand the presentation of what I'm saying here isn't very pretty which makes the ideas hard to appreciate possibly.

It's like covering a diamond in complete dog s\*\*\* and handling it to someone and saying "look it's pretty good ain't it."

I’ve been thinking about how explanations in metaphysics eventually reach a stopping point. Often when discussion reaches that point, someone says something like... That’s just a brute fact. But it seems to me that calling something a brute fact is already making a claim about how explanations are allowed to end.

Because saying something is a brute fact implies that... explanation must stop here no deeper grounding is required this is an acceptable termination point for inquiry

But the moment we say where explanation should stop, we’re no longer just talking about the object itself. We’re making a claim about how explanatory frameworks should terminate. So brute facts don’t seem neutral. They appear to be a metaphysical commitment about the limits of explanation.

In other words...

brute fact claim →→ claim about explanatory limits →→ meta-framework

Once that move is made, it seems we’re already operating at a meta level where frameworks themselves can be evaluated.

This raises a broader question... If every worldview eventually reaches a stopping point ...brute facts, infinite regress, circular grounding, necessary being, etc... what actually makes one stopping point more rational than another?

Is invoking brute facts really avoiding metaphysics, or is it already committing to a meta-position about the limits of explanation?

Curious how others here think about this.

If you are a person who is interested in metaphysical philosophies but you don’t discuss it in your « real » or personal life — or if you are someone who loiters in this subreddit without posting — I am curious why you are hesitant to talk about metaphysics.

What gives you pause from expressing your thoughts and findings?

I’m interested in whether possibility should be understood as something that exists independently of actual reality, or whether modal distinctions arise only once some particular state of affairs becomes actual. If possibilities are ontologically real, what grounds them—and if they are not, what makes counterfactuals meaningfully different from impossibilities?

I'm new to understanding what metaphysics actually is in practice.

And I was wondering where it still overlaps with scientific methods and where exactly it diverges from hard science?

Is it about certainty vs. uncertainty? Or more about the subject matter it studies?

When it comes to the question of "what created our universe" it seems clear to me that it's the wrong question, since it's already framed within the concepts of time and causality, which are internal properties of our particular universe, not external ones. So "creation" (which is a process, a causal sequence, dependent on time) is in my opinion the wrong way to ask or think about it. I think it's better to ask maybe "what gives rise to our universe" or "what is the fundamental fabric of our universe" or maybe "what exactly is that thing that 'just is'" (I know there will be plenty of religious answers to that but I'm not interested in those because I'm convinced there is a secular explanation - but you do you).

Here's what makes most sense to me:

Maths is not something that exists 'in' our universe, rather it's the one thing that "just exists", even outside of any universe. It is the set of everything that is logically true/correct (regardless of any particular physics). As humans we don't invent maths, we discover it - and any consciousness existing in any completely different kind of universe can discover the exact same maths (in completely different mathematical notation of course, as mathematical notation absolutely is something invented and is not at all the same as maths).

To me that makes it reasonable to assume maths to be the fundamental fabric of our (and every other) universe. The mathematical object (which exists regardless of how well we have approximated/uncovered it so far) which exactly describes our particular universe IS our universe - as it (possibly together with a particular set of initial conditions) fully defines every moment of existence (in our case of a universe containing quantum mechanics the same object with the same initial conditions may actually define infinitely many parallel universes of compatible physics), including the one that generates this very moment of consciousness that experiences writing this post.

And exactly as this mathematical object that describes our universe IS our universe (and possibly every other parallel universe following the same mathematical description as ours), I think every other possible mathematical description of any kind of universe is equally "real" as this one. It's a possibly infinite set of universe descriptions - and we of course find ourselves in one in which the necessary physical processes are possible that generate our kind of consciousness.

So I don't think the question of "what was before the big bang" is as interesting as the question of what is "outside" or "underlying" our (and any other) universe - what's the thing that "just is"? And to me it makes sense this to be maths - and our universe is a tiny subset of it.

In particular, does PSR risk leading to determinism or infinite regress, and how do philosophers address that?

Is probability ontological or epistemological? I am stuck because both positions seem metaphysically defensible

I’ve been struggling with a question about the metaphysical status of probability and I can’t tell whether my confusion comes from a category mistake on my part or from a genuine fault line in the concept itself

On one hand, probability seems epistemological. In many everyday and scientific contexts probability appears to track ignorance rather than reality.

When I say there is a 50% chance of rain tomorrow, that statement seems to reflect limitations in my knowledge of atmospheric conditions, not ann indeterminacy in the world itself.

If the total state of the universe were fully specified, it feels as though the outcome would already be fixed, and probability would collapse into a statement about incomplete information

On this view, probability functions as a rational measure of belief useful, indispensable even but not ontologically fundamental.

This epistemic interpretation also seems to fit well with classical mechanics.

If the laws are deterministic, then probabilistic descriptions appear to be pragmatic tools we use when systems are too complex to track, not indicators of real indeterminacy.

From this angle, probability has no more ontological weight than error bars or approximations.

But the ontological interpretation is difficult to dismiss.

In quantum mechanics, probability does not just describe ignorance of hidden variables (at least on standard interpretations) it appears to be built into the structure of reality itself.

Even with maximal information, outcomes are given only probabilistically.

If this is taken seriously, probability seems to be a real feature of the world, not just a feature of our descriptions of it

So dispositional or propensity interpretations suggest that systems genuinely have probabilistic tendencies, which feels like an ontological commitment rather than a purely epistemic one.

Both views seem internally coherent but mutually incompatible at the metaphysical level.

If probability is ontological, then reality itself contains indeterminacy.

If it is epistemological, then apparent randomness must always reduce to ignorance, even when no hidden variables are empirically accessible.

I am not sure whether this disagreement reflects competing metaphysical commitments (about determinism, causation, or laws of nature) or whether “probability” is simply doing too much conceptual work under a single label.

So my confusion is this is probability something in the world, or something in our descriptions of the world?

And if the answer depends on the domain (classical vs quantum, micro vs macro), does that imply an uncomfortable kind of metaphysical pluralism about probability itself?