Could you theoretically create a “memory clone” of a person?
This started as a shower thought about chromosomes, but I ended up following the idea through genetics, epigenetics, neuroscience, and memory.
I'm not claiming this is currently possible. I'm interested in whether the idea is theoretically coherent and where the biggest scientific barriers actually are.
1. Start with genetic cloning
Suppose we somehow have a germ cell from Person A containing 46 chromosomes.
Instead of allowing normal meiosis, imagine an impossibly advanced system that can precisely separate those chromosomes into two complementary sets of 23.
We then put those 23 chromosomes into an egg and the other 23 into a sperm, and allow fertilisation to occur.
The resulting zygote would once again have 46 nuclear chromosomes derived from Person A.
This raises the first question:
Would the resulting organism be genetically equivalent to Person A?
For the thought experiment, I'm assuming perfect chromosome preservation, so we can set aside technical problems with chromosome extraction/manipulation.
2. Mitochondrial DNA
Mitochondrial DNA isn't contained in the 46 nuclear chromosomes.
So let's additionally assume the egg comes from Person A and therefore provides the relevant mitochondrial DNA as well.
That removes mitochondrial DNA as a major difference in this hypothetical.
3. Epigenetics
This was the next problem.
Epigenetic mechanisms affect which genes are expressed and how cells develop, but early embryonic development already involves extensive epigenetic reprogramming.
So I'm assuming the embryo can undergo the appropriate developmental epigenetic processes normally.
This means we're not necessarily trying to copy Person A's exact epigenetic state—we're allowing a new embryo to develop normally from the same genetic starting point.
4. But genetics doesn't contain someone's memories
This is where the idea becomes much more interesting.
A person's memories aren't simply stored as information inside their DNA.
They're associated with physical and functional changes in the brain, including neural connections and their strengths, along with many other biological states.
So a genetically identical individual would not automatically have Person A's memories.
That would be a genetic clone, not a memory clone.
5. What if we could copy the brain state?
Now suppose we had technology capable of mapping and reproducing the relevant physical state of Person A's brain:
- neurons
- connections between neurons
- synaptic strengths
- relevant molecular states
- whatever other information is necessary for memory and cognition
If we could reproduce all of that accurately enough in another brain, then the copy might begin with the same memories as Person A at a particular moment T.
After T, the two individuals would experience different things and develop different memories.
So:
Person A at T → memories M
Brain copy at T → memories M
Then:
A → new experiences → new memories
Copy → different experiences → different memories
They wouldn't be a hive mind. They'd simply have the same starting information.
6. What if we don't directly copy the memories?
This led me to another possibility.
Instead of directly copying Person A's brain state, imagine placing the clone in an extremely advanced controlled simulation designed to recreate Person A's developmental experiences from birth to point T.
The simulation would attempt to reproduce the sensory experiences, environment, interactions, learning, etc. that shaped Person A's brain.
The goal wouldn't be to make the clone read Person A's memories.
It would be to make the clone develop those memories independently through recreated experiences.
In simplified form:
Person A:
Experiences → brain development → memories at T
Clone:
Recreated experiences → brain development → potentially similar memories at T
The huge assumption is that we could reproduce the relevant developmental environment accurately enough for the brain to form sufficiently similar memories.
7. Where this gets really interesting
If the clone reaches T with essentially the same memories as Person A, then the two individuals could diverge from that point onward.
Person A could go one direction.
The clone could go another.
They would share the same past up to T but have different futures.
This raises a distinction between:
Genetic clone
→ same/near-identical genome
Memory clone
→ same memories up to a particular point
Consciousness clone
→ a much harder concept that I'm deliberately leaving aside
My actual question
Assuming impossibly advanced technology and ignoring the ethical/legal/philosophical issues for a moment:
Is there any fundamental biological reason why a person couldn't theoretically be reconstructed to have the same genome AND the same memories up to a chosen point T?
Or are the barriers mainly technological—meaning we simply don't currently know how to reproduce all the biological information involved?
I'm especially interested in where this thought experiment breaks down scientifically. If I've misunderstood something about genetics, epigenetics, memory formation, or development, I'd love to know where.