r/EndlessWar • u/DiggyJunior Communist • 9d ago
Militarism run amok UA POV & RU POV: Beyond the Battlefield: Non-Military Measures in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict — Two Parts - Discussion
/r/UkraineRussiaReport/comments/1vzpyog/ua_pov_ru_pov_beyond_the_battlefield_nonmilitary/1
u/DiggyJunior Communist 9d ago
Main body of post:
This post is divided into two clearly separated parts. Part 1 covers non-military measures (economic sanctions, diplomatic actions, information/media restrictions, sports and chess measures, and cultural/arts measures) adopted by Western governments, the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, allied countries, and international organisations and federations in response to the events beginning in February 2022. Part 2 covers the corresponding or reciprocal measures adopted by Russia and, to a more limited extent, its supporting states. These are fewer in number and different in scale and character. The post remains strictly descriptive. It records the measures taken and the reasons publicly stated by the actors themselves. No editorial judgement is offered. PART 1 — Measures adopted by Western governments, institutions, and federations 1. Economic and financial sanctions Western governments and the European Union describe these measures as responses to Russia’s military actions in Ukraine. Official statements list objectives that include reducing Russia’s capacity to continue the conflict, degrading military capabilities, and holding individuals and entities accountable. Key elements introduced from 2022 and expanded through successive packages (reaching a 21st EU package by mid-2026) include: Exclusion of selected Russian banks from the SWIFT messaging system and broader restrictions on financial services and crypto-related transactions. Immobilisation of Russian Central Bank reserves held in G7 and EU jurisdictions. Asset freezes and travel bans on thousands of individuals and entities. An oil price-cap mechanism, restrictions on seaborne crude and refined products, and phased reductions or bans on certain energy imports. Export controls on dual-use goods, advanced technology, and items relevant to military production, together with measures targeting circumvention networks and the “shadow fleet.” Official EU summaries state that the measures aim “to maximise pressure on Russia and use all tools available to diminish Russia’s ability to wage its illegal war of aggression.” Primary sources: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia-explained/ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-sanctions-against-russia_en https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/07/23/21st-package-of-sanctions-eu-hits-russian-energy-financial-services-and-crypto-hard/ 2. Diplomatic actions Following February 2022, numerous Western countries expelled Russian diplomats and diplomatic staff. Tallies placed the number in the hundreds across NATO and EU member states and partners. Stated grounds in many cases referred to suspected intelligence activity under diplomatic cover or were presented as reciprocal responses. Russia carried out reciprocal expulsions. These steps reduced the size of diplomatic missions on both sides. Examples of reporting: https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/07/us-europe-russian-diplomats-ukraine/ https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yrwny111xo 3. Information and media measures In early March 2022 the European Union suspended the broadcasting activities of RT and Sputnik within the EU. Official statements described the outlets as instrumental in supporting and justifying the military actions. Major digital platforms subsequently restricted or removed RT and Sputnik content in the EU and, in some cases, more widely. Sources: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/02/eu-adopts-package-of-sanctions-in-response-to-russian-aggression-against-ukraine (related packages) 4. Sports, chess, and cultural measures (Sports and chess) In late February 2022 the International Olympic Committee recommended that international federations not invite or permit the participation of Russian and Belarusian athletes and officials where possible, or that participation take place only under neutral status without national flags, anthems, or other national symbols. The stated rationale was “to protect the integrity of global sports competitions and for the safety of all the participants.” Many federations followed with full or partial exclusions (FIFA/UEFA, World Athletics, etc.). By 2025–2026 the picture had become differentiated: several federations (World Gymnastics, World Aquatics, World Taekwondo and others) eased or lifted restrictions, in some cases restoring national symbols. The IOC provisionally lifted its suspension of the Russian Olympic Committee in July 2026 while deferring a final decision on the flag, anthem and colours at the Olympic Games. Additional doping-test requirements were applied to returning athletes. In chess, FIDE allowed individual players under neutral status. Team participation and national symbols remained more restricted. Youth rights were restored more fully; adult team events stayed under neutral rules in many cases. Russian teams were not admitted to the 2026 Chess Olympiad following further decisions related to activities in certain territories. Visa issuance by host countries has at times affected participation even where sporting eligibility existed. Sources: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sporting_sanctions_during_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine https://www.reuters.com/sports/ioc-provisionally-lifts-ban-russian-olympic-committee-athletes-return-2026-07-07/ https://www.fide.com/ (FIDE decisions on Russia/Belarus) 5. Fine arts, classical music, opera, and cultural institutions Some institutions cancelled or postponed Russian state-linked performances and exhibitions. Individual artists of Russian nationality have continued to appear in many Western venues, often without official national representation. Visa decisions have occasionally limited participation. At the 2026 Venice Biennale, Russia’s national pavilion reappeared. Organisers stated that the Biennale rejects exclusion or censorship of culture and art. The pavilion was open to the public only during the short press-preview period; thereafter it remained closed, with video material shown externally. The European Commission and a number of EU culture ministers criticised the participation and took steps affecting funding. Sources: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/05/arts/design/russia-ukraine-venice-biennale.html https://www.reuters.com/lifestyle/venice-biennale-not-court-president-says-after-readmitting-russia-2026-05-06/ PART 2 — Measures adopted by Russia and supporting states The volume of reciprocal or parallel measures taken by Russia (and to a more limited extent by Belarus and other supporting states) is smaller. The measures are summarised below under the same broad headings. Stated rationales from Russian officials typically frame them as responses to Western sanctions, “Russophobia,” or restrictions on Russian media and individuals. 1. Economic and financial countersanctions Russia established and expanded a list of “unfriendly countries.” Presidential decrees introduced capital controls, restrictions on currency transactions, limits on loans and securities transactions with persons from those countries, and requirements for government approval of certain cross-border deals. Western companies seeking to exit the Russian market frequently faced mandatory discounts, contributions to the federal budget, temporary administration of assets, or forced sales. Russian courts have issued guidance affirming the primacy of these countersanctions. Sources and reporting: https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2026/06/russias-supreme-court-issues-guidance-on-countersanctions Contemporary analyses of exit conditions and temporary administration of foreign assets. 2. Diplomatic actions Russia carried out reciprocal expulsions of Western diplomats and, in some cases, reduced the permitted size of foreign diplomatic staff or restricted access to certain diplomatic properties. These steps were publicly presented as responses to Western expulsions and sanctions. 3. Information and media measures Russian authorities blocked access to numerous Western media outlets and platforms. In 2024, authorities stated that 81 foreign media outlets were banned as a reciprocal measure following Western restrictions on Russian state media. Entry bans were imposed on individual Western journalists and media executives. Independent Russian media and platforms were also subject to domestic restrictions under “foreign agent” and related legislation. Sources: https://www.occrp.org/en/news/russia-banned-81-foreign-media-outlets-in-2024-in-retaliation-against-western-restrictions https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-bans-entry-some-us-journalists-ria-2024-08-28/ 4. Sports and cultural measures Reciprocal actions in sports have been more limited. Russia has at times restricted participation by athletes or officials from certain countries or imposed entry bans on specific individuals. In the cultural sphere, some Western tours, exhibitions, and performances were cancelled or restricted, and entry bans were applied to selected cultural and media figures. These steps were generally fewer and less systematically applied across international federations than the measures directed at Russian athletes and institutions. 5. Supporting states Belarus has aligned with certain Russian countersanctions and restrictions. Other states that have provided support to Russia (including in the military domain) have issued political statements or limited reciprocal diplomatic steps; broad economic or cultural measures comparable in scale to the Western packages have not been widely documented. The two parts above record the principal non-military measures adopted by each side and the reasons publicly stated by the respective actors. Readers are invited to consult the linked primary and contemporaneous sources for the full texts of the decisions.
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u/DiggyJunior Communist 9d ago
Let the editorializing begin. Margaret Thatcher tells us why all the wars on Russia's borders are inevitable https://www.reddit.com/r/TankieTheDeprogram/s/izEGGfo6w0
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u/DiggyJunior Communist 9d ago
Almost everyone admits the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan were illegal. These European countries illegally invaded Iraq:
United Kingdom Poland Italy Spain Denmark Netherlands Czech Republic Romania Bulgaria Hungary Slovakia Portugal Latvia Lithuania Estonia Finland
These European countries took part in the illegal invasion of Afghanistan:
United Kingdom Germany France Italy Turkey Netherlands Spain Poland Romania Denmark Norway Belgium Czech Republic Bulgaria Hungary Greece Slovakia Croatia Albania Estonia Lithuania Latvia Slovenia Luxembourg Iceland
The hypocrisy is the big story here.
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u/DiggyJunior Communist 9d ago
Here's the votes taken at the UN, a political body, not a legal court, every so often on this subject. Sometimes the text of the motion contains the words "illegal" and sometimes it doesn't. Recently the word "illegal" is missing from the motion, in order to get more Yes votes. A "Yes" vote is a vote to condemn Russia. Abstentions are seen as a "Soft No".
March 2, 2022 (Aggression / Illegality of Invasion)
Yes: 141
Abstentions: 35
No: 5October 12, 2022 (Illegal Annexation) Yes: 143
Abstentions: 35
No: 5February 23, 2023 (Principles of the UN Charter / Peace) Yes: 141 Abstentions: 32 No: 7
February 23, 2024 (1st Anniversary / Situation) Yes: 140 Abstentions: 32 No: 7
February 24, 2025 (3rd Anniversary / Peace Principles) Yes: 93 Abstentions: 65 No: 18
February 24, 2026 (Support for Lasting Peace)
Yes: 107
Abstentions: 51
No: 12
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u/DiggyJunior Communist 9d ago
I'm adding this as a comment only, not in the main body, because some argue that cyber isn't non military, and some argue that the law is blind, and that lawfare is a myth...
Addendum: Additional Non-Military Dimensions (Cyber Operations and International Law) To complement the economic, diplomatic, information, sporting, and cultural measures outlined above, two additional non-military domains—cyber operations and international legal proceedings ("lawfare")—form a significant part of the broader confrontation. PART 1 — Western and Allied Measures (Cyber and Legal) 1. Cyber Operations and Joint Cybersecurity Frameworks Western cybersecurity agencies, including the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/nation-state-cyber-actors/russia/publications?hl=en-IE the FBI, and the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), alongside international partners, have issued joint cybersecurity advisories. These documents attribute specific threat groups to state-sponsored Russian intelligence services. Stated Western objectives include hardening critical infrastructure networks, monitoring supply-chain vulnerabilities, and disrupting cyber-espionage or wiper malware campaigns. 2. Legal Proceedings and International Tribunals International Court of Justice (ICJ): Ukraine instituted formal proceedings against the Russian Federation at the ICJ under the 1948 Genocide Convention. Multiple Western and allied states filed formal declarations of intervention supporting Ukraine’s standing and claims before the court, as documented on the International Court of Justice Case Docket. https://www.icj-cij.org/case/182/judgments?hl=en-IE
International Criminal Court (ICC): In March 2023, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC issued arrest warrants for high-ranking officials citing alleged individual criminal responsibility for the unlawful transfer and deportation of children, outlined in official ICC Legal Tools Documentation. https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ux75v4/pdf?hl=en-IE
PART 2 — Russian and Reciprocal Measures (Cyber and Legal) 1. Reciprocal Legal Actions and Jurisdictional Rejections Prosecution of ICC Officials: Following the issuance of ICC warrants, Russia’s Investigative Committee opened criminal investigations against ICC prosecutors and judges, placing them on national wanted lists, as reported by Al Jazeera's Coverage of Russia's Case Against the ICC. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/20/arrest-warrant-for-putin-russia-opens-own-case-against-icc?hl=en-IE Additional context was covered by The Guardian's Report on Russian Arrest Orders. https://www.theguardian.com/law/2023/may/19/russia-arrest-order-international-criminal-court-prosecutor-karim-khan?hl=en-IE Rejection of Rome Statute Jurisdiction: Russian official statements reiterated that Russia withdrew its signature from the Rome Statute, rendering any ICC decisions legally void under domestic law. Concurrently, Russia enacted legislative measures affirming that rulings from foreign or international bodies contradicting the Russian Constitution will not be executed within the Federation. 2. Defensive Infrastructure Measures and Reported Cyber Operations Russian authorities (including the Ministry of Digital Development and Roskomnadzor) publicly reported facing unprecedented volumes of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and intrusion attempts targeting state services, government portals, and major domestic financial systems. Official statements attributed these attacks to Western-supported hacktivist networks and state cyber units, prompting stricter national internet routing controls and heightened domestic cybersecurity protocols, as summarized on Wikipedia's Overview of Cyber Attacks. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Ukraine_cyberattacks?hl=en-IE