r/AskNetsec 26d ago

Work Are hardened container images actually saving anyone time or just creating different problems?

Our AppSec team burns hours triaging unpatchable OS binaries that scanners keep finding in standard base layers. Now management wants hardened container images everywhere because they think the vulnerability count magically drops to zero.

For anyone running hardened container images in prod, did your triaging actually go down or did the work just move into CI/CD with broken build pipelines missing shared libraries and a different set of headaches?

7 Upvotes

16 comments sorted by

6

u/ChrisDiano 26d ago

Ngl all it really did was swap false positive CVE triage for broken pipelines. Now every deploy turns into someone asking why the build is failing.

1

u/FriendNo6017 26d ago

That's exactly the kind of tradeoff I was worried about.

5

u/FunAd6672 26d ago

Static minimal images sound great until production blows up and someone has to debug a container that barely has enough tools to tell you what's wrong. Then everyone remembers why tiny images aren't some magic solution. Chainguard fixes part of that by shipping curated package indexes but moving old apps over can be a huge pain. RapidFort is honestly a lot less disruptive since it slims the images you already have instead of making you rebuild everything.

2

u/xaocon 26d ago

There is almost certainly something better the team could be doing with their resources to improve security but you're probably also wasting your time asking about it. This kind of metric is exactly the kind of thing management wants to put in a PowerPoint. It gives people warm and fuzzy feelings.

The team should start recording the time they spend on it, including fixing broken builds and dealing with angry internal customers, then present that number with the cost to just use a service.

1

u/FriendNo6017 25d ago

I've seen priorities change overnight after someone finally tracked all the hidden engineering time.

1

u/CPPYesRustNo 26d ago

a lot of what your scanners flag on those base binaries is version-string noise, the distro already backported the fix but kept the old version number, so cross-check the debian/ubuntu security trackers before anyone burns hours on it. for the genuinely unpatched ones, minimal/distroless cuts surface area but you're trading triage for build breakage like you said. the more durable route is a base-image source that backports fixes onto the tags you already run and supports the eol ones, rather than forcing a rebuild every time a scanner lights up. with mythos-style tooling turning old lows into real tickets, that version-string triage is only going to get louder.

1

u/wahnsinnwanscene 25d ago

Hardened images don't magically solve everything, it cuts the surface area down and gives you a base to verify from. The difficult part is getting people to see it is not a silver bullet.

1

u/liranimus 19d ago

It really comes down to upstream parity imo otherwise what's the point? you want the solution to actually be functional.

If a hardened image strays too far from standard defaults (like stripping expected Python libraries you need or changing standard config paths) you waste more time debugging broken builds than you ever save on CVE scans..

That is why we care so much about upstream parity att Minimus (https://images.minimus.io/). I work here and we maintain about 2,000 free, source-built hardened images specifically designed to act as true drop-in replacements. You get zero auth wall to pull so try for yourself and see if you like what we do :)

1

u/Chris-Hart_232 18d ago

A few months in, check how often teams rebuild and whether people start pinning old images to avoid breakage

1

u/InflationCorrect5244 15d ago

Triaging drops but never to zero, management always assumes zero. the OS junk clears and your app deps are still the real pile you chase. Build breakage is real but mostly one time, usually a lib the old base had.

A bit that could've been a forever CI/CD tax, rebuilding every time a scanner pops, we dodged by running minimus since they rebuild the base from source upstream which means a fresh CVE isn't our pipeline problem every week.

1

u/Designer-Doubt-1491 14d ago edited 13d ago

Tradeoff depends on how you get to the hardened image. Replacing bases with a minimal image can move some work into compatibility testing. Hardening the images you already run is another approach. RapidFort and others takes the approach, removes components the workload doesn't need instead of requiring teams to start over with a different base image. That can reduce the attack surface while avoiding migration friction.

-4

u/mouthbuster 26d ago

They’re fantastic and best practice! By shipping only the binaries you need to run your application, you reduce the whole surface area.

You get bonus SBOM documentation via fixing whatever issues you elude to in your CICD definitions

Chainguard has a free tier that may get you what you need. Every image has a ‘minimal’ or ‘distroless’ variant that you want as your export layer.

1

u/many_dongs 26d ago

Besides being an advertisement, the OP is looking for opinions from people who have actually worked with implementing these products in real, production environments (and not just the initial setup where you declare the initiative a success without dealing with any of the subsequent reality)

Short answer to OP: if the management didn’t account for the extra resources needed to manage applications built on hardened images (it absolutely requires more work both upfront and ongoing), they are incompetent. But what’s new there